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This thesis examines the ways in which the Liberal Party - the Natal Division in particular-
attempted to become an effective political force in South Africa. The Party was fanned in May
1953 as a non-racial political party. Initially, it concentrated on working among the white
electorate, and on achieving political change through parliamentary means. The Party gradually
shifted its attention to the voteless black majority, and took its active opposition beyond the
boundaries of parliamentary politics. Members of the Natal Division played a leading role in
this shift. The party gave expression to a distinctive strand of radica1liberalism, within a
broader spectrum of South African liberalism. The Party was unsuccessful in preventing the
entrenchment of the apartheid policies it so vehemently opposed. However, the Natal LP
succeeded in developing a good working relationship with Congress Alliance, especially the
African National Congress, in the region, in attracting a large number of black members
through its grass-roots involvement, and in keeping liberal principles and priorities in the public
eye in inauspicious circumstances. From 1960, Party leaders attracted increasing government
persecution for their anti-apartheid activism. The Party deserves more attention than is
commonly given to it in the South African historiography of resistance politics. The Liberal
Party's continued existence as a non-racial political party was rendered impossible by




ANC African National Congress
APC Alan Paton Centre
ARM African Resistance Movement
COD Congress of Democrats
COP Congress of the People
CPSA Communist Party of South Africa
ICS Institute ofCommonwealth Studies
IDAMF Interdenominational African Ministers' Federation
LP Liberal Party
LPSA Liberal Party of South Africa
NIC Natal Indian Congress
NIO Natal Indian Org~sation
NNALA Northern Natal African Landowners' Association
NNC Natal Native Congress
NP Nationalist Party
NRC Native Representative Council
SACP South African Communist Party
SACPO South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation
SACTU South African Congress ofTrade Unions
SAlC South African Indian Congress
SAIRR South African Institute ofRace Relations
SALA South Afiican Liberal Association
SALG South Afiican Liberal Group
SANNC South African Native National Congress
SAP South African Party
TIC Transvaal Indian Congress




1. The descriptive tenn 'black' includes Africa~ Indian and Coloured people.




This thesis is concerned mainly with the Liberal Party (LP) in Natal from the Party's formation
in May 1953 until its dissolution in early 1968. The Natal Division started out as the least-
distinguished and smallest of the three Divisions, but it subsequently developed a dynamic
character of its own and played an increasingly significant role on a national level. 1 Through a
process of radicalisation, the Natal Liberal Party changed its focus from that of a
predominantly white parliamentary political party to that of a principled non-racial organisation
committed to bringing about social and political change in South Africa through extra-
parliamentary methods of opposition.
The black liberation struggle was not part of the official curriculum when I studied history at
high school level during the early 1980s. Consequently it is a period of South Africa's history
of which my (white) generation is largely ignorant. However, I was fortunate enough to have
this gap partially filled for me when I studied history at university. The political changes in
South Africa in the early 1990s renewed my interest in the liberation struggle, and what
interested me in particular was the participation of white people, other than those in the South
African Communist Party.
I was interested in what motivated those liberal whites who had not just apathetically 'followed
the crowd', but had decided to oppose actively what they believed to be an unjust system.
What paths did they take? Of further interest was the fact that the membership of the Liberal
Party became predominately black. The complex nature of liberalism, especially in the South
African context, became apparent while researching the development of liberal thought in the
country. A further interesting angle was the manifestation of this liberalism as seen against the
background of prevailing, and changing, political attitudes ofboth black and white people.
Why had liberalism in South Africa acquired such a bad name?
1 The Party consisted of three Divisions: the Natal, the Transvaal, and the Cape. A Free State Division
was created later but never attracted a significant membership. Each Division was divided into branches.
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The essential questions which motivated this thesis about the involvement of the LP in the
struggle against apartheid were: how this had come about? What was the extent and nature of
the Party's involvement? How did the Liberal Party's role relate to, and compare with, other
organisations opposing apartheid? In applying these questions, I concentrate on the Natal
Division of the LP, and some of the reasons behind this are that Natal's white electorate was
hardly a bastion of liberalism, that the Division had a number of influential and interesting
political figures, and that the Party attracted a large number of African members in the region.
The LP is often portrayed as a whites-only organisatio~ but the membership of the Natal
Division was predominantly black by the mid-1960s. Furthennore, the Natal Liberal Party has
not been studied in depth before. In writing a regional history of an organisation such as the
Liberal Party, one is confronted with the difficulties of how much emphasis to give to
specifically regional questions, and how to relate these to developments in other regions. This
study is not intended to be a general history of the Liberal Party of South Africa. The history
of the Natal Liberal Party needs, however, to be placed in a national context. This provides not
only a comparative dimension but it is necessary because of the influential participation of the
Natal leadership at local, regional and national levels.
A further difficulty encountered in writing this thesis was that of defining liberals and liberalism
in South Africa. The diffuse nature of liberalism is bound to present problems in any study of
the topic. There is also the complication of distinguishing between white and black liberals in a
racially ordered society.. This study focuses on liberals in the LP, and not on a broader group of
white liberals who were opposed to apartheid, such as those in the Union Federal Party, the
Progressive Party, the South African Institute ofRace Relations (SAIRR), or elsewhere. The
overall problem is exacerbated by the presence of African liberals, who generally espoused a
liberalism infused with aspects of African nationalism. Many ANC members were liberals (a
few also became members of the LP), and the organisation developed a liberalism of its own.
Since the LP was a non-racial party, the role of liberals of all races in the Party are discussed.
As with the analysis ofany political organisation, developments must be seen in the context in
which they occurred. It is thus essential that the development of the LP be seen against the
background of the entrenchment of apartheid by the Nationalist government.
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A variety of sources have been used in order to gather information for this study. As far as
primary sources on the LP are concerned, the archives at the Alan Paton Centre (APC) on the
University ofNatal's Pietermaritzburg campus provided a wealth of data. The Liberal Party
Papers are a collection of wide-ranging primary material including the minutes of meetings of
various committees and LP Congresses, correspondence, newspapers, Party publications
(Contact and Liberal Opinion in particular), etc. There is a comparative lack of information
from 1960 onwards, as detailed records were not kept by the Party during the 1960s as a
security measure. I was able to· take advantage of the interviews conducted as part of the
Centre's oral history programme, which complemented my own interviews. The unpublished
manuscript by Peter Brown in the Alan Paton Centre, 'A History of the Liberal Party of South
Africa', proved particularly useful. It is a narrative account of the history of the LP and much
of this is taken verbatim from material included in the Liberal Party Papers. It is written from a
contemporary perspective as it was compiled during the latter half of the 1960s (after Brown
was banned in 1964). He included valuable insights and reflections on the LP and its members,
especially with regards to Natal, where he was more involved. The manuscript has information
which I have been unable to locate elsewhere.
There is no shortage of secondary literature on the development of liberalism in the earlier
period prior to 1950. Much of it is from the perspective of historians critical to liberalism, such
as Martin Legassick and Paul Rich2, while some later work, for example lButler, R.Elphick
and D.Welsh's Democratic Liberalism in South Africd, is more sympathetic to the role of
liberals. Detailed information on the LP is limited in secondary sources, as the Party receives
little extensive analysis in prominent works on the liberation struggle. Certain studies
concentrate on the black organisations, where prominence is given the roles ofwhite
communists. 4 Those that examine the development of active white opposition to apartheid
2 For example: M.Legassick, 'The Rise of Modem South African Liberalism: Its Assumptions and Its
Social Base', Seminar Paper, The African Studies Faculty, University of Sussex, 1973; P.Rich, White Power
and the Liberal Conscience (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1984).
3 lButler. RElphick & D. Welsh (eds), Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and
Prospects (Cape To~ David PhiIip, 1987). .
4 For example: T.Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (London, Longman, 1983)~ T.Karis
& G.M.Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, Volume ~ of T.Karis & G.M. Carter (eds), From Protest
to Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964 (California, Stanford
University, 1977); T.Karis & G.M.Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1990, Volume 5 of From Protest to
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generally contrast the roles of Liberals with those of members of the Congress of Democrats. 5
There is a tendency to focus on the anti-communist sentiments of Liberals and to see them as a
undermining the militancy ofblack politics. I found David Everatt's thesis valuable in my
understanding of the wider involvement of whites in the liberation struggle and for providing
an alternative viewpoint on the LP. The later years of the LP are neglected in such studies,
which tend to concentrate on earlier developments of the Party, up to the early 1960s. In a
recent publication on the liberation struggle, there are two brief chapters dealing with the LP,
which are less critical of the LP than one would have expected.6
There is a lack of literature which provides a specific organisational analysis of the Liberal
Party as a political party. There are a number of general works whose material is associated
with liberalism and the Liberal Party, for example the writings of Alan Paton, Margaret
Ballinger, Edgar Brookes, Peter Alexander and Phyllis Lewsen. 7 None of these, however, offer
a detailed organisational analysis of the Liberal Party. Before the recent publication of
Randolph Vigne's book, Liberals Against Apartheid, the main sources on the LP were lanet
Robertson's Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963, and the chapter by Douglas Irvine, 'The
Liberal Party, 1953-1968', in Democratic Liberalism in South Africa. s Robertson's
comparative study of liberalism in South Africa examines liberalism in the United Party, the
Progressive Party, the LP and the ANC, and ends in the early 1960s. Irvine's chapter is not
intended to be an in-depth and detailed account. Vigne provides a fuller record of the history
of the LP, and a more detailed analysis of the Party. He has made extensive use of the archives
at the Alan Paton Centre. Vigne's book is essentially a general narrative history of the LP, and
ChaJ/enge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990 (Pretoria., Unisa, 1997).
5 For example: J.N.Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid
(Boulder.Colo.. Westview, 1994)~ D.Everatt, 'The Politics of Nonracialism: White Opposition to Apartheid
1945-1960. '. D.Phil.Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990.
6 I.Liebenberg et al. (eds), The Long March (Pretoria, HAUM, 1994).
7 A.Paton, Journey Continued (Cape Town, David Philip, 1988)~ M.Ballinger, From Union To
Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation (Cape Town, Juta.1969)~ E.H.Brookes. A South African Pilgrimage
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977)~ P.Alexander, Alan Paton: A Bibliography (Oxford, ODP, 1994)~
P.Lewsen, Reverberations: A Memoir (Rondebosch, UCT Press, 1996).
S R Vigne. Liberals AgainstApartheid: A History ofthe Liberal Party ofSouth Africa, 1953-68
(London. MacmilIan, 1997); J.Robertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963 (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1971); D.Irvine, 'The Liberal Party, 1953-1968' in J.Butler, RElphick & D.Welsh (eds), Democratic
Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospects (Cape Town, David Philip, 1987), Chapter 6.
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it contains more detail on the earlier years of the Party and on events in which Vigne was
involved. He is largely uncritical of the Party, and attempts to establish the LP's role in the
liberation struggle and to show how the liberalism of the LP has survived into the 1990s. The
above works all concentrate on the initial period of the Party's development and examine the
Party from a national perspective. In this study I chose to examine the development of the LP
in Natal, looking more closely at local personalities and membership, distinguishing features,
and the Party's work amongst Afiican communities, as well as giving a fuller account of the
latter years.
This thesis consists of five main chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One serves as an
introductory chapter on the development of liberalism in South Afiica from the Cape Liberal
Tradition of the mid-nineteenth century until about 1950. This chapter attempts to show the
complexity of liberalism in South Africa and to examine the forces which have shaped it. The
section dealing with Natal explores the emergence of a particular political situation in the
region, which provides a background to the subsequent development of liberalism and the LP
in the region. Chapter Two deals with a time of change after the shock Nationalist PartY
victory in the general election of 1948 and what this meant for liberalism. Liberals found
themselves less able than previously to exert influence over either the government or Afiican
political opinion. Many liberals had become disillusioned with the United Party, and by 1952 a
considerable number of white liberals were proposing a more assertive alternative. The
decision to form a political party after the second United Party loss in the 1953 general election
was a reluctant one in many respects. Nevertheless, the Party established itselffrom a number
of disparate groups, over which the prominent Cape Liberals dominated. Their comparatively
conservative viewpoints held sway in the initial years and the Party followed the conventional
path of a white parliamentary political party. By 1955, the Natal Division of the LP had begun
to take on a character of its own and to establish itself in the region. The foundations, which
allowed for the Division to play a more significant role in the Party in the future, were laid
during these years.
Chapter Three concentrates on the Natal LP's radicalisation and its ascendency on a national
level during the years 1956 to 1958. The reasons for the Natal Division moving in the direction
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that it did are explored. It had not found much support amongst the white electorate, and
attracted increasing numbers of African members instead. Its progressive views on the
franchise and extra-parliamentary opposition, together with the high level of activity and the
stability of the Division, enabled it to play a larger role on a national level and to influence the
LP's adoption of a more radical line. The Division also developed a good working relationship
with the Natal ANC and the Natal Indian Congress. Chapter Four deals with an intensely
turbulent period in South Africa's history, from 1959 to 1962. It was during this period that
the LP, both nationally and in Natal, reached its height. The year 1960 is taken as a turning
point in the history the country and in the development of the LP. The transformation process
within the Party continued with the adoption of the universal franchise and an increasingly
active extra-parliamentary role, and the Party reached closer identification with black political
aspirations as its African membership multiplied.
Chapter Five is a shorter chapter than the others, as it deals with last years of the LP from
1963 to its dissolution in 1968, by which time Party activity was much r.educed. During these
years the LP became a target of the Nationalist government, and its members endured state
persecution in an attempt to cripple the Party, as the state had already done to black opposition
in the country. Despite the odds, the Natal Division remained as active as possible, largely due
its well-organised Party structure. With the passing of a government Act banning multi-racial
political parties in 1968, the Liberals chose to dissolve the Party. By the 1960s, Liberals
espoused a radicalised strand of South African liberalism, which differed from that of other
liberals, such as those in the Progressive Party.
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CHAPTER ONE
More thanjust 'Friends ofthe Natives'? : Liberalism in South Africa before 1950
Introduction
In charting the evolution of liberalism in South Africa and establishing the political views of the
early leaders of the Liberal Party (LP), it is necessary to look at liberalism during the late
nineteenth century and the half-century prior to the formation of the party itself in May 1953.
In such an analysis the different interpretations of liberals and of liberalism that were held
during this time can be explained. This diversity does, however, present problems of analysis.
The following chapter attempts to grapple with these differing interpretations of liberalism in
the South African context as essential background to the study of the Natal Liberal Party
·during the 1950s and 1960s. It must be stressed that the purpose here is merely to give an
outline and is not a comprehensive essay on liberalism in South Africa.
In order to facilitate the discussio~ the chapter is structured along chronological lines. The
development of liberalism before 1950 is charted in three sections. First, the liberal tradition
which developed in the Cape Colony during the nineteenth century; second, the social welfare
activities of inter-war liberals (1920s and 1930s) and their attempts to find solutions to the
'native question'; third, the challenges faced by the liberals of the 1940s in a rapidly changing
South Africa. The last section deals with liberals and liberalism in Natal before the 1950s and
highlights those features which distinguished the region.
1.1 Towards a definition ofliberalism in South Africa before about 1950
Liberals in South Africa up until the present-day have always held widely diverging views, and
there has never been a clearly defined liberal policy. Before the formation ofthe LP in 1953, no
explicitly liberal political party existed. Liberals were found in various welfare, liberal and
administrative government bodies, as well as in certain political parties. It is largely a matter of
interpretation whom one considers a 'liberal' or not. The matter is further complicated by the
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presence ofboth black and white liberals, who were different in many ways. This chapter will
be concentrating on white liberals, and 'liberals' in this context are taken to mean white
liberals, unless indicated otherwise. The reason for this is that in the racially-ordered society of
South Africa, it was white liberals who took the lead and defined liberal policy. In the earlier
part of the century, liberals were generally defined as 'friends of the natives' who 'advocated
policies towards Africans more generous than those of mainstream white South Africans'. 1
South African liberalism by the end of the 1950s, as espoused by liberals in the LP, could be
described as an 'attempt to solve the problems of racial conflict by creating interracial solidarity
and cooperation on the basis of equal rights and shared values and roles'.2 In other words, this
advanced the idea of a 'common society'. In general, the emphases of South African liberalism
have been 'on non-racism, on freedom from racial discrimination, and on the protection of
individual liberty' .3 Liberalism in South Africa before 1950 was largely dominated by the
personalities of certain individuals, rather than by any specific organisation. Their personal
idiosyncrasies, together with the fact that they a were numerically small, widely-dispersed
group and rarely co-ordinated in their efforts, makes any attempt at generalisation
questionable. 4
In attempting to define liberalism in South Africa one comes up against a number of problems
with what liberalism has become to mean. For example, the common every-day usage of the
term liberal by many white people today means 'non-racial'. 5 Much of the available literature
on liberalism in South Africa was written by critics of liberalism during the 1970s and 1980s
when strong anti-liberal views prevailed. Its policies were attacked from both the left and the
1 R.Elphick, 'Mission Christianity and Interwar Liberalism' in lButler, RElphick & D. Welsh (eels),
Democratic Liberalism in South Africa (Johannesburg & Cape Town, David Philip, 1987), p.66.
2 H.Dickie-Clark, 'On the Liberal Definition of the South African Situation' in P.van den Berghe (00),
The Liberal Dilemma in South Africa (London, Croom Helm, 1979), p.49.
3 H.Kuper, 'Commitment: The Liberal as Scholar in South Africa' in P.van den Berghe (00), The
Liberal Dilemma in South Africa (London, Croom Helm, 1979), p.30.
4 B.White, 'Maurice Webb: A Case Study in Social Welfare Liberalism in Natal, 1926-1953', Journal
o/Natal and Zulu History, Vol XV (1994/1995), p.!.
5 C.1Driver, 'Between The Hammer and The Anvil: The Quandary of Liberalism in South Africa' in
RHunt Davis (00), Apartheid Unravels (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1991), p.59.
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right.6 Liberalism became"almost a term of political opprobrium' in certain contemporary black
political circles in South Africa. 7 The term had a derogatory meaning attached to it where
liberals were portrayed as 'do-gooder' white paternalists or as capitalists bent on preserving
their privileged status quo, or as 'kaffirboeties' (literally: brothers of African people) and
enemies of the state on an equal footing with communists. However, with the changing
political scenario in South Africa during the 1990s, liberalism is acquiring a measure of
respectability in political and academic circles. Many basic values of liberalism are included in
the country's new constitution.· Nevertheless, a good deal of the available literature on
liberalism in South Africa consists of those historians' views critical of liberalism, which were
only countered in the late 1980s by a liberal response. 8 Liberal writers maintain that liberalism
in South Africa has largely been defined by its critics. Accordingly, it has frequently been
misrepresented in South African historiography by discrediting liberals and liberalism, and
suppressing its multi-racial and non-racial character. 9
Liberalism as it developed in South Africa has to be seen in a particular context, for these
liberals were a product of, and operated within, a conservative society. In the South African
situation it seems that racial issues are central to the definition of 'liberal'. Certain early
twentieth century liberals might be considered 'benevolent paternalists' rather than 'liberals' in
the strict western European definition of the term. Martin Legassick raises the question of
'perhaps whether in the context of South Africa there exists a liberalism which is not mere
benevolent paternalism' .10 (He is speaking here, obviously, ofwhite liberals.) Be that as it may,
the point is that the parameters defining South African liberalism are wide and not clearly
marked. The term indicated a 'South African-specific position, rather than a position at one
,with western democratic liberalism'. 11 For instance, white liberals were considered as such
6 Kuper, 'Commitment', p.30; Driver, 'Between The Hammer', p.60; Dickie-Clark, 'On the Liberal
Definition', p.48.
7 P.Ric~ Hope And Despair (Londo~ British Academic Press, 1993), p.4l.
8 D. Everatt, 'Liberals, Liberalism and the Liberal Party', Review Article, Journal ofNatal and Zulu
History, vol.XI (1988).
9 Kuper, 'Commitment', pp.36-4l.
10 M. Legassick, 'The Rise of Modem South African Liberalism: Its assumptions and Its Social Base' ,
Seminar Paper, The African Studies Faculty, University of Sussex (1973), p.3. Legassick's emphasis.
11 Everatt, 'Liberals, Liberalism and the Liberal Party', p.163.
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because they held basic liberal values, thought of themselves as part of the liberal establishment
and worked within liberal organisations. Liberalism did not and does not necessarily require a
political party through which to express itself: which makes definitions of any sort more
difficult to make. The diffuse nature of liberalism is both a weakness and a strength. On the
one hand it is open to various interpretations and misrepresentations, while on the other hand
liberalism was able to change with the times. Its members were not stuck in a set doctrine
dictated to them by an international body nor by nationalist leaders. Instead, liberals have
constantly revised and reassessed their approaches to the political situation. 12 Individuals
changed their views on issues such as segregation and later the franchise. Of course this
diversity led to a lack of unity which might have otherwise allowed liberals to make a greater
impact. Liberalism was ultimately unsuccessful in South Africa in the first half of the twentieth
century in that it failed to develop a cohesive political programme which had any real impact on
the body politic.
Liberalism in South Africa was not static and underwent many changes during the first half of
the twentieth century. In general, the approach of South African liberalism was essentially a
gradualist one which could be described as reformist rather than revolutionary. There was an
ever-present optimism amongst liberals that the white electorate and the government could
gradually be influenced in the right direction. The views of liberals changed with changing
international trends in political thinking and with changes in the socio-economic and political
development of South Africa. For example, the achievements of African-Americans and
progress made in 'race relations' in the United States influenced liberals during the 1920s13,
and many liberals had rejected segregation by the late 1920s after initially supporting it. The
various approaches of inter-war liberalism had developed into distinct strands by the early
1950s. In this evolution there was an incremental transformation from the prevailing gradualist
approach to a more democratic one, which can be seen as a move away from Cape Liberalism
to a brand of South African liberalism which was espoused by liberals in the LP by 1960. By
that time the views of liberals in the LP represented a more radical strand of liberalism
12 Dickie-elark, 'On the Liberal Definition', p.4S.
13 RHaines, 'Or Edgar H. Brookes and the Liberalism of the 1930's', B.A.Hons.thesis, University of
Natal, Durb~ 1975~ Rich, Hope and Despair, p.48.
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compared to those that had left the party and joined the Progressive Party (formed in 1959) or
those that had remained in the United Party (UP).
Liberals were involved in the politics of South Africa until 1948 in a number of ways, although
generally not·in the parliamentary party arena. Although there were liberals in the South
Afiican Party (SAP) and later in the UP, the majority of mainstream liberals (such as those
under discussion) did not belong to a political party. Rather, they were active at the
administrative level of government. Many early liberals were prominent figures who enjoyed
varying degrees of political influence with government. Their playing-card was their influence
over the African political elite.
As discussed above, it is very difficult to define liberalism in South Africa and to generalise
about liberals. However, there are certain generalisations that can be made. Liberalism was
marginal to the dominant views of the white population in South Africa, and the liberals formed
a small minority within it. Liberals were mostly (but not only) English-speaking, and were
usually middle-class intellectuals in academic or professional fields. There were, however; some
well-known Afrikaans-speaking liberals such as the Marquard and Molteno families. The late
nineteenth-century Cape liberals, too, were of mixed English and Afrikaans-speaking origins.
Many early liberals were active Christians, who had some personal contact with missionaries or
missionary organisations.
The essentials of liberalism appealed to certain groups of African people. Early African liberals
were generally mission-educated with middle-class backgrounds. Liberalism did have a
considerable influence over Africans educated at missionary institutions. 14 Leading members of
the Afiican National Congress (ANC), such as Pixley Seme, Dr A.B.Xuma, Professor
Z.K.Matthews and Albert Lutuli espoused a broadly liberal ideology, as did Selby Msimang, a
founder member of the ANC and later a prominent member of the LP in Natal. Hilda Kuper
knew Lutuli personally and describes him as 'the very embodiment of liberal ideals' .IS The
basic principles of the ANC, in fact, were essentially liberal in the first half of the twentieth
14 Dickie-elar~ 'On the Liberal Definition', p.50.
IS Kuper, 'Commitment', pp.31-32.
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century.
One of the most common criticisms of liberalism is that liberals came from a class base that was
too narrow to have any effect on South African society or even on the government. According
to radical historians, liberalism in South Africa was the ideology of capitalism. 16 This, on
further examination but not in the scope of this study, is an overstatement and would not
accurately describe liberais. 17 On the whole, liberals were not wealthy businessmen but
professionals such as university staff: lawyers, clergymen, schoolteachers, writers, social
workers and journalists. Some liberals were described ~s having socialist leanings. The UP was
more likely to be representative ofEnglish-speaking capitalis~ and thus if one were to stretch
the definition of liberalism to include liberally-inclined members in this party, the allegation
becomes more plausible for those concerned. While those early liberals who were involved in
government may have expected their reforms to revitalize a capitalist economy, the advance of
capitalism was not their primary motive. Liberals did not 'actively promote segregation as a
means of hastening the process of capital accumulation', but by attempting to preserve political
and social stability they may have inadvertently helped to 'maintain the conditions for the long-
term reproduction of capitalist relations' in South Africa. 18
1.2 The Cape Liberal Tradition and its Legacy
Most scholars trace the roots of South African liberalism during the first half of the twentieth
century to the liberal tradition which developed in the Cape Colony in the second half of the
nineteenth century. While the Cape Liberal Tradition, as it became known, bore some of the
trademarks of its English origins, the brand of liberalism which had developed in South Africa
by the 1950s had its own distinctive characteristics. It had been moulded by the unique political
16 P.van den Berghe, 'The Impossibility of a Liberal Solution' in P.van den Berghe (00), The Liberal
Dilemma in South Africa (London, Croom He~ 1979), p.63; PoLewsen, 'Liberals in Politics and
Administration. 1936-1948' in J.Butler, RElphick & D.Welsh (005), Democratic Liberalism in South Africa:
Its History and Prospects (Johannesburg & Cape Town, David Philip, 1987), pollS 0
17 For the following discussion:Van den Berghe, 'The Impossibility', pp.64~ Lewsen, 'Liberals in
Politics', p.115.
18 S.Dubow, 'Liberalism and Segregation Revisited' in Collected Seminar Papers on The Societies of
Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ICS, London, vol 15 (1990), pp.7-8.
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circumstances and socio-economic conditions which developed in this country. Regional
differences are a further characteristic of South African liberalism which emerged as it
developed. These had their roots in the pattern of colonial conquest of southern Africa.
The prominent nineteenth-century Cape liberals were a small white minority who were not all
English-speaking and who were drawn from a variety of fields, including financial and
commercial enterprises, the legal profession and Christian missionary organisations. 19 The
adherents of Cape Liberalism were not many but were people of exceptional ability, for
example James Rose-Innes and John X. Merriman. The principles of Cape Liberalism and the
liberal institutions founded in the colony had been imported from Britain in the first half of the
nineteenth century. These included a respect for parliamentary government and other
guarantees of freedom, such as the rule of law, an independent judiciary and the freedom of
speech. The British had attempted to remedy certain inequalities at the Cape from their take-
over in 1806 and this initiative was taken up again by the colonial office under Earl Grey after
the Whig return t6 power in 1846.20 This led to the granting of Responsible Government in
1853.
Probably the best known feature of Cape Liberalism was the non-racial qualified franchise
policy that was introduced into the Cape Colony in 1853. The approach of Cape liberals was a
gradualist one which reserved the right to vote for all 'civilised' men, regardless of colour, and
which asserted the view that all men should have the opportunity to become 'civilised'.
Furthennore, it was the responsibility of 'Europeans' to provide for the education ofblack
people in this 'civilizing process' .21 Even if the franchise qualification was by criteria of
'civilisation' which was based on Western ideas of education and wealth, the 'acceptance of a
shared humanity' was nevertheless 'unquestioned' by Cape liberals. 22 Nineteenth-century Cape
19 S.Trapido, ' "The friends of the natives" : merchants, peasants and the political and ideological
structure of liberalism in the Cape, 1854-1910' in S.Marks & A.Atmore, Economy and society in pre-industriaI
South Africa (London, Longman, 1980), pp.25 1-252.
20 RDavenport, 'The Cape Liberal Tradition to 1910' in lButler, RElphick & D.Welsh (OOs),
Democratic Liberalism in South Africa (Cape Town & Johannesburg, David Philip, 1987), pp.22, 31.
21 lRobertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963 (OxforcL Clarendon, 1971), p.5.
22 K 'C . ,uper, onumtment , pp.30-31.
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Liberalism did not entertain the idea of a democracy in the modern-day sense of the term. 23
They did not believe in racial integration or suggest the adoption of a universal franchise.
Although their liberalism was based on a strong belief in the superiority of whites, there was a
genuine humanitarian desire to see others 'better' themselves and become 'civilised'.24 Cape
Liberalism 'sought to protect the members of all groups in what it regarded as a common
society' rather than 'attach itself to the rights of one particular group' .25
The Cape Liberal Tradition was idealised to some extent by early twentieth century adherents
and has been the subject of debate amongst latter-day academics. Cape Liberalism was by no
means free of contradictions and inconsistencies, and neither was it static. 26 Its political
manifestations were shaped by economic as well as social and political factors, reflecting the
changes in Cape society from a primarily agrarian society to a increasingly industrialised one. 27
Although the liberal import developed along its own lines in the colonial situation, Cape
Liberalism did not develop in isolation and continued to be influenced by liberal developments
in England to some extent before the turn of the century.
The liberalism ofthe Cape was influenced by the humanitarian and philanthropic movement in
England in the first half of the nineteenth century. This was infused into Cape Liberalism
mainly through missionary organisations, most notably the London Missionary Society led by
Dr John Philip. This connection between liberalism and the missionary movement continued
into the twentieth century. A further aspect to the missionary influence on liberalism is relevant
in this study. The Cape Tradition had a profound influence on African political thinking into the
twentieth century.28 The combination ofa missionary education and liberalism produced a
group of African political leaders in the Cape, as well as in Natal and to a lesser extent in the
23 P.Lewsen, 'The Cape Liberal Tradition - Myth or RealityT in ISMA Paper No.26 (November
1969), p.ll; Trapido, 'The friends', p.258.
24 Lewsen, 'The Cape Liberal Tradition', p.17.
25 Davenport, 'The Cape Liberal Tradition', p.30.
26 Ibid., pp.247-248.
27 P.Ric~ 'Segregation and the Cape Liberal Tradition' in Collected Seminar Papers on The Societies
of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, rcs, London, vollO (1981), p.33.
28 P.Walshe, Black Nationalism in South Africa (Ravan, Johannesburg, 1973), p.5.
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Transvaa1~ in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.
The disparity in franchise laws caused heated debate at the National Convention to discuss the
proposed union in 1908. The non-racial franchise policy of the Cape was not found in the other
colonies. In the northern Boer states of the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal Republic
only white men could vote and sit in parliament. In the Colony ofNatal white men were subject
to economic criteri~ while black men were restricted by much higher qualifications and all but
a few were excluded. The Cape delegates proposed the implementatiqn of the Cape model for
the union. The other three delegations strongly opposed this proposal. The opinion in Natal
was expressed by its delegates who refused to extend political rights to Africans in the
province. Thus the Cape delegates failed to extend their franchise provisions to the rest of the
country. Most delegates saw Boer-British unity and the unification of South Africa as more
important than provisions for black political representation. The Cape liberals hoped to further
their cause after union. 29 Hence a compromise was reached: only white men would sit in
parliament and the provinces would retain their respective franchise laws (black membership
was to be allowed in the Cape Provincial Council). This could only be amended by a two-thirds
majority reached in a joint sitting ofboth houses of Parliament. These provisions in the South
Africa Act in 1910 were to prove significant later.
1.3 'Race Relations', the 'native question' and urbanisation: The Inter-war Years
Liberal activity in South Africa in the 1920s and 1930s was essentially welfare-orientated and
flourished in the climate created by a strong missionary presence in South Africa. New kinds of
class conflict and social need were developing after the First World War. There was rapid
African urbanisation as the demand for labour increased and the economic viability of the
reserves steadily declined. Liberal concern was aroused by the lack ofgovernment interest in
African welfare and their primary aim was to alleviate hardships.
In the political field liberals worked at promoting dialogue and maintaining contact between
black and white, and attempting to influence 'native policy' by appealing to enlightened whites
29 Robertson, Liberalism, p.7.
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in the government and amongst the general public. 30 Consultation between black leaders and
various interested parties, including white missionaries, educationalists and welfare workers,
was a trend which had been encouraged in the 1920s. Examples of this were the'European-
Bantu' Conferences held between 1923 and 1933. Although liberals may have been critical of
government policy, they did not believe in direct political action in confronting the government.
Rather, liberals preferred to work with the administration, hoping to encourage it in a liberal
direction. The general view was that liberal activity should be limited to welfare matters rather
than pursuing contentious political issues. A few liberals were unhappy with this relatively
passive role and they resented the attempts of prominent, more conservative liberals to
depoliticise liberal associations, such as the Joint Councils and later the South African Institute
of Race Relations (SAIRR).31
Since liberals in South Africa in the first half of the twentieth century believed in working
within the constitutional framework to modify government policy in a more liberal direction,
they participated in various segregationist government structures and were involved with
'native policy' on a number of levels. Some gained limited direct access to governmental policy
formation. 32 Liberals from this period placed great faith in the reasonableness ofboth
government and black leaders. 33 The influence ofwhite liberals on the African political
leadership was considerable in this earlier period. The modus operandi of inter-war liberalism
was to form associations in order to spread liberal ideas. The Joint Councils and the SAIRR are
two examples of non-governmental organisations that liberals worked through, while
governmental bodies included the Native Affairs Commission (formed in 1920) and the Native
Economic Commission (1931). The focus in the inter-war years was on the 'native question',
with Indian and Coloured issues receiving less attention.
30 Elphick, 'Mission Christianity' ~ p.66.
31 P.Ric~ White Power and the Liberal Conscience (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1984), pp.27-28. The Joint
Councils and SAIRR are discussed later.
32 P.Ric~ 'The South African Institute of Race Relations and the debate on "race relations", 1926-
1958' in Collected Seminar papers on Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ICS, London,
vol.12 (1981), p.78.
33 Elphick, 'Mission Christianity', p. 72. Elphick's italics.
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The main ideological debate amongst liberals during this period revolved around the policy of
segregation and the proletarianisation of Africans. The centre of the liberal movement in South
Africa up until Union had been in Cape Town, but after the First World War it shifted to
Johannesburg. The University of the Witwatersrand became the focus as a number of leading
liberal ideologues worked there. Segregation was a complex response, with roots in earlier
historical trends, to the process and pattern of industrialisation in early twentieth century South
Africa. It was fonnulated in the search for a solution to the 'native question'. Segregation was
portrayed as a compromise between 'repression' and 'assimilation'. 34 Racist discourse was
prevalent worldwide from the late nineteenth century and racist assumptions and attitudes were
commonplace in political debate in early twentieth century South Africa. 35 In the early 1920s a
'new fonn of pro-segregationist liberalism' emerged36 where segregation was seen as a
'pragmatic, moderate·and flexible policy' .37 Most liberals were likely to have supported some
form of territorial segregationist policy. Certain liberals, such as Howard Pim, Edgar Brookes
and C.T.Loram., were involved in the elaboration of segregationist policy in the early 1920s.38
Alfred Hoernle spoke of the necessity of adapting liberalism to segregation as this was the
prevailing creed in South Africa and had to be taken seriously. 39
The liberals' search for a solution which led them to segregation arose from their concern to
protect and presetve traditional African society from the harsh realities of industrialisation. The
development of anthropology in South Africa in the 1910s and 19208 had a significant
influence on segregationist ideology..w The image of a cohesive and unchanging rural culture
was presented which idealised the traditional African lifestyle. Africans were seen as 'naturally'
rural and 'alien' in cities. Much of the earlier writing included crude definitions of race which
34 S.Dubow, 'Race, civilisation and culture:the elaboration of segregationist discourse in the inter-war
years' in S.Marks & S.Trapido, The politics ofrace, class and nationalism (London,Lon~1987),pp.74,88.
35 Ibid., pp.71-75.
36 Worde~ The Making ofModem South Africa, p.77.
37 Dubow, 'Liberalism and Segregation', p.2.
38 Ibid., p.l. See E.H.Brookes, History ofNative Policy in .s:4 (Pretori~ Van Schaik, 1927).
39 Rich, Hope and Despair, pp.48-49.
40 Dubow, 'Race, civilisation and culture', p.8l.
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were later dispelled. 41 W.H.Macmillan, a professor of History at the University of the
Witwatersrand, had become an increasingly controversial figure in the liberal establishment
during the 1920s. He criticised the conservative influence of anthropological studies on the
liberal establishment and on liberals such as the Hoernles and J.D.Rheinallt-Jones.·n Hoernle's
wife, Winifred, was the head of the department of anthropology at the University of the
Witwatersrand. 43
The Joint Councils for Europeans and Natives were established from 1921 in an attempt to
maintain contact between black political leadership and liberally-inclined whites on a local
level. The movement was the initiative ofC.T.Loram and was influenced in particular by Dr
lE.K.Aggrey, an African member (from present-day Ghana) of the Phelps-Stokes Commission
and who had been educated in the United States. A variety of people participated in the
councils, including prominent liberal professionals, academics, churchmen, social workers and
African politicians. By 193 1 there were approximately thirty Afiican and three Indian councils,
and one Coloured council in the process of being formed. 44 There was debate amongst liberals
whether the Joint Councils should become more active as political pressure groups, or retain
their essentially welfare character. Joint Councils varied in political outlook. For example, the
Johannesburg council was comparatively radical under the leadership ofMacmillan. 45
According to Paul Ric~ the Joint Councils allowed for the accommodation of inter-war
liberalism with the government's segregation policy. 46 The councils were no doubt of help to
black political leaders and were one of the few avenues open for black political expression, but
some black leaders criticised the councils for stifling more strident political stances against
government policy. The Joint Council movement gradually petered out during the late 1930s
with the increasing disaffection ofblack political leaders with moderate, petition politics.
~l Rich, Hope and Despair, p.53.
42 W.H.Macmillan, My South African Years (Cape Town, David Philip, 1975), p.214.
~3 Rich, 'South African Institute of Race Relations', p.80.
44 Haines, 'Dr.Edgar Brookes', pp.15-16.
4S Macmillan, My South African Years.
46 Rich. White Power, pp. 18-26.
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The SAIRR was founded in 1929 on the initiative of two prominent liberals, Loram and
Rheinallt-Jones. The majority ofwell-known liberals belonged to the Institute and its
membership was open to people of all races. The SAIRR was broadly liberal but it was
liberalism of a somewhat conservative brand. It was not aligned to any political party (most of
its white members probably supported the SAP and then the UP). Its aim was to collect and
publish information on the effects of racial discrimination and segregation and conduct research
into 'race-relations', thus combining political activity and research. In doing this it hoped to
alter the attitudes of whites in South Africa, especially those in government. Members of the
Institute had a Fabian belief that reliable and correct facts could change white attitudes, but
they found that this was seldom the case. 47 Direct political action was to be avoided. Instead,
informal political pressure would be exercised on the government. The Institute was never an
active political body and similar debates about political activism occurred in it as had arisen in
the Joint Councils. Macmillan suggests that the SAIRR was formed to take the' political sting
.out of the study of African disabilities' and to replace the Joint Councils. 48 According to
Brookes the Institute was a 'Ministry ofMunitions' rather than a 'Ministry ofWar' .~9 The
development of radical tendencies within some Joint Councils was certainly a worrying factor
to certain elements in the liberal establishment. so
Paul Rich criticises theS~ under the leadership ofLoram and Rheinallt-Jones, for
compromising liberalism by having no firm political standpoint and accepting government
policy. SI According to Martin Legassic~ liberals 'did not step outside the assumptions of
segregationism' during the inter-war period and when they did 'it was for the most part
defensively rather than aggressively'. 52 When they criticised segregationist policies they did so
from within the framework of segregation and so many of the reform measures they
recommended were 'intended to resolve the contradictions of segregation rather than challenge
4
7 Lewsen, 'Liberals in Politics', p.10 1.
48 Macmillan, My South African Years, p.216.
49 E.H.Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1977), p.42.
50 Rich, 'South African Institute of Race Relations', p.79.
51 Ibid.~ Rich, White Power, p.lS.
52 M. Legassic~ 'Race, Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: The Case ofRF.A.
Hoernle', African Affairs, vol.75 (April 1976), p.237.
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its premises'. There is no doubt some truth in this. However, it should be kept in mind that
these liberals operated in a conservative society and that segregationist principles were not
unique to South Africa.
The majority of liberals had rejected segregationist ideas by the late 1920s. The reasons for this
are important in the evolution of liberalism in South Africa. Firstly, it became clear that the
break-down ofpre-colonial African societies had gone too far and that the reserves were
incapable of maintaining the populations within them. Furthermore, the repressive nature of
forced segregation was difficult to ignore. 53 The idea of economic interdependence in the
political economy of South Africa which rendered separate development meaningless began to
be stressed by certain schools of thought, most notably by Macmillan and the economist
S.H.Frankel. 54 Secondly, there was disillusionment with Hertzog, whose Pact government55
resisted liberal influence for an enlightened type of segregation and was seen to be passing
blatantly racist measures like the 1926 Colour Bar Act. Liberals were also placed under more
pressure by Africans in the Joint Councils after the publication in 1926 ofHertzog' s bills on
proposed segregationist legislation. Perhaps the biggest turnaround in ideas came from
Brookes, who had recanted his earlier support for segregation by 1928. He was followed by
other former advocates of segregation. Another Pact victory in 1929 and the liberals' apparent
inability to influence 'native policy' (the Hertzog administration passed more legislation in
favour of whites (specifically Afrikaners) from 1924 to 1933) led to a general pessimism
amongst liberals in the 1930s. Liberals felt that they needed to reassess their policies in order
for liberalism to have an impact on the prevailing mood of racial domination and consequently
on government legislation.
An analysis of liberalism in South Africa would be incomplete without including some
background of the development ofAfrican politics, not only because of liberals' influence on it,
but also because many ofthe early African political organisations were broadly liberal. The
53 Worden, The l\faking o/Modem South Africa, pp.78-79.
54 Dubow, 'Liberalism and Segregation', p.4~ Macmillan, My South African Years, pp. 196-7.
55 The Nationalist Party, under the leadership of J.M.B.Hertzog, had come to power in 1924 in an
electoral pact with the Labour Party. It was known as the Pact government.
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most prominent, well-established and longstanding of the formal black political organisations
was the ANC. It was formed in 1912 from a number of previously colonially based associations
as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), and later became the ANC. Its early
leadership was elitist and conservative, and its demands moderate. Most leaders were mission-
educated Christians with a middle-class background. The African political elite was influenced
by liberalism as the higher education of Africans was partly administered by missionaries at
institutions such as Lovedale in the Eastern Cape56 and Adams College in Natal, where pupils
received a comparatively liberal Western education. Most African leaders in this early period
had attended such institutions, while a few had received further education abroad.
The connection between liberals and the missionary movement in South Africa is important in
understanding the type of liberalism that developed during the inter-war years, where the
emphasis was on urban social welfare. This was an important area of liberal concern as they
tried to reduce the 'physical and moral "decay'" of urbanisation. 57 The government had failed
to develop any sort of structure to deal with African welfare since the reserves were supposed
to be economically self-sustaining and, hence, to supply a safety-net to the indigent. According
to Richard Elphick, the line between 'liberals' and 'mission Christians' was often not clear-cut,
and their activities were intertwined in the 'network of Christian humanitarianism'. S8 Liberalism
in the 1920s and 1930s was rooted in the solid presence of the 'benevolent empire' of
missionary enterprise and in the 'missionary tradition of practical Christianity' .59 In 1928 there
were 48 mission organisations operating in South Africa which were involved in education,
health and social welfare amongst the African population.
The search for a solution to the 'native problem' occupied much of liberal discourse in the
inter-war years. The proposed segregationist legislation by Hertzog was debated amongst
liberals in the late 1920s to the early 1930s. These measures included the removal of the Cape
Africans who qualified for the vote from the common roll, and placing them on a separate one.
56 Most of the staff were in fact from the Cape Education Department, which also helped fund these
institutions.
51 Dubow, "Race, civilisation and culture', p.76.
58 Elphick, 'Mission Christianity', pp.67-70.
59 Ib'd1 ., pp.79-80.
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Those who opposed the so-called 'Hertzog Bills', which were initially introduced in 1926 and
then retracted, 'fought under the banner of liberalism' .60 When the amended bills were
presented in 1935, the political scenario had altered with the formation of the up.61 At the time
English and Afrikaner unity appeared more important to Smuts, who supported Hertzog. 62
lH.Hofmeyr, a liberal cabinet minister, opposed the bills in Parliament with the support of only
ten followers in the UP.63 The large majority of UP members were conservative
segregationists, and Hofineyr was increasingly isolated.64
The ineffectiveness of liberal opposition was clearly demonstrated when the 'Hertzog Bills'
were passed with relatively little opposition in Parliament. Liberal opposition to the bills was
organised through the Joint Councils and the SAIRR after the initial publication of bills in
1926. The protest action of the SAIRR in Cape Town and Johannesburg was better organised
than in Natal. 65 Since most liberals were critics rather than direct opponents of the
government's segregationist policies, it is not surprising that compromise and accommodation
blunted their attack. Some agreed with certain aspects of the bills and the end result was an
acceptance of the bills on the condition that a more equitable distribution of land be granted in
compensation for the loss of the common franchise. 66 According to Rich, leading liberals in the
SAIRR opposed the bills but had too much at stake to risk a complete confrontation with the
government.67 The conservatism of the SAIRR, and Rheinallt-Jones in particular, was criticised
by liberals such as the Ballingers and those in the Non-Racial Franchise Association and the
Cape Native Franchise Vigilance Committee, who were uncompromising in their support for
the common franchise. 68
60 Robertso~Liberalism, p.9.
61 The Nationalists under Hertzog formed a coalition with General Smuts of the SAP in 1933. In
December 1934 the two parties fused to form the UP with Hertzog as prime minister and Smuts as his deputy.
This was seen as a move towards Anglo-Afrikaner conciliation.
62 Robertson, Liberalism, p.9.
63 Ibid., p.ll.
64 Lewse~ 'Liberals in Politics', p.llO.
65 White, 'Maurice Webb', p.6.
66 Dubow, 'Liberalism and Segregation', p.5.
67 Ric~ White Power, p.64.
68 Dubow, 'Liberalism and Segregation', p.5.
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Liberals entered a new phase of political representation with the passing of the 'Hertzog Bills'
as the Natives Representation Act and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. The former Act
allowed for three elected white representatives in the House of Assembly to stand for Africans
in the Cape. These spokespersons were known as the 'Natives Representatives' and a number
of prominent liberals filled these seats, most notably Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno.
Africans in all four provinces were represented in the Senate by four indirectly elected white
senators. These included liberals such as Brookes, Walter Stanford, William Ballinger and
Rheinallt-Jones. A Native Representative Council (NRC), which had advisory powers, was also
created by the Act. Through this council African political leaders were to consult with the
Natives Representatives and the government. These included liberally-inclined nationalists such
as Selby Msimang and Albert Lutuli from the ANC.69
It has been suggested that the passing of the 1936 Act played a crucial role in the development
of African political awareness and was the start of a movement that grew away from the
control and influence ofwhite liberals. 7o The All African Convention (AAC) met in
Bloemfontein in December 1935 to organise opposition to the bills. (Black opposition was also
expressed through the Joint Councils.) It was organised by D.D.TJabavu (son of the well-
known Cape African liberal J.T.Jabavu) and included delegates from a variety of African
organisations. The ANC's influence was at a low ebb at this time. The Convention enabled
African politics to become organised on a more national basis for the first time. 71 However, its
tactics differed little from those of the ANC, namely petition and 'moderate reformism', and it
met with little response from the government.12 Selby Msimang was elected secretary for the
AAC and was included in the deputation to see Hertzog in Cape Town. 73 According to
Msimang, Hertzog refused to compromise. The failure of the AAC deputation was criticised
by, and had the effect of revitalizing, the ANC.
69 E.H.Brookes & C.de B.Webb, A History ofNatal (Pietennaritzburg, University of Natal Press,
1965), p.296.
70 P.Rich, 'African Politics and the Cape Native Franchise, 1926-1936' in Collected Seminar Papers
on The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, rcs, London, vo1.9 (1978-79), p.133;
Walshe, Black Nationalism, p.2l.
71 Rich, 'African Politics', pp. 13 1-132.
72 Worden, The Making a/Modem South Africa, p.85.
73 APC, PC 24/1/1/13 & PC 12/1/1/2, Selby Msimang Papers, Notes for proposed biography.
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During the inter-war years the majority of liberals still had faith in their political influence, and
this was typified by the establishment of the SAIRR. It was also during these years that more
progressive views had begun to develop in response to the blatant racism of the Pact
government's legislation. Although liberals were increasingly critical of government policy they
failed to thoroughly challenge segregation or provide workable alternatives. There was a
genuine concern for the welfare of Africans, particularly those recently urbanised, and this was
the focus of liberal activity during the 1920s and 1930s. It was during the next decade of rapid
change that liberal calls for economic integration and permanent African urbanisation became
more vocal.
1.4 The 1940s : Times ofchange - From 'high point' under Smuts to 'retreat' from
resurgent Afrikaner and African nationalism.
The divisions which had been developing in South African liberalism during the previous
decade became more defined and established after the Second World War. Far-reaching socio-
economic changes had taken place in South Africa during the war and in the immediate post-
war years, as a result of widespread African urbanisation in response to extensive
industrialisation. This provided a challenge to liberals as they now had to grapple with an
increasingly complex political situation. Furthermore, liberals faced a challenge to their position
of helping articulate black responses to white policies as a result of the radicalisation of
mainstream black political opinion.
The influence of liberalism in government reached its peak during the early 1940s under the
Smuts Administration. Liberals took advantage of the war-time conditions of increased
industrialisation and unchecked black urbanisation which challenged existing government
policy. There was hope for liberal refonners during the Second World War. Hertzog had
resigned in 1939 over his objection to South Africa joining the war on the side ofBritain, and
Smuts took over the leadership of the UP and the government. The Secretary of Native Affairs
(who presided over the NRC), Douglas Smit, was sympathetic to reform initiatives. The
Natives Representatives in Parliament continuously pressed for refonns from the late 1930s
into the 1940s and achieved some marginal successes. HotIneYf, then deputy prime minister
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and likely successor to Smuts, gave encouragement to liberals with his more progressive views.
However, he was inconsistent in his liberal convictions.74 Furthermore, he was outnumbered
and increasingly unpopular in the UP. He tended to follow Smuts' more conservative line, thus
compromising many useful reform efforts. Nevertheless, the limited reforms and concessions
that were made by the government were the result of pressure from liberal Natives
Representatives and the initiatives ofHofineyr.75
By the mid-1940s liberals had become more cosmopolitan in South Afiica. 76 The changing
political situation in South Africa from the late 1930s had stimulated liberal debate and
encouraged a diversity ofviews and discussion topics amongst liberals. Furthermore, the views
of liberals like the Ballingers had begun to diverge from those progressive thinkers within the
UP. There was the development ofmore critical, deep-rooted analysis ofthe South African
situation. Although the number ofdissenting voices in opposition to the SAIRR increased,
there was no sufficiently strong alternative viewpoint to challenge that of the Institute until
after the Second World War. The more social-democratic wing of left liberals, which had
centred around MacmilIan and the Ballingers in the 1930s, began to assert itself 77
The left-liberal camp of the Ballingers was joined by other liberals, such as Donald Molteno,
against the conservative liberalism ofthe SAIRR which had been fostered by Loram, Rheinallt-
lones and Hoernle. 78 A small group within the Institute wanted a more active political
approach but were outvoted. 79 This, together with a letter sent by Dr Alfred Xuma, president
of the ANC, to the SAIRR requesting clarification of the Institute's policies in 1942, proved to
be a catalyst in defining different liberal positions. In essence the clash was between those
favouring an increasingly assertive political role who disagreed with the Institute's 'apolitical'
standpoint, and those wanting to continue with a more 'race relations' -type of approach. For
example, William Ballinger and the liberal association, the 'Friends of Africa', became involved
74 P. Alexander, A/an Paton: A Bibliography (Cape Town & Oxford, ODP, 1995).
75 Lew~ 'Liberals in Politics', p.l09.
76 Rich, White Power, p.126.
77 Macmillan, one of the SAIRR's main critics, had left South Africa in 1932.
78 Rich, White Power, pp.73-75.
79 Rich, 'South African Institute of Race Relations', p.83.
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with the development of trade unionism amongst African workers from the late 1930s and
early 1940s.80 His interest was in contrast to certain liberals in the SAIRR, who considered this
type of involvement too radical.
During this period there was a noticeable increase in the number of reports written by liberals
outlining possible solutions which were based on an economic analysis. 81 An academic
economic liberalism had developed in the 1930s through liberal figures such as Macmillan,
Frankel and the Ballingers. Liberals urged the Smuts Administration to accept economic
integration and permanent urbanisation of Africans. The work of the influential liberal
historian, C.W.de Kiewiet, was amongst those pressing this viewpoint. 82 While the influx of
Africans into cities and towns created a problem for the government's segregationist policies,
liberals saw this as a natural process which would require basic socio-economic reforms. They
believed that economic growth would necessitate political reform and dissolve the structures of
racial segregation. The government had tried but had failed to prevent the permanent
settlement ofblack people in towns during the war, and Smuts had announced in 1942 that
'segregation has fallen on evil days' .83 However, any optimistic hopes that liberals may have
entertained in the early 1940s faded after 1946. The government became increasingly reactive
as it came under mounting pressure from opposition on the right to deal with the demands of
black political organisations.
During the 1940s there was an increase in political activism amongst liberals. Many came to
recognise that black people needed direct political representation, rather than indirectly through
the existing structures. These liberals warned that unless some concessions were made, it might
be too late to halt the complete radicalisation ofblack political opinion. By 1946 Brookes,
Molteno and Margaret Ballinger favoured a common-roll for all with a qualified franchise. 84
80 WilIiam Ballinger had experience in this field as he had originally come to South Africa in 1928 to
advise the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU).
81 D.Everatt, 'The making ofa liberal programme 1947-1950', Collected Seminar Papers on The
Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, rcs, London, vol.15 (1990).
82 See: C.W.de Kiewiet, History ofSouth Africa, Social and Economic (London, OUP, 1941).
83 Quoted in Lewsen, 'Liberals in Politics', p.I05.
84 Lewsen, 'Liberals in Politics'. p.1IO.
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Liberal activity was still limited to working within government structures in order to influence
it in right direction, and members of the white liberal establishment called on the black political
leadership to moderate its demands. According to Brookes they had hoped to influence
government 'slowly and steadily ... in the right direction'. &S Unfortunately, they only realised
after 1948, when it was too late, that their pace had been too slow.
The influences on African political thought increased in number and diversity after the First
World War. As discussed, the older generation of African political leaders was conservative,
and the ANC represented their elitist interests. The organisation had rejected the radicalism of
the ICD during the 1920s, and had gone through both a decline and a conservative phase under
Pixley Seme's leadership in the 1930s. Black political demands were not radical in the inter-
war years in the sense that they did not amount to any major changes in the existing political
system. Refonn measures were to be obtained through acceptable constitutional channels,
which included working with white liberals in attempts to influence government. Demands
included an equal access to education, a more equitable distribution of land, and an extension
of the Cape franchise. They anticipated a gradual process toward a 'common society'. These
demands, however, seemed radical to the majority of the white population. As their avenues of
political expression were limited, Afiican political leaders were dependent to a large degree on
the white liberal establishment. During the 1940s black politics had begun to enter a more
assertive phase with the growth of African nationalism. As part of this process, some African
political leaders became critical of the leadership provided by white liberals, and the liberal
guidance of the Joint Councils and the SAIRR was no longer accepted as automatic. 86
Expectations had been raised during the war, and there had been a significant rise in black,
especially African., political activity. The ANC had been revitalised by its reorganisation under
Alfred Xuma (elected president in 1940) and by an upsurge ofpopular protest in the 1940s.87
Although the ANC was still essentially a liberal organisation during the 1940s, its demands and
methods had changed reflecting the sense ofurgency and fiustration felt by its leaders. The
&S Brookes, South African Pilgrimage, pp.79, 101.
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shift to a more radical position in the ANC became evident during the 1940s as younger
intellectuals in the Youth League (established in 1944) rose within the ranks. Tom Lodge
regards the emergence of the ANC Youth League as one of the most important developments
(besides the radicalising influence of communism) in African politics during the 1940s. 8g It
introduced into the ANC ideas of African nationalism that it had hitherto lacked. These
younger members were impatient with the traditional conciliatory methods of the ANC and
dissatisfied with its failure to become a mass movement. 89 The liberal establishment called for
the ANC to moderate its demands and methods, which elicited hostility from the organisatio~
mainly from Youth Leaguers. Even moderate African leaders in the NRC were demanding
direct political representation by this time. 90 From the mid-1940s onwards the idea of possibly
using extra-parliamentary methods and passive resistance to initiate political change was
gaining acceptance. This is evident in the ANC's policy document, the 1949 'Programme of
Action'. The political activity of the South African Indian Congress (SAlC)91 had also
increased with organised passive resistance campaigns against the state's assault on Indian
rights during the 1940s. By 1950 talks on co-operation had taken place between the ANC and
the SAlC with the 'Doctors' Pact' of 1947.92
The alternative non-Afiican influence to that of liberalism on Afiican politics was that of
communism. Although the Communist party of south Africa (CPSA) had been multi-racial in
character, it had not made much ofan impact on black politics before the 1940s.93 According
to Lodge, the growing ties between the ANC and the CPSA was one of the most important
developments in African politics during this decade. 94 The CPSA had begun to experience a
revival towards the end of the 1930s after experiencing a period of decline. Its influence
88 T. Lodge. Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (London, Longman, 1983), p.lO.
89 T.Karis & G.M.Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, Volume 3 of T.Karis & G.M.Carter
(eds), From Protest to ChaJ/enge, 1882-1964 (Californi~ Stanford University, 1977), p.4.
90 Rich, Hope and Despair, p.8l.
91 The SAlC was fonned in 1919. The Natal Indian Congress (NIC) (fonned in 1894 by Gandhi) and
the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) fonned part of the organisation. By the late 1940s the SAlC had come
under the radicalising influence ofcommunis~as a number of its leaders were communists.
92 Drs. A.B.Xuma (ANC), YusufDadoo (TIC) and G. M. ('Monty') Naicker (NIC).
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increased during the course of the 1940s, and helped to radicalise both African and Indian
politics. There was initially suspicion of white communists from the ANC, especially from
members of the Youth League and other Africanists who resisted the influence of communists
in the late 1940s. The CPSA's involvement in black politics was opposed by the government
which had conducted raids on its offices after the 1946 Mineworkers' Strike, and the
organisation was banned in 1950 (The Suppression of Communism Act).
In the light of the above discussion it is interesting to note the differences, generally speaking,
between communists and liberals which may have accounted for the success of the former in
black politics in the political climate of 1940s. Besides obvious ideological differences, the
political styles of communists and liberals differed. Communists were prepared to work more
closely with black political organisations and supported extra-parliamentary methods of
opposition. They provided a radicalising influence to black politics while liberals urged black
~eaders to moderate their demands. Many white liberals in the late 1940s were anti-communist.
One characteristic, however, that communists and liberals in South Africa had in common was
that they were small in number and were mostly white intellectuals, although most liberals were
solidly middle-class while communists were more likely from a working class or lower middle
class background.
The radicalisation ofblack political thought and activity during the 1940s resulted in the
marginalisation of the liberal influence over the African political leadership. During the Second
WorId War the SAIRR came under increasing pressure from African leaders to make its
political position clear. It chose to remain 'apolitical' and by the end of the War was
increasingly out of touch with African political opinio~ especially after the 1946 Mineworkers'
Strike and the adjournment of the NRC. 9S There was already evidence of the shift away from
the white liberal influences of the SAIRR with the election of Hymie Basner, an ex-
Communist, as a Natives' Representative in 1942. He defeated the director of the SAIRR at
the time, Rheinallt-Jones. Brookes's influence in the SAIRR had increased by the late 1940s
(after the retirement ofRheinallt-Jones) and he was successful in pushing the organisation into
9S Rich, 'South African Institute ofRace Relations', p.83.
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a more assertive but still neutral position. 96 The Institute established more active 'front'
organisations, such as the Civil Rights League in 1948.
It was during the late 1940s that ideas about forming a new political party began to circulate
amongst liberals. On the whole, liberals supported the UP, and Hofineyr was seen as their only
hope in the party. He was considered the likely leader of a potential liberal party. Overtures had
been made to him from as early as 1938 to lead a new party but he declined, feeling that the
time was not right and that liberals should rather form associations to spread liberal ideas. It
was felt that HofineYf would lead a new party but would not take the first step in starting it.
Leo Marquard, a lawyer and well-known liberal, tried to persuade him in 1946 to lead a new
party but nothing developed.97
During the 1940s, and especially after the 1948 general election defeat of the UP by the NP,
African and Afrikaner nationalism came to dominate the political terrain. The position of
liberalism as some sort .of 'middle-ground' was thus threatened by African nationalism on the
one hand and Afrikaner nationalism on the other. The growth of African nationalism has
already been discussed above. An increasingly radical Afrikaner nationalism became a political
force as the colour question superseded the 'Boer-British' issue during the 1930s and
Afrikaner nationalists wanted to ensure the survival ofwhite supremacy as well as of the
Afrikaner. Liberalism became the 'ideological antithesis to militant Afrikaner nationalism' .98
1.5 Natal: A Different Sort of 'Liberal Tradition'?
A liberal tradition did not develop in the Colony ofNatal during the nineteenth century as it
had in the Cape. At the talks over the proposed Union in 1910 Natal fitted more easily into a
category with the two Boer Republics than with the Cape Colony. The small liberal tradition
which did emerge amongst Natal's white population had strong ties with Christian missionary
96 White, 'Maurice Webb', pp.8-9.
97 APC, PC 2/6/6/1, P.M.Bro~ 'A History of the Liberal Party of South Africa', Wlpublished
manuscript, pp.4-5.
98 Legassick, 'The Rise of Modem South African Liberalism', p.29.
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activity. Ofmore interest perhaps than the lack of a noteworthy liberal tradition amongst the
white population was the development of a liberalism amongst the African Christian converts
who fonned part of an economically successful group, the kho/wa, from which the political
leadership came. As has been demonstrated so far in this chapter, there is no straightforward
definition of liberalism in South Africa, and this is particularly true in the case of Natal. Many
of those who were considered liberal, both black and white, might only be accepted as such in
the South African context.
The small white liberal presence in Natal in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first
half of the twentieth century was neither effective nor influential enough to have any major
impact on political developments in the Colony. While individuals like Bishop Colenso99 had
personal influence, no distinctive liberal tradition similar to that of the Cape ever developed.
Despite their mid-nineteenth century Victorian English origins, British settlers did not display
any signs of producing 'an indigenous liberalism' in Natal. 100 The situation in Natal did not lend
itself to the fonnation of a settler liberalism as
'the resilience of African society and the weakness of the colonial state
(together with the unwillingness of the British to foot the bill) had led almost
from the start to set of policies dependent on conserving and manipulating
aspects of the African precapitalist social order'. 101
A segregationist ideology had therefore developed together with a 'virulent British racism'
which was 'only partially modified by a more liberal missionary ethos' .102
There were particular features ofNatal's political situation that allowed for its unique character
in the South African context and which need to be taken into consideration when examining
the development of liberalism in this region. Firstly, there was a str~ng missionary presence
which provided a base for the growth of liberalism. Secondly, the white population was vastly
99 John Colenso came to Natal from England in January 1854 as the new Bishop of the Anglican
Church, and subsequently became a controversial figure in the Colony. See J.Guy, The Hereti~: A Study ofthe
Life ofJohn Wil/iam Co/enso, 1814-1883 (Pietermaritzburg, University ofNataI Press, 1983).
100 Trapido, 'The friends', p.252.
101 S.M~ The Ambiguities ofDependence in South Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1986), p.58.
102 Ibid., p.58.
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outnumbered by Africans. This, together with the large number of Indians, allowed for the
development of a strong reactionary response amongst whites. Thirdly, there was the fear that
the Colony and later the Province might lose its ties with Britain. The desire of white Natalians
to maintain their 'English-ness' and their British traditions was often seen to be as important as
black/white racial issues.
The vast majority of white colonists in Natal were British and were culturally homogenous at
the turn of the century. Their fears and interests were often pandered to by the colonial
government. Members of the (white) Natal Parliament were mostly successful farmers and
businessmen, and were anxious to preserve their positions and privileges. 103 The Colony had
eventually been granted Responsible Government in 1893, and this gave the Natal Parliament
a free hand in shaping the colony's 'native affairs'. The African population suffered the most
from the 'unpredictability of the choppy sea of Natal politics' after the granting of Responsible
Government, with the enactment of several racialistic measures by the Natal Parliament. 104 The
general view of the Natal colonists was against the extension of political rights to Africans. The
massive disparity in numbers helps explain the fear of the white colonists ofbeing 'swamped'
by Africans and therefore their hostility towards even a qualified 'native' franchise. The Indian
population did not escape either. They were deprived of the parliamentary franchise in 1896,
and further moves were made to deprive them of the municipal vote. 105 It also became
increasingly clear that it was unlikely that the majority of Indians would be repatriated.
There was a noticeable increase in the racial prejudices ofNatal's white colonial population
from the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century, and the 'native question'
began to receive more attention. Economic factors were probably the most determining in this
development. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the balance of political power in
Natal had swung towards settler commercial and agrarian interests. 106 The development of
103 A. Dunimy, 'Towards Unio~1900-1910' in A.Duminy & B.Guest (eds), Natal and Zululand, From
Earliest Times to 1910 (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press & Shuter&Shooter. 1989). pp.407-408.
104 Brookes & Webb, A History ofNatal. p.216.
105 Ibid., A History ofNatal, p.288.
106 S.Meintjes, 'Edendale,1850-1906: A case study of rural transformation and class formation in a
South African mission station in Natal', PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
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merchant capital and white commercial farming resulted in a demand for labour and land, and
fear of competition. The racist sentiments of the white colonists were futher fuelled by the
Bambatha Rebellion in 1906.
There was no significant liberal movement amongst colonists in the early twentieth century that
had much effect on government. But there were attempts to improve the lot of Africans. A
group of sympathisers formed the Native Reform League whose members included Maurice
Evans (Durban member of the Legislative Assembly), Marshall Campbell (member of the
Legislative Council) and Harriette Colenso (daughter ofBishop Colenso). Evans drew a
distinction between the 'civilised' kholwa and the 'tribal' Africans. He suggested that the
system of exemption and enfranchisement should be retained for the former while the latter
should have a paternalistic type of self-government. 107 This was not the view of the majority of
white Natalians who supported the system of customary ('native') law and 'rule by chiefs'
which had been implemented by Theophilus Shepstone, the then Secretary for Native Affairs,
in the mid-1800s for all Africans.
There was no evidence of any liberal inclination amongst the Natal delegates at the National
Convention in 1908 and of the attempts by concerned groups to influence the Natal Parliament
to protect the rights of its black population. The delegates felt even more strongly about the
question of the extension ofthe Cape 'native' franchise to the rest of the union than they did
about the federation issue. (The Colony was strongly in favour of a federal system rather than a
union.) Frederick Moor, the Natal Prime Minister and one of the delegates, even suggested
that the franchise be dropped in the Cape. He felt that Afiicans were incapable ofbecoming
'civilised' and explained that this was the opinion ofwhite Natalians. All five of the Natal
delegates voted against the compromise eventually agreed on for Union. 108
The small number ofmore progressive thinkers in 1910 was not enough to organise an
effective lobby for Afiican rights, let alone form some sort of political organisation. A group of
1988, p.320.
107 Duminy, 'Towards Union', p.407.
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white sympathizers, including Harriette Colenso, formed a Committee to promote the interests
of the African people in the discussions over the Union proposals. They assisted the Natal
Native Congress (NNC) in its attempts to influence and put pressure on the Natal Parliament,
as well as the British government, to protect African interests in the drafting of the Act of
Union. However, their efforts seem to have had very little success, as the interests of the Indian
and African populations of the Colony were ignored at the National Convention as well as in
the drafting of the Union agreement.
The leadership of formal African political organisations in Natal was drawn from the kholwa
and could be described as espousing broadly liberal values. A modern political consciousness
amongst the African population in Natal had first developed within this group. The kholwa had
converted to Christianity through the efforts of many missionary endeavours in the Colony, and
it was through missionary influences that they absorbed European values and ideas. Their
conversion to the Christian faith thus included a cultural transition:
'Through the church and literacy, the kholwa were in contact with a
broad set ofbeliefs in which the importance attached to Christian faith
for spiritual life was matched in social and political life by the
importance attached to the values of Victorian liberalism.' 109
The kholwa formed the nucleus of a 'new and self-consciously distinct social group in Zulu-
speaking society' which constituted part of an emerging middle class or petty bourgeoisie. 110
Most of this group had received some sort ofbasic education from the missionaries and their
number included land-owning commercial farmers, clergy, teachers, lawyers, interpreters,
clerks and traders.
The missionary presence in Natal provided at least some fertile ground for the growth of
liberalism in Natal. There were Anglic~ Methodist and Roman Catholic missionary
organisations, as well as the congregationalist American Board ofMissions, which were active
in Natal and Zululand. Missionaries had up until 1910 provided the only education for Africans
and after Union they continued with this tradition. Perhaps the most well-known institution
109 N. Cope, To Bind The Nation (pietermaritzburg, University of Natal, 1993), p.23.
110 Ib'd1 ., p.23.
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was Adams College on the south coast ofNatal. Most leaders of African political organisations
in the first half of the twentieth century had been taught at a mission institution and so been
influenced by liberalism. Missionary organisations also played an important role in the welfare
of Africans by providing medical and social welfare care, such as clinics and orphanages. An
illustrious example of the missionary tradition in Natal was Bishop Colenso. From the
beginning 'it was clear that Colenso looked upon his missionary work among the Zulus as his
most important duty' .111
The kholwa wanted to be distinguished from the rest of the African population and felt that
they should receive 'civilised status' on a par with white settlers in recognition of their
conversion to the Christian way of life. 112 The white settler population were hostile to the idea
of any change in the status of the kholwa, and the Natal colonial government steadfastly
refused to contemplate their exemption from customary ('native') law as a group (they could
.apply for exemption on an individual basis only). This was an ongoing contentious issue
between the colonial government and the kholwa from the 1860s into the 1900s. The changing
circumstances at the tum-of-the-century were unfavourable to the economic and political
development of the emerging African middle-class in Natal. The Natal Native Congress (NNC)
was formed in 1900 to represent the political interests of the kholwa and was led by John
Dube. This organisation was conservative, and its members were typical of the African petty
bourgeoisie in Natal. The political priorities of the kholwa were the extension of the franchise,
freehold land tenure, and 'overall their inclusion as full members in a non-racial South African
middle-class' .113
It was more likely that issues concerning Natal's constitutional status would divide white
opinion than questions of colour. 114 White Natalian politics was provoked into action by issues
such as Anglo-Afrikaner conciliation, a bilingual South Africa and support for the British
III Brookes & Webb, A History o/Natal, pp. 105-106.
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Empire rather than any bills about limiting rights of black people. After 1910, the majority
supported the SAP and then the UP on both national and provincial levels. A minority were
secessionists and wished to defend Natal's place in the British Empire. There was very little
support for the Afrikaner Nationalists up to 1950; this was largely confined to the northern
districts ofNatal which included a larger percentage of Afrikaans-speaking people.
According to Barry White, the most important sphere of liberal activity in the inter-war years in
Natal was urban social welfare. 11s The particular 'social geography' ofNatal after Union
impacted on, and is important in understanding, the type of liberalism which developed. The
majority of the African population in Natal was rural and remained so into the 1940s. This
owed much to the legacy of Shepstone's 'native reserve' system which was implemented in the
mid-1800s in an effort to control African settlement. The basic structure created during the late
1800s remained in place and allowed for the development of a migrant labour system which
offered workers low wages in urban centres, as the rural economy of the reserves was meant to
sustain their families. Economic developments and industrialisation as a consequence of the
First World War created a demand for labour which led to increased urbanisation amongst
Africans and Indians in the inter-war years. There was also pressure created by the economic
decay and overpopulation in the African reserves. Although urbanisation was largely
permanent with the Indian populatio~ the nature of the African workforce remained mainly
migrant.
The effects ofblack urbanisation in the 1920s were of concern to liberal whites, besides
missionaries. As discussed earlier, the emphasis was on social welfare rather than any sort of
direct political action during the inter-war years. This type of activity was fostered by an active
missionary presence in the case ofNatal. Many liberals were involved with missionary
organisations or people in some way. Liberals' endeavours in social welfare have been
criticised for alleviating but not solving the problem. Their concern was not effective nor
influential enough to achieve radical changes, but their interest and practical welfare work
should be credited with some value. 116
11S White, 'Some Thoughts'~ White, 'Maurice Webb', pp.3-4.
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As elsewhere in South Africa, Natalliberals shared a gradualist non-assertive approach to
politics and justified working within government administration and segregated structures as an
attempt to influence developments in a liberal direction. The attitudes of the majority of these
liberals about segregation were not always clear. Natal liberals included some of the leading
ideologues of segregation, notably C.T.Loram. The African political leadership in Natal
maintained a close association with the white liberal establishment, and white liberals continued
to exert an influence on it. White liberals acted as useful intermediaries between African leaders
and the government.
Liberal activity in Natal was mainly through the Joint Councils, and there was little in the way
of liberal research going on in Natal in the 1930s until the establishment of a branch of the
SAIRR office in Durban in 1940. 111 The Institute was influential in Natal liberalism. 118 It was
directed for many years by Maurice Webb in Durban, and since he gave financial assistance to
the Institution, he was largely able to dictate its activities. 119 He supported the Institution's
decision not to become an active political body and resented attempts by certain liberals to
influence it in a more politically active direction.
Natal had little to offer when compared with Johannesburg and Cape Town as centres of
liberalism in South Africa. The white liberal establishment in Natal from the 1920s was
composed of an eclectic group ofpeople. The following discussion on well-known liberals is
perhaps the best way of illustrating this. C.T.Loram was a prominent liberal figure in the inter-
war years and a proponent of the more conservative liberal political line. Brookes maintains
that in hindsight Loram was more ofa 'broad-minded conservative' than a liberal, but at the
time he was considered a liberal and was sincere in his desire for the advance ofAfricans. 120 He
was involved in African education, in the Native Affairs Commission (1920) under Smuts and
played a significant role in the formation of the Joint Council movement and later the SAIRR.
He encouraged those with an interest in African advancement to form or join 'Native Welfare
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Associations', which led to the fonnation of 'Social Clubs' where black and white could meet.
Afiican liberals were very often influenced by lectures given at these clubs by prominent liberal
figures. 121
Maurice Webb and Mabel Palmer were considered liberal in South African context and this
seems largely based on their activism in social welfare and liberal organisations rather than their
actual beliefs. 122 Both had emigrated from Britain in the 1920s and brought with them the
Fabian socialist ideas popular in England at the time. Webb also had strong Quaker sympathies.
These leanings point to an interest in the less fortunate and an obligation to help, which formed
the basis of the pragmatic, social welfare type of liberalism. According to White, Webb was
the epitome of inter-war social welfare liberalism in Natal. l23 He was involved in the
administration of over thirty welfare committees and two Joint Councils, he was the chainnan
of the Board of Governors at Adam's College, a Council member at the Natal University
College, and the regional representative of the SAIRR (he became president of the national
body in 1943). Mabel Palmer was representative of the liberal presence at the University of
Natal in Durban, where she was a lecturer during the 1930s. She played a significant role in the
welfare work of the Durban Joint Council, and in organising tertiary education for Indian and
African students. 124 Although mainly concerned with education, she had some contact with the
ICU in the 1920s, and with the Ballingers' co-operative schemes in Natal in the 1930s.
Edgar Brookes was an important liberal figure in Natal from the 1930s, who was also well-
known on a national level. Besides holding a number of positions and serving as Principal of
Adams College (1934-1945), his most important position as a Natal liberal was probably his
term as the Natives' Representative Senator for Natal from 1937 to 1952. Brookes's
recantation ofhis earlier support for the policy of segregation has already been documented.
His eventual acceptance of the 'Hertzog Bills' as they appeared in 1936 is also interesting.
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After initially rejecting any compromise over the Cape franchise in the early 193Os, he began to
have second thoughts in 1935 when it appeared that the bills would become law. 125 He then
considered a position representing Africans in Parliament and accepted a nomination for the
position of senator from the Zulu Regent, Chief Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu. Brookes was also
active in the SAIRR from the early 1930s, although his influence of was only really seen in the
late 1940s.
What of the African liberals in Natal? This question raises more questions than can be
answered here. Suffice it to say that basic liberal ideals remained central to the political
convictions of liberally-inclined Africans, alongside the influences ofboth Zulu ethnic
nationalism and Afiican nationalism. African liberals did not have a set of rigid political
principles, but rather a variety of encompassing beliefs allowing for different aspects to
develop to their political orientation. Shula Marks describes the ideology of the African
political elite in 1910 as 'an inclusive, liberal-democratic nationalism' .126 In the changing and
often contradictory world .0fNatal politics, an ambiguous position was sometimes expedient
for political survival. 127
Both Selby Msimang and John Dube were involved with the formation of the SANNC (later
the ANC) in 1912, where the NNC merged with the new organisation. Dube became the first
national president, but was ousted from this position in 191 7 for his ambivalent view on
segregation. The ANC in Natal then split with a small branch staying loyal to the national body
and the more conservative NNC being dominated by Dube. He was now forced to mobilize his
own support in Natal and seems to have turned increasingly towards the Zulu royal family. 128
The alliance between Dube and the NNC and the Zulu royal family, represented by Solomon,
can be seen as a move on Dube' s part to provide an alternative focus to growing radicalism
after the First World War and as a bulwark against radical change. 129 The political hopes of the
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kholwa had been dashed by legislation since Union, and they now looked to the rural tribal elite
for new political allies. 130
On the whole, African politicians were conservative in Natal in the first half of the twentieth
century. The NNC was practically the only active political organisation in Natal, except for a
period from the mid-1920s until the early 1930s when the lCD dominated. There was generally
a lack of political mobilIsation and organisation amongst the African working class, mainly
because of its migrant nature, before the 1940s.131 From 1946 the Natal ANC was controlled
by A.W.G. (George) Champion, who was comparatively moderate. 132 When Brookes toured
Natal as a Senator he found that 'bread and butter' issues, especially requests for more land,
were more commonplace than questions about the franchise or the general status of Africans in
South Africa. 133 The radicalising influence of the ANC Youth League was only seen in the late
1940s as it expanded into Natal during 1947,134 Champion's conservatism is clearly
demonstrated by his angry reaction to the enrollment of a large group ofyoung ANC
supporters from Durban by Selby Msimang, the provincial secretary. 135 ,At a subsequent
meeting, Lutuli was voted in as the Natal president of the ANC, and Msimang remained the
secretary.
Reactions to the. 1935-1936 version of the 'Hertzog Bills' seem to have been varied and
complicated by a series of alliances between various interest groups in Natal. Brookes's
alliance with John Dube to get the proposal for a Native Representatives' Council (NRC)
passed by the ANC was successful, but it carried the proviso that the Cape franchise was not
abolished. 136 Some African leaders thought the proposed NRC might open up further channels
of influence with the government. 137 Dube, Champion, Msimang and Albert Lutuli belonged to
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the NRC. 138 They did not, however, represent the ANC in this capacity.
Msimang had returned to Natal during the 1940s. 139 He had been active in labour organisation
in Bloemfontein during 1930s where he had been arrested and detained. He settled in Edendale
near Pietermaritzburg (then a freehold area) after having managed some family farms at
Driefontein, a freehold area near Ladysmith. In Edendale, he was involved with the local
branch of the ANC and became the provincial secretary. He was also involved with community
issues and served on a number of organisations, including the Local Health Commission and
the Edendale Advisory Board.
White liberal philanthropists in Natal extended their social welfare concerns to the urbanised
Indian communities. Contact between Indians and white liberals was also maintained through
the Indo-European Joint Councils. The vast majority of South Afiica's Indian population was
. (and still is) based in Natal. 140 In the early twentieth century the Indian community was
fractionalised by differences in religio~ language and class. Politics was dominated by the
conservative trader and professional classes in the SAlC and the NlC. During the 1940s a
radical element, which was strongly influenced by communism, was gaining prominence in
Indian politics. These educated younger members of the Indian population were looking to
include the working class which up until this point had been excluded. This increase in political
activism in 1940s was in response to increased legislation discriminating against Indians. Indian
politics was split with the 'accommodationist' element still working with the government while
the more radical section sought to oppose segregationist legislation with a passive resistance
campaign. Liberals in parliament tried to prevent measures like 1946 'Pegging Act' from being
passed by the Smuts Administration.
138 Brookes & Webb, A History ofNatal, pp.296-297.
139 APC, PC 24/1/1/2 & PC 12/1/2/2, Selby Msimang Papers, Notes for proposed biography.
140 For the following discussion: U.Mesthrie, 'The Cape Town Agreement and its effect on Natal
Indian Politics,1927 to 1934', Conference Paper, Conference on the History of Natal and Zululand, University
of Natal (1985); M.Palmer, History ofthe Indians in Natal (Westport,Conn., Greenwood, 1977); M.Swan,
'Ideology in organised Indian politics, 1891-1948' in S.Marks & S.Trapido, The politics ofrace, class and
nationalism (London, Longman, 1987); W.B.White, 'Passive Resistance in Natal, 1946-48', Journal ofNatal
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Conclusion
There is no definition of South African liberalism in the first half of the twentieth century which
could adequately describe all liberals. South African liberals occupied positions which were
unique to that liberalism and which must be viewed in context of the time and place. Liberals
were found in various types of organisations, and in groups as disparate as the UP and the
ANC. What held them together was a desire to see improved 'race relations' in South Africa
and the belief that change should be achieved through constitutional gradualism. Liberalism in
South Africa was shaped in many respects as a response to developments in the country, and
did not develop in a logical progression from the Cape Tradition to the more democratic
liberalism of the LP in the late 1950s.
No endemic liberal tradition developed amongst Natal's white settlers as it had in the Cape
Colony, although the missionary presence influenced a small minority of whites and a larger
number of African Christian converts, the kholwa. The liberal ideals and political methods
shared by this group 'were typical of moderate African politics into the 1940s. The small group
of white liberals failed to influence the colonial government before Union, and thereafter the
focus of white liberals concentrated on social welfare and education. Those who were involved
in politics tended to be conservative and opposed a more active role in politics, preferring to
influence the government in 'the right direction' .
Liberals, like the majority of the South African population, did not expect the UP to lose the
1948 general election to the Nationalists. This defeat had important repercussions for liberalism
in South Africa. The set of principles guiding the new government were so contradictory to
those of the liberals that it made any compromise between them and that government
impossible. 141 The possibility of liberals losing their political influence under the new
government became a reality. For example, Brookes was immediately under pressure to resign
from the Native Affairs Commission but waited until 1950 to do so. 142 Furthermore, liberals no
longer had access to government ministers as they had with the UP.
141 White, 'Maurice Webb: 35 years of Race Relations in Natal', p.19.
142. Brookes, South African Pilgrimage, pp.95-98.
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A prime consideration of the liberal establishment after the 1948 electoral defeat of the UP was
to ensure the return of that party in the forthcoming general election in 1953. Although the
bulk of the group of liberals under discussion had by this time developed major policy
differences with the UP, they still supported it as a political party. It was seen as the only
option for the return to constitutional gradualism and to prevent a further breakdown in
relations with black political leaders, and a split in the opposition was to be avoided. But it was
during these years that liberals recognised the ineffectiveness of the UP in halting the apartheid
legislation of the Nationalist government and its failure to modify party policy in a liberal
direction. Furthennore, the radicalisation and shift towards militancy within organised black
political opposition., especially the ANC, in response to new restrictive legislation made liberals
aware of their loss of influence in black politics and of the urgency of finding a political
solution. The events after 1948 forced them to seriously consider forming a political party as
an alternative option to the UP.
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CHAPTER TWO
What alternatives? Reluctant choices and liberal principles
in the formation ofthe Liberal Party, 1950 -1955
Introduction
The 1948 general election victory of the Nationalist Party (NP) had serious repercussions for
liberalism in South African. The changes that took place in the following years - the
beginnings of the policy of apartheid implemented by the new government, the radicalisation of
black political organisations which resulted in the Defiance Campaign of 1952, and the critical
importance of the 1953 general election for progressive whites in South Africa - realigned
political boundaries and forced liberals to face up to their commitment to the extension of
political rights to black South Africans. By 1953, the first serious legislation of the apartheid
policy of the Nationalist government had been passed, and the United Party (UP) seemed
unable to reverse the general political direction that South Africa was taking. Furthermore, the
trend towards militancy in African political organisations was an indication of growing black
nationalism. Liberals found themselves unable to exert influence over either the government or
radicalised African political opinion. 1
The failure ofthe UP in the 1953 general election galvanised liberals into forming a separate
political party, something which had been discussed with increasing frequency from the late
1940s. The formation of the Liberal Party (LP) in May was welcomed by neither the left nor the
right. These Liberals had progressive views in the context of the time in that they were more
advanced than the rest of the white electorate, but their views lagged behind those of the far
left. In Natal, the formation of the LP was somewhat overshadowed by that of the United
Federal Party (UFP), but it still managed to attract attentio~ particularly amongst the black
political organisations.
1 D. Everatt, 'The making ofa liberal programme 1947-1950', in Collected Seminar Papers on The
Societies of Southem Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ICS, Londo~ vol.15 (1990), p.149.
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The Party itself was not free from internal disputes over policy in the early years as its members
faced dilemmas over its main role in the South African political arena., which nearly resulted in
the break-up of the Party. Although the dominance of the conservative leadership was
challenged by an emerging more radical section, the view of the former group held sway as the
Party was not yet strong enough to survive without the respectability lent to it by this
prominent group ofLiberals. Although the Natal Division contained a mixture of radical and
conservative elements at its formation, the developing radical trend had manifested itself in the
Division by 1956 - a year which marked a new path in the history of the party.
2.1 1948- early 1953: Years oftumult in liberal circles
The liberals' political party of choice had of necessity been the UP, and the party's defeat in the
1948 general election by the NP, led by Or D.F.Malan, was a shock to the liberal establishment.
It was a blow from which the UP would never recover. Many liberals had tried to influence UP
policy in a liberal direction and to secure the nomination of progressive candidates before the
election. Hopes of liberalising the UP from within were dashed with the death of lH. Hofineyr
in December 1948, and there was no obvious successor to him in the party. By the late 1940s
the general views of the group of liberals under study had diverged sharply even from those in
the progressive wing of the UP.
Despite being unable, so far, to influence UP policy, and set back by the death of Hofineyr, the
liberals nevertheless felt that they should support that party as it was the only parliamentary
alternative to the NP. It was of prime consideration not to split the opposition in order to oust
the Nationalists in the next general election scheduled for 1953. They saw the UP as the only
hope for a return to the path of constitutional gradualism in the reform of race relations.
According to Edgar Brookes, however, liberals were in fact deluding themselves by thinking
that the 'triumph ofapartheid was only a temporary aberration of the electorate' .2
Although there was talk amongst diverse groups of liberals about starting a new political party,
particularly after Margaret Ballinger's announcement in 1949 that she was considering such an
2 E.H. Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977), p.105.
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option, nothing concrete developed. Liberals had looked to Hofmeyr to start a new party. Since
his death, Ballinger was considered the next choice. Not all sections of the liberal establishment
agreed with the idea of starting a political party, though. The South African Institute of Race
Relations (SAIRR), under the directorship of Quintyn Whyte, was against liberals entering the
arena of party politics. 3 The SAIRR supported the UP and expected it to return as the
governing political party.4 However, both Whyte and Brookes saw the need for the SAIRR to
adopt a more assertive political policy after 1950.5 Whyte asked Alan Paton' s opinion in late
1952 of establishing a 'Moderate Liberal party'.6 Paton's reply gives an indication of the
difference in liberal opinion. He pointed out that it was meaningless to have a moderate liberal
party, as the UP's efforts at being 'moderately liberal' had achieved nothing. Paton approached
Maurice Webb in November 1952 about establishing a liberal party after the 1953 election, but
Webb felt it better to work from within the UP. 7 This view seems to have been shared by others
in the liberal establishment.
What was clear by the early 1950s was that liberals had failed to provide. a challenging liberal
solution to the country's racial problems. Liberals had been active in producing programmes
and reports during these years which dealt mainly with economic issues (mainly the economic
integration ofblack people) while ignoring political ones, especially pertaining to the colour
question. 8 These reports were largely dismissed by both the government and black leaders.
Meanwhile, the Malan Administration took the first steps towards developing apartheid
legislation during the early 1950s, and its policies undid any progress that had been made under
the previous Smuts Ministry. The character and momentum of the Native Affairs Department
began to change, too, with the appointment ofDr H.F.Verwoerd as Minister of Native Affairs
in October 1950. A number of laws were passed discriminating against black people in almost
every aspect of their lives, from education, through employment, to areas of residence and land
3 Everatt, 'The making of a liberal programme', p.147~ P. Ric~ White Power and the Liberal
Conscience (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1984), p.1l7.
4 J.D.Rheinalt-Jones, 'At the Crossroads', SAIRR Presidential Address, 20 January 1953.
5 W.B. White, 'Maurice Webb: 35 Years of Race Relations in Natal, 1921-1956', Conference Paper,
Conference on the History of Natal and Zululand.. University of Natal, July 1985, pp.20-21.
6 Ibid., p.23.
7 Ibid.
S See: Everatt, 'The making of a liberal programme'.
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ownership. The government also took finn action against any opposition with measures such as
the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), which it used indiscriminately against any person
or organisation whom it deemed to be a danger to the security of the state.
The Nationalist government's proposal in 1951 to alter the constitution by removing the
Coloured voters from the common roll in the Cape, as Hertzog had removed the Africans in
1936, elicited an outcry from liberals and UP supporters. It was more the fact that the NP was
trying to alter the constitution than the question of Coloureds losing their rights that troubled
most liberally-minded whites. For example, the Black Sash started out as a largely English-
speaking middle-class white women's organisation opposing the attack on the constitution, but
did not at that time suggest that political rights should be extended to other racial groups.
Similarly, but more significant politically, there was the formation and growth of the Torch
~ommando in response to the latest move by the government. This extra-parliamentary
organisation was' made up largely of white ex-servicemen. It was a mass protest movement with
principles generally recognised in South Africa as liberal values. It aroused much interest and its
paid-up membership increased to 125,000 within a year. 9 It opposed the arbitrary manner in
which the NP had tried to alter the constitution but did not advocate the extension of political
rights to black people. Its membership was exclusively white, and it was for this reason that
white liberals like Peter Brown did not join the organisation. 10 The Torch Commando became
closely linked to the UP, something that many members had sought to avoid. This was
especially true in Natal. 11 The independence of the movement failed as it joined the UP on its
platform for the 1953 general election together with the Labour Party12 in a United Democratic
Front. The movement gradually dissolved after the election.
Liberal activity increased during 1952, with a number of groups being formed and discussion
between them intensifying. This year has been described as a 'year of ferment' which made
9 1. Robertso~ Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971), p.54.
10 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
11 Robertso~ Liberalism, p.59.
12 A 'al'
SOCl 1st party that had become more progressive about colour issues after the Second World War.
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liberals think about their position. 13 Although the call for a new political party was being
championed by various liberal groups, the South African Liberal Group (SALG) was the first
attempt at forming a more explicitly political liberal organisation. It was founded by Oscar
Wollheim, a prominent Cape liberal, in January 1952 in Cape Town. Its main aim was to put
pressure on the UP, which was the typical response of the white liberal establishment at the
time.
Although the centres of South African liberalism in the early 1950s were Cape Town and
Johannesburg, there was renewed liberal activity in Natal. The first meeting of liberals took
place in June 1952 in Pietermaritzburg at the invitation ofPeter Brown. 14 He was contemplating
an organisation 'something between a political party and a discussion group'. It was formed
mainly in response to the realisation that the UP was ineffective and the political situation in
South Africa was deteriorating. The group continued to meet during 1952. While the group
was mainly white, a few leading Indians and Africans also joined. Most noteworthy was the
membership of SelbyMsimang. Paton, who had moved back to Natal in late 1948, had become
more politically active by late 1952. He attended a meeting of Brown's group in October and
joined. He then later formed a group in Durban with Father Bill Evans from the TocH
settlement at Botha's Hill. The Berea branch of the UP in Durban contained a number of
progressive university staffmembers, such as Hans Meidner, Hilda and Leo Kuper, and Jean
and Ken Hill, who supported a move away from the UP. Meidner was born in Germany of
Jewish parents, and had fled that country in 1938. They became some of the Natal LP's first
active members and were to form the basis of the Durban branch of the Party. I S
Msimang had met Brown in Edendale, where Brown worked for the Local Health Commission
and later the YMCA Msimang's increasingly active position within the Natal ANC in the early
1950s had lost him his job. 16 Since the African National Congress (ANC) could not afford to
13 APC, PC 2/6/6/1, P.M.Brown, 'A History of the Liberal Party of South Africa', unpublished
manuscript, p.7.
14 For the following discussion: InteIView with P.Brown, 25/3/1998; Brown, 'History', pp.9-10;
A.Paton, Journey Continued (Cape Town, David Philip, 1988), pp. 62-63, 67.
15 APC, PC 2/2/1/3, H.Meidner to P.Brown, November 1964.
16 For the following discussion: APC, PC 12/1/2/2, Selby Msimang Papers, Notes for proposed
biography..
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keep him on as a full-time secretary, he resigned his position as the provincial secretary but
remained a member. His resignation from active politics was a condition of his new employment
as a Messenger of the Court with the Bantu Affairs Commission, which he got with the help of
Edgar Brookes. He became an active member of the Pietermaritzburg liberal group which he
found 'fulfilled all my beliefs in the liberation of my people' .
In Natal, liberals were able to meet socially with people of all races with similar ideas about a
'common society' in South Africa. 17 The International Club in Durban had a multi-racial and
varied membership and was well supported during the late 1940s and early 1950s. It seems that
many lasting friendships were made here, especially between white liberals and Indian people
belonging to the Natal Indian Congress (NIC). The Club in Pietermaritzburg, unfortunately, did
not last long. The SAIRR in Durban had a number of keen members and organised various
functions. Although the above meetings were not directly political, they gave progressive whites
a chance to mix with people of other races, something that was practically unheard of at the
time and impossible anywhere else. 18
Despite the formation of liberal groups and the suggestions of forming a separate political party,
there remained a diversity of liberal opinion in South Africa, a factor which was to cause
problems later in the LP. The following illustrates this point well. In the Transvaal two groups
had formed in Johannesburg, but were distinctly different from each other. 19 The first group was
the 'Ballinger Group' and was seen as the more 'respectable' of the two. The other group was
radical in comparison and was led by Jack Unterhalter and Jock Isacowitz. The members of this
group were more in touch with the mood ofblack political opinion and more flexible over
policy and strategy. lsacowitz had been a member of the Communist Party of South Africa
(CPSA), but had left before 1948.20 It is indicative of the changing m<?od of politics in South
Africa (and somewhat ironic) that the Ballingers were now considered conservative, whereas
17 APC, R Vigne's interviews with J.Hill, 15/2/1995, & C.K.Hill, 1/3/1995; P.McKenzie interviewed
by P.Merrett, 8/6/1996.
18 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Brubeck, 19/2/1998.
19 Brown, 'History', pp.l1-12; R Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid: A History ofthe Liberal Party of
south Africa (London, Macmillan, 1997), pp.13-14.
20 The CPSA had disbanded in 1950 before its ban under the Suppression of Communism Act (1950)
came into force.
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they were seen as progressive during the 1930s and early 1940s.
This changing mood was evident, too, in the arena of black politics. There had been a
transformation in the nature of black political demands inspired by the Atlantic Charter during
the mid-1940s, and the change in strategy came in the early 1950s. The ANC had come under
the increasing influence of the ANC Youth League and the CPSA by 1949, and the new
militancy reflected an underlYing sense of urgency and frustration. This was evident in the 1949
Programme of Action, inspired by the Youth League, which endorsed tactics of strike, boycott
and civil disobedience. The South African Indian Congress (SAlC) (the NIC in Natal) had
organised passive resistance campaigns during the 1940s against urban segregation. The ANC,
together with the SAlC, organised a non-violent passive resistance campaign known as the
Defiance Campaign which began in June 1952. This campaign was important in the political
development of South Africa, especially when coupled with the importance of the upcoming
1953 general election.
The Defiance Campaign was organised to oppose and highlight discriminatory apartheid
legislation, and it was successful in that more than 8000 people were arrested, but it was marred
and later abandoned because of incidents ofviolence. The Campaign also attracted support for
the ANC and was the prelude to the transformation of the organisation into a mass movement. 21
It was also the first time the African and Indian political organisations had successfully co- .
operated. A few whites in Johannesburg and Cape Town joined the Defiance Campaign.
Amongst these were communists, trade unionists and members of the Springbok Legion.
Belonging to none of these, but perhaps the most notable, was Patrick Duncan, son of the
former Governor-General of South Africa and a future LP member.
There was limited participation in the Campaign in Natal with only 300 arrests in Durban and
none outside it. 22 Indeed, Brown does not recall the Campaign as having much ofan effect in
21 The membership of the ANC increased to approximately 100,000 after the Defiance Campaign.
A. Stadler, The political economy o/modern South Africa (Cape Town & Johannesburg, David Philip and
London, Croom Helm, 1987), p.lSl; T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (London, Longman,
1983), p.61.
22 Lodge, Black Politics, p.4S.
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Edendale and Pietennaritzburg. 23 Members of the ANC in Natal were not as keen as their
counterparts in the Transvaal to co-operate with the SAIC. 24 This has been blamed on the deep-
seated animosity between Indians and Africans in Natal, evidence of which were the 1949
~Durban Riots'. Albert Lutuli (national president of the ANC from November 1952) expressed
doubts that.the Natal ANC was ready to organise mass action in Natal, and Msimang voiced his
concern about joint African-Indian leadership as being inappropriate. 25
What effect did the Defiance Campaign have in arousing sympathies among whites? Janet
Robertson claims that it divided whites between those that supported a liberal policy towards
blacks and those that did not, as it 'was a challenge without precedent to those whites who
professed to hold liberal views about colour'. 26 Furthennore, it provided the spark to those
liberals who were thinking more definitely in tenns offonning a separate party. The Defiance
Campaign seems to have had a marked effect on white opinion ifwe judge it by the activity and
regrouping of the white left, which included both socialists and liberals, during and after the
Campaign.27 Although the. SAIRR disapproved of the Campaign, 'there were liberals who
sympathised with it. A statement by leading liberals from Johannesburg, Cape Town and
Durban sympathetic to the Campaign was issued and published in the liberal journal, The
Forom, in October 1952. Prominent names among the 22 signatories were Edgar Brookes, Alan
Paton, William and Margaret Ballinger, Donald Molteno and Leo Marquard, who all joined the
LP in 1953, except for Brookes who joined in 1962.
An examination of the content of this statement highlights the differences between the group of
liberals under discussion and black political opinion. It also gives an insight into prevailing
liberal viewpoints among the prominent liberals who fonned the LP a few months later. The
statement expressed the urgency that South Africa should adopt a policy whereby it would
'attract the support ofeducated, politically conscious non-Europeans by offering them a
23 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998; APe, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape I, 1995.
24 W.B. White, ~Passive Resistance in Natal, 1946-48', Journal ofNatal and Zulu History, vol V
(1982), p.17; Lodge, Black Politics, p.60.
25 Lodge, Black Politics, p.42.
26 Robertson, Liberalism, pp.83-5.
27 Lodge, Black Politics, p.62.
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reasonable status in our common society' .28 This could be achieved by reviving the Cape Liberal
Tradition whose basis was 'equal rights for all civilized people, and equal opportunities for all
men and women to become civilized'. They appealed to Afiican and Indian leaders to accept
the fact that this process would take 'time and patience'. However,
'The gap between militant ANC Youth League aspirations and Parliamentary
liberal standard-raising seemed immeasurably wide. And yet the very recognition
of the Defiance Campaign by Margaret Ballinger and her co-signatories gave
cause for hope. '29
Liberalism within the ANC had been transformed by the late 1940s, and the difference between
liberally-inclined African political leaders and white liberals became increasingly apparent and
the gulf between their aims and methods widened.30 The demands of African political leaders
by the early 1950s were for immediate equality: not a 'reasonable status' that would be
achieved gradually. Lutuli had publicly rejected the gradual extension of political rights to
Africans as well as 'methods of petition and deputation'. 31 The majority of white liberals were
unable to accept the immediate implementation of a universal franchise. Although they
supported a non-racial franchise, it had to be qualified. Furthermore, these liberals supported
change through a process of constitutional gradualism. The extra-parliamentary tactics of non-
co-operation being promoted by the ANC in the Defiance Campaign were unacceptable to most
white liberals. However, years of consultations through the Native Representative Council
(NRC) and various deputations had failed to achieve any results. The NRC had been abolished
by the Nationalist government in 1951, and its abolition signified the end of any possible direct
contact between the government and black opposition .leaders.
African political leaders during the Defiance Campaign had hoped for the emergence of a white
organisation that would work closely with the ANC in preparing South Africa for a non-racial
28 Quoted inJ.Frederikse, The Unbreakable Thread (Bloomington,Indiana University, 1990), p.59.
29 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.l3.
30 Everatt, 'The making of a liberal programme', p.l42~ Robertson, Liberalism, pp.29ff, 40, 64ft".
31 Robertson, Liberalism, p.l02.
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future. 32 A diverse group of left-wing whites sympathetic to the Campaign, including liberals,
were invited to a meeting at the Darragh Hall in Johannesburg in November 1952. A number of
liberals and ex-CPSA members attended. The liberals at the meeting were opposed to the
inclusion of communists, but differences in basic policy were also a problem. The South African
Congress of Democrats (COD) was formed shortly after this meeting and included several ex-
CPSA members. The COD identified fully with the aims of black political organisations and
promoted an equal franchise. This organisation was to become part of the multi-racial Congress
Alliance (or Movement) together with the ANC, the SAlC and the South African Coloured
Peoples' Organisation (SACPO). The Congress Alliance was structured on a multi-racial, as
opposed to a non-racial, basis. However, there was close co-operation between members of the
different Congresses and friendships developed across racial lines. Furthermore, several Indian
and African members espoused communist ideas whilst belonging primarily to their respective
Congresses.
During late 1952 the liberal movement gathered momentum with discussions taking place
between different groups. Wollheim had circulated an invitation to start a national liberal
association in an attempt to co-ordinate liberal activity. Younger people had begun to join
liberal groups and they 'introduced a new tone, a sense of urgency, and a desire to work closely
with Africans' .33 The group that had been meeting in Pietermaritzburg held a public meeting in
the City Hall in December which about forty people attended.34 It was decided to form a local
liberal association and consider the offer from Cape Town. Such a meeting was also held in
Durban to consider the idea, with the same result.
There was a meeting in January 1953 in Cape Town to consider the proposal offorming a
national liberal association.3S Four delegates from Natal, including Paton, attended. A
32 J.N. Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid (Boulder, Colo.,
Westview Press, 1994), pp.68-69.
33 T. Karis & G.M. Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, Volume 3 of T. Karis & G.M.
Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-
1964 (California, Stanford University, 1977), p.8.
34 Bro~ 'History', pp. 15-16.
35 Paton, Journey Continued, p.67; P. Alexander, Alan Paton: A Bibliography (Oxford, OUP, 1994),
p.282.
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constitution for the South African Liberal Association (SALA) was duly adopted. There were
objections to certain points in the constitution from the Pietermaritzburg and Durban branches,
but both decided to adopt it and affiliate themselves to the SALA.36 They would raise their
objections later. The Pietermaritzburg and Durban groups formed a Natal Regional Association
with members from both areas serving on the committee. Paton was the chairman, Selby
Msimang the vice-chairman and Brown the secretary. The committee was predominantly white,
with two Afiican and two Indian members.
The belief was widely held that the UP could win the general election in April 1953, and liberals
closed ranks in support of the party. It was therefore felt that the question of forming a separate
political party should be postponed until the election was over. 37 It was generally thought better
to safeguard existing rights in the face of apartheid than to advocate further 'non-white' rights.
This attitude did not help the liberals' attempts to influence black political opinion. The
differences between the COD and the liberals (and hence the differences in how they were
perceived by black people) were highlighted by the former's siding with the ANC and remaining
vocal in its call for political equality prior to the election. The importance of the 1953 general
election for South Africans cannot be underestimated. The 1948 election had caught people by
surprise, but the build-up to the 1953 election 'made it perfectly plain that what was at stake
was the future of South Afiic~ and that in particular the Nationalist Party was seeking a
mandate to shut all but white South Afiicans permanently out of power' .38
2.2 Theformation ofthe Liberal Party, May 1953
'Disillusionment was not sufficiently widespread' among liberals to start a new political party
until the second victory of the Nationalists in 1953.39 Not only did the NP win the general
election in April 1953, but it increased its lead to include a majority of seats. Liberals could no
longer escape the reality of the situation - the possibility of the UP returning power was
36 APe, PC 2/9/11/1, Minutes, Inaugural meeting of the Natal Regional Association of the S.A.L.A.,




39 Robertson, Liberalism, p.27.
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becoming increasingly remote.
Calls came from various groups within the liberal camp to launch a political party after the
general election. When the Interim Council of the SALA met in Cape Town immediately after
the election (only Cape members were able to attend), it appears that the general impression
was that the Transvaal and Natal members supported the idea of launching a political party.
According to Brown, the 'Transvaal certainly wanted a party but Natal was in two minds'.40
The Transvaal Regional Committee was in favour ofthe immediate formation of a political
party. By contrast, members in Natal were concerned about forming a party immediately
without a detailed political programme. It was decided at a meeting of the Natal Regional
Committee in early May that the SALA should emerge as 'an active political Association' prior
to becoming a political party so that it could produce such a programme.41
The meeting ofthe SALA on 8 and 9 May 1953 in Cape Town included representatives from
the three provinces. From Natal, Peter Brown and Selby Msimang attended, while a proxy was
held for Alan Paton by Leslie Rubin (from the Cape) and for Geoffiey Durrant (from
Pietermaritzburg) by Brown.42 Msimang was the only African person present. Although there
was general support in Natal for the formation of a separate party43, there seems to be some
discrepancy as to whether or not Natal supported the formation of the party at that particular
time. While Everatt maintains that the Natal delegates carried a mandate to oppose the launch
of a party44, Robertson states that Brown attended the meeting 'without a clear mandate', but
he was persuaded to support the move as he was aware ofthe respect many Natal liberals had
for Jock Isacowitz (the leading member of the Transvaal Committee pushing for a new party)
and of the 'sizeable backing that existed in the Natal groups for the formation of a party' .45
Paton had supported forming a separate party after he had become more active and influential in
40 Brown, 'History', p.22.
41 Ibid., p.23.
42 Ibid., p.24.
43 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
44 D.Evera~ 'The Politics of Nonracialism: White Opposition to Apartheid 1945-1960.' D.Phil.
Thesis, University ofOxford, 1990, p.175.
45 Robertson, Liberalism, p.lll.
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liberal circles; he had indeed been a representative for Natal at the formation of the SALA in
January 1953. He had been pessimistic about the chances of a Liberal Party in South Africa
because he knew so few whites were prepared to support a political party that advocated the
sharing of power. However, he realised that such a party needed to be formed to fight Afrikaner
nationalism and to educate white South Africans, and that he had to be a part of it. 46 He thus
supported the mandate to form a new party. 47
Margaret Ballinger and her group opposed the launch of a new party at this time. It was felt
that the move was immature as a political programme was yet to be prepared. Ballinger, Donald
Molteno and some of the Natal delegates voted against such a move on the 8 May 1953.48 The
vote also did not have the required majority and therefore the formation of the party was
deferred. However, on the following day, the Natal delegates voted in favour of the launch of a
new party after Brown moved:
"(I)THAT this Association form a political Party forthwith.
(2)That a conference be called at an early date to formulate the programme of
the new Party".49
The vote was 18-2 in favour of the resolutioI\ and since neither Ballinger and Molteno had
changed their votes, it was the Natal delegates who swung the decisioI\ and the LP was
launched. 50
What persuasive arguments were offered for the Natal delegates to change their minds? First,
there was pressure from the Transvaal branch of the Association. It appears that the Transvaal
was likely to form its own political party, regardless ofwhat happened at this meeting. 51 The
Transvaal delegates sought to counter the influence of the COD in black politics in their
province. 52 Second, a point which was used by the Transvaal delegates, and of which the Natal
46 Alexander, Paton, pp.276-278.
47 APe, 95APA16, Alan Paton Lecture by P.M. Brown, 'AIan Paton: The Man and the Politician',
University of natal, Pietennaritzburg, 6/9/1995.
48 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism' , p.175.
49 Brown, 'History', p.26.
50 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.175.
51 Brown, 'History', p.26; Everatt, 'Politics ofNonracialism', p.174.
52 Robertson, Liberalism, p.110; Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.174.
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delegates were fully aware, was the imminent formation of a political party by the leadership of
the Touch Commando, the Union Federal Party (UFP). This was perhaps the most important
factor, as the UFP's political programme was expected to be similar to that which was being
proposed by liberals for their new party. The two parties were thus hoping to attract members
from the same section of the electorate, and the liberals wanted 'to get in first'. 53 Third, if the
SALA did not take the initiative at that point and form a party, there were doubts whether it
would ever be formed. 54
The Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA) was launched officially on 9 May 1953 in Cape
Town. The majority of its leadership came from the Cape liberal group, except for Alan Paton
(vice-president) from Natal, and was led by Margaret Ballinger (president).55 As discussed
above, she had thought the move immature and not been fully in favour it, but had reluctantly
agreed to lead the Party. The prominent Cape liberals, and Ballinger in particular, were
distinguished political figures and they lent respectability to the new Party. Although more
radical liberals did not agree with this conservative group on many issues, they did recognise
their contribution.
The launch of the UFP came within a day of the LP's. The Press, especially in Natal, tended to
give the launch ofthe UFP more attention. Although both stories were carried and comparisons
made, the LP lost the opportunity for valuable publicity. The Natal Mercury dealt mainly with
the UFP as it 'claims more immediate attention in Natal', but felt that 'a Liberal Party is long
overdue' .56 However, 'the support [the LP] will receive for the time being is likely to be
comparatively limited' since 'its objects are probably far in advance of public opinion'. In
comparison, there would be 'considerable support for the Union Federal Party in Natal'.
The Daily News expressed a similar opinion: that the LP was 'rather too far in advance of
prevailing colour sentiment in the Union to recruit a multitude of members' and that the UFP
53 Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998.
54 B 'Hi ' 26ro~ story, p. .
55 Ballinger actually came from the Transvaal, but since she was a Native Representative she spent the
majority of her time in the Cape and shared the viewpoints of the so-<:alled Cape liberals, she was considered
part of the Cape liberal group.
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was likely to recruit more, especially in Natal. 57 The UFP was expected be the LP's main
opposing contender for electoral support in Natal as it was likely to have more appeal and its
published statement was 'just liberal enough' to attract those in the white constituency who
might otherwise have supported the LP. 58 Although the UFP was mainly concerned with
developing a federal system in South Africa in which Natal would have a degree of autonomy, it
acknowledged the extensive economic integration of Africans and recognised that they would
have to be included in the political process at some point in the future.
When these newspaper articles refer to members, support or public opinion, it means that of the
white population in Natal, which was the only group eligible to vote in parliamentary elections.
The majority of white Natalians were staunch UP supporters and had a distrust of the
Afrikaner-dominated NP which had only recently come into government. Thus, they were
neither liberal, in the sense that prospective LP members were, nor did they support Afrikaner
nationalism. They also shared a certain set of racial attitudes and prejudices, the result of a
history ofbeing a small reactionary white minority of colonists in Natal..An article in the Leader.
on the launch of the new parties nevertheless predicted the alternatives this group would
ultimately opt for: 'One thing is certain. Sooner or later the Europeans ofNatal will make a
clear choice between their racial prejudices and the principles ofjustice and fair play which they
so freely profess. ,59 The new parties might well have been expected to influence such a choice
in the near future.
The formation and policies of the LP, as opposed to the UFP, attracted attention in black
political circles because its membership was open to people of all races. Although membership
of the Party at its inception was almost exclusively white, that it was promoting a non-racial
character was unique for any political organisation at that time. While the membership of the
CPSA had been mixed, the COD had a whites-only membership in accordance with the multi-
racial structure of the Congress Alliance. (There were African and Indian communists who had
belonged to the CPSA before its dissolution in 1950, and who now belonged to the ANC and
57 Daily News, 11 May 1953.
S8
APC, PC 2/9/1111, P. Brown to M. Rodger, 25 May 1953.
59 Leader, 15 May 1953.
53
SAlC respectively.) Furthermore, with the exception of the Communist Party and the COD, no
other white-dominated political party had previously endorsed the extension of full political
rights to black people (such as the LP was proposing).60 The difference was that while the COD
supported a universal suftTage in 1953, the LP officially promoted a non-racial but qualified
franchise.
In a commentary in Ilanga Lase Natal, the formation of the LP was see~ for a number of
reasons, as a 'significant development in South Africa today'. 61 The colour policy of the UFP
was regarded as too similar to that of the UP, and another article suggests that those who were
too timid for the LP should join the UFP, 'leaving the true democrats to join the Liberal
Party' .62 Both articles warn that the LP would receive a mixed reception in African political
circles. Even though the Party's policies may be in advance of 'European' opinion, they lagged
behind those of certain African schools of thought. An article in Bantu World expressed similar
~ntiments. It congratulated both new parties, but felt that the LP was the more promising of
the two with regard to the rights of African people.63 Furthermore, these parties should not
'expect non-Europeans to show much enthusiasm at present' .
The reaction by various political organisations to the formation of the LP was criticism from all
sides. Although it was reported that 'Non-European leaders' in Durban had adopted a 'wait-
and-see' attitude to the Lp64, there were members of the ANC and the Congress Alliance who
regarded the Party as ineffective and accused it of trying to usurp their position and recruit
potential Congress members. According to Paton: 'They were angry with us for not joining the
grand Congress movement. '65 Why had the white members ofthe LP not joined the Congress
Alliance? The most likely answer is that they would have been expected to join forces with
other left-wing whites who were not liberals and who advocated different solutions to South
Africa's problems. The majority of liberals were hostile to communism and saw the COD as a
60 Robertson, Liberalism, p.112.
61
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front for communist activity since many of its members had previously belonged to the CPSA.
Furthermore, they objected to the multi-racial structure of the Alliance.
Perhaps the strongest attack on the LP came from Dr.YusufDadoo, former president of the
SAlC, who described the party as 'half-baked and comprising' and could not be expected to
'persuade the Nationalists to desist their path to fascism'.66 Two prominent members of the
NIC, IN. Singh and I.C. Meer, accused the LP of 'dividing the people' .67 P.R. Pather from the
comparatively conservative Natal Indian Organisation (NIO) was more complimentary, as he
welcomed the formation of the LP. 68 A strong attack on the LP also came from lG.N. Strauss,
leader of the UP.69 Although no Member of Parliament from the UP left in order to join the LP,
electoral support might be lost to the new party.70 Besides this, the Liberals were accused of
splitting the opposition by retracting their support from the UP.
The Party was launched in Natal towards the end of June 1953. Public meetings were held in
Durban and Pietermaritzburg, with smaller meetings in the Natal Midlands. The meetings were
considered well-supported (about 450 people in Durban and about 200 in Pietermaritzburg) and
the audiences consisted of people of all races. 71 Questions from the floor dealt mainly with the
Party's franchise policy, and most attacks came from members of the NIC. They questioned the
sincerity and commitment ofa party promoting only the gradual extension of political rights to
black people while still seeking support from them.
2.3 A dilemma ofpriorities: Liberal Party policy formation, 1953 -1955
In spite of initial reservations among some of its prospective members, the LP had been formed,
and its launch was greeted with a mixed reception in the political community. The new Party
66 Quoted in Leader, 22 May 1953.
67 Quoted in Paton, Journey Continued, p.68.
68 Leader, 22 May 1953.
69 Paton, Journey Continued, p.68.
70 Robertson, Liberalism, p.123.
71 Brown, 'History', pp.28-29; Reports in Natal Mercury and Daily News, 26 June 1953, & Natal
Witness, 30June 1953.
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was now faced with a number of challenges in establishing itself as a viable political
organisation. Looking at the development of the LP's policies, one notes that there were a
number of contentious issues which at times threatened to split the Party. The members of the
LP did not constitute a homogenous group who agreed unanimously on a particular set of
political objectives. Although they held divergent political views, they were bound together by a
common goal: that of opposing the discriminatory apartheid policies of the Nationalist
government.
The contrasts in opinion which surfaced as the LP developed were over ideological political
issues and not over questions of racial equality.72 In the early years, these differences in the LP
had a 'rough geographical correlation': the Cape was regarded as conservative, the Transvaal
as radical, and Natal was in the centre. 73 The prominent members of the Cape group saw the LP
as a manifestation of the Cape Liberal Tradition, and since the Cape members had the prestige
and dominated the leadership, their views held sway for a number of years. As mentioned, this
group contained a number of distinguished politicians who lent respectability to the party, and
thus their relative conservatism was tolerated by the more radical members in the interests of
Party unity.
The early membership of the Natal Division of the LP contained a cross-section of liberal views,
and it seems to have suffered less from internal cleavages than the other Divisions, especially
the Cape. Members such as Leo Kuper, Hans Meidner and Violaine Junod (all originally
Durban members) occupied a more advanced position on issl,les such as the franchise than did
Peter Brown and AIan Paton. Brown notes in the report on the first National Conference in
1953 that it should be recognised that in a place like Pietennaritzburg 'where things move
slowly and we do not feel any great pressure of events, we are almos~ bound to find ourselves
on the Right, at the most, in the Centre. It is perhaps difficult for us to understand the deep
sense of urgency which grips people in a place like Johannesburg' .74
72 Paton, Journey Continued, pp.118, 132-133~ J.Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (London,
Pall Mall Press, 1963), p.197.
73 Paton, Journey Continued, p.133.
74 APe, PC 2/9/26/1, Report on the First National Conference of the LP, July 1953.
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The principles75 which the LP adopted in May were essentially those of the SALA. Since the
formation of the Party had been largely unanticipated, a detailed political programme had yet to
be formulated. The Party suffered from internal policy disagreements from the start. Early
formulations of policy for the Party proved too conservative for certain sections of the LP
membership on a national scale, and the main points of contention became apparent shortly
after the formation of the party at the first annual Congress (then called Conference) in July
1953. First, there was the issue of whether the franchise should be qualified, and if so, what
these qualifications should be. That the franchise would be non-racial and on a common roll
was not in dispute, but the possibilities of a wider or narrower vote remained disputed. Second,
there was the question whether or not the LP should restrict its activities to the accepted
parliamentary arena ('constitutional means' only). Third, the Party's opposition to communism
was an issue in the light of potential co-operation with the Congresses.
At the centre of these debates was the problem ofwhat role the LP was to play in black politics
and how this would affect the Party's position as a parliamentary party. What relationship
should the LP adopt towards the ANC and the Congress Movement? Considering the non-
violent civil disobedience tactics and demands for equality recently expressed during the
Defiance Campaign, as well as the influence of communists in the ANC, it is not surprising that
many Liberals were apprehensive about closer relations. However, there were those that
realised that in order for the LP to play a greater role in South African politics and encourage a
non-racial membership, some identification had to take place between the Party and the
Congresses. Since the LP was promoting equal rights for all citizens and its membership was
open to people of all races, its policies were of particular interest to, and came under the
scrutiny of, black political organisations. As expected, the two policies which were criticized by
the Congress leaders were the qualified franchise and the 'constitutional means' which the LP
meant to employ.
The franchise question was a controversy which was to almost destroy the unity of the Party.
At the 1953 National Conference of the LP there was 'no important body of opinion which ...
7S See Appendix One. The common emphasis was on typical liberal principles, such as a high regard
for individual rights, the freedom of speech, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law.
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argued for a policy of immediate adult franchise'. 76 It was accepted that the policy should be a
qualified~ non-racial franchise~ and that compulsory education should be available to all in order
that the qualifications could be met. Whether or not universal suffrage was ultimately the aim of
the Party was part of the debate, but the main point ofcontroversy was the nature of the
qualification. This debate showed up the differences between the three regions: the Transvaal
members were the most radical, the Cape the most conservative, and the Natal delegates
occupied 'a position between the two extremes, but nearer the Cape' .77 Certain members
wanted Std.VI as the qualification for the vote, while others felt this was too low. The
Pietermaritzburg branch had wanted Std.VI together with a further qualification. 78 As was to be
expected, certain members considered the qualifications too high, while others felt they were
too low. The dilemma for the LP was that, if the qualifications were set too high, it would
discourage potential black supporters, while if they were set too low, any expected support
from the white electorate would be lost. As an African member of the Pietermaritzburg branch
pointed out, the qualifications should not be set too high if the LP wanted to appeal to Africans
in any great numbers as these were presently unobtainable to the vast majority.79
Brown says in his Report on the 1953 Conference that he realised that there would be members
in Pietermaritzburg who would find the Std VI qualification, which had been decided on, too
low. 80 There was considerable discussion of the question at the committee meeting ofthe
Pietermaritzburg branch at the end ofJuly after the Conference. Certain members, notably the
chairman, Simon Roberts (a prominent Pietermaritzburg lawyer), felt the qualification was too
low and that the loss of 'European' support would greatly reduce the chances of any electoral
success for the Party.8t Roberts vacated the chair over this issue at a later meeting in September
(but remained a member ofthe Party).82
1953.
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It was at the 1954 National Congress that the franchise issue exploded and caused serious rifts
in the Party. The chairman of the Franchise Committee, set up in response to the objections
raised at the 1953 Conference, reported that the Committee felt that the qualified franchise had
to be dropped as a permanent feature of party policy.83 Jimmy Gibson, a radical Cape member
and chairman of the above Committee, had introduced a resolution suggesting this at the Cape
Provincial Congress, which had been defeated. 84 The members of the Franchise Committee,
with the exception ofRodney Davenport (Cape), supported his views. This included Peter
Bullen from Natal. It appears that the franchise question was not on the agenda for the National
Congress of 1954, but a resolution was introduced at the last minute by the Transvaal Division
which was similar to that of Gibson' s. This was a suggestion which was unlikely to elicit much
support from the Party leadership in 1954, but which obviously had support from a number of
members.
After much debate a statement of policy was released to the effect that the ultimate aim of the
LP was to introduce the universal adult suffrage, but that a qualified franchise was necessary in.
the interim. This would be based mainly on educational criteria still to be established.85 The
Std.VI qualification was thus removed. 86 The outcome was considered a victory for the more
radical members of the Party over the more conservative Cape members, who had envisaged a
qualified franchise as permanent.87 Stating that the ultimate aim of the Party was a universal
adult franchise may have sunk any chances the LP ever had of electoral success under the
existing dispensation. 88 It was, however, a bold step for the Party to have taken, especially
when compared to the other white parliamentary political parties at the time (excluding the
COD). It was, furthermore, evidence of the beginning ofa process ofchange in direction within
the LP.
In the debate on the franchise issue which followed, Natal opinion seems to have been divided.
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For example, Mlahleni Njisane (an sociologist with Kuper from the University ofNatal,
Durban) pointed out that black political organisations were suspicious of the motives of the LP,
and felt that any qualification would be seen as another form of discrimination. 89 He added that
the 'Non-Europeans had not the time for gradualism', and that they 'wanted the franchise on
the basis on which the Europeans now had it'. Selby Msimang, on the other hand, supported the
motion against the resolution because 'the direction of the Party must depend for its success
entirely on the influence of the people who at present enjoyed the vote'.90 Furthermore,
'Africans must not make it difficult for the Party to make headway by proposing things which
the [white] electorate would not accept'. Herein lay the LP's dilemm~ as policies to attract
black members would alienate potential white support.
At this point, Brown and Paton supported a franchise with some sort of qualification. 91 Both
were not convinced at the time about the advantages of a universal franchise and were
furthermore unhappy with the manner in which the whole question had been before the National
Congress. 92 Brown considered resigning from the Party, while Paton, who had been in the
United States of Americ~was very angry that he had not been consulted. The question of the
franchise was put 'on hold' after the National Executive Committee Meeting in late 1954.93
The debate over the LP's choice ofusing 'constitutional means' only to achieve change and
their role as a strictly parliamentary party became more of an issue from 1956, but it was a point
of concern in Natal before this because of the provincial leadership's desire to work more
closely with the Congresses from the beginning. At the National Committee meeting prior to
the National Congress in 1954, representatives from the Natal Division were divided into two
roughly equal groups over this issue.94 There were those who argued that the Party should
focus on the black population, while others were more conservative in maintaining that the
Party should try to convert the white electorate to liberalism. Members of the latter group saw
89 Minutes, National Congress, July 1954, quoted in Brown, 'History', p.5l.
90 Ibid.
91 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998; Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.29.
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the role of the LP in black politics as vital, but felt that the party should not exclude itself from
a role in parliamentary politics. It was clear at this meeting that a large number of Party
members felt that there was a need for closer identification with black peoples' aspirations and a
need to recognise the possibility of individual members becoming involved in activities that
might not be strictly 'constitutional'.
2.4 The Natal Division: offto a good start
At the launch of the LP in 1953, the Natal Division had the smallest membership and was the
least-distinguished of the Divisions. By the end of 1956 it had the largest membership, including
the largest percentage ofblack members, and had increased its stake in the national leadership.
The Division contained a cross-section of political views in the earlier years but had managed to
contain internal disputes, something for which Natal became well-known. It was largely due to
the hard work and dedication of several active members in the years after the launch of the
Party that the Natal Division found itself in this position by late 1956.
The efforts of the leadership in Natal to encourage membership were energetic. At the first
meetings after the launch ofthe Party, the need to increase membership and the number of
branches was seen as a priority.95 Furthermore, these leaders had realised the importance of a
black membership (Africans and Indians) at the Party's inception and had worked actively
towards this. At the formation of the Party in 1953, the overwhelming majority of members
were white, while the national leadership was completely white. The latter was to change during
the 1950s, and it was from Natal that the black leaders came. Indeed, by 1954 the National
Committee had black representatives from Natal on it.
The two original SALA groups were founded in Pietermaritzburg and in Durban, and it was
from these two groups that the two regional branches of the Natal Division of the LP were
formed: the Inland and the Coastal. The Natal Inland Regional branch, comprising of
Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas, the Midlands and northern Natal, and the Coastal
Regional branch grew to include an increasing number of active branches. By the end of 1953
95 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Regional Committee, 7 June 1953 & 28 July 1953.
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the Natal Division had increased its membership to 201.96 In comparison, the Transvaal had 329
members, while the Cape had 380 members. Paid-up membership figures at the end of 1955
show that the Cape (595) and Natal (416) Divisions continued to flourish while the Transvaal
(254) seemed stagnant.97 During the following year the membership of the Natal Division
overtook that of the other Divisions.
Much ofthe growth in the Natal Division can be attributed to the work ofPeter Brown, and it
had become clear already at this stage that he was an important element in the Division. As
provincial secretary for the Divisio~ he travelled around the province, from the Midlands to
northern Natal to the coastal regions. He visited towns where interest had been expressed and
canvassed support for the Party. Meetings usually took place at some person's home. Any
interest, whether from house-meetings or otherwise, was followed up with a letter and
information about the Party. Paton often accompanied Brown and gave speeches. No doubt
Paton, the famous author, was a drawcard, but Brown did the groundwork. In a letter to Brown
from Walter Stanford in October 1955, the latter congratulated Brown on his part in making
Natal such a successful Division:
'I am glad to see from your minutes the activity amongst the branches and the
energy with which Natal is going along, I think with more energy than in the
other Provinces at the moment. This is good to see, and many congratulations to
you personally for your part in it.' 98
The leadership ofthe Natal Division actively encouraged the development ofa black
membership from the Party's inception and the success of these initial attempts could be seen by
the mid-1950s. This was not only an attempt to reflect the Party's d~sired non-racial character,
but also an attempt to realise in practical terms the firm belief that the role of the Party should
include working through both black and white communities. However, this non-racial emphasis
was not without its problems as efforts to attract black members had the potential to alienate
96 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minute~ National Committee, 27-28 FebruaIY 1954.
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white members.
Although there had been keen interest in the policies and development of the Party, there had
been no rush initially by black people to join the Party. It had been difficult to make inroads into
the black communities, a fact which took many white members by surprise.99 According to
Jordan Ngubane, Africans were distrustful of white overtures. 100 Nevertheless, there was
interest in the Party and its policies. People of all races had been present at the inaugural public
meetings of the Party in Pietermaritzburg and Durban in late May 1953. 101 The national
secretary noted in a letter to Brown in July 1953 that it was 'especially interesting to find how
much interest there [was] among the Non-Europeans in Natal'.102 By 1955 membership in the
Natal Division was composed of approximately a third each of Africans, Indians and whites. 103
Not only was the membership racially mixed in Natal, but so was party leadership. Black
members were represented on regional and provincial committees. Prominent African and
Indian leaders from Natal also served on the National Committee.
As expected, the LP did not make significant inroads into the white community in Natal,
although white members were recruited in the most numbers initially. The policy of recruiting
black members did not go down well with the more conservative white element of the Party in
Natal. 104 For example, in letters of resignation Mary and Grace Lee from Pietermaritzburg
objected to the acceptance of the aim of a universal franchise as well as the possibility of the
party co-operating with the Congress Movement. 105 Furthermore, they objected to the
acceptance of 'Non-Europeans' to full membership without 'screening [for] real' political views
and felt that the Party was going too far in attempting to recruit 'Non-European' support. No
doubt there were other members who felt this way, and would in due course transfer their
allegiance to either the UP or the UFP.
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There were also attempts to widen the sphere ofLP effectiveness. Natal had, along with the
Transvaal Division, pushed for the compatibility ofjoint Congress-LP membership at the 1953
National Conference. 106 At a meeting with the ANC Executive in October 1953 attended by
Paton, Brown and Msimang from the LP, the ANC stipulated that, while it would not
encourage dual membership, it would not prevent it. 107 When asked if action would be taken
against those with dual membership who might take part in non-constitutional activity, Paton
replied that no action would be taken as long as such activity was not done in the name of the
LP.
Although the LP did not recruit a great number of ANC members, it did succeed in attracting
individuals who were to play an important part in the LP. In Natal, members such as Selby
Msimang and Jordan Ngubane, a well-known journalist and influential figure in Natal who
joined the Party in 1955, had been prominent members of the ANC before joining the LP, and
still maintained their membership of the former. Msimang was a founder member of the ANC
and had been the Natal provincial secretary, while Ngubane was a founder member of the ANC
Youth League. Msimang set-up the initial meetings with the ANC which gave the PartY in Natal
access to ANC members. 108 Mlahleni Njisane was active in the LP but still maintained his ANC
membership. Elliot Mngadi, who became a member in 1954 after attending a house-meeting in
Ladysmith and who later organised efforts to prevent forced removals in northern Natal, was a
member of both the LP and the ANC. He was a Messenger of the Court in Ladysmith, and was
a community leader in the freehold area (Roosboom near Ladysmith) where he lived. Certain
other ANC members may have supported the LP without becoming members. For instance,
Franklin Bhengu replied to Brown's letter that, although he had 'read with interest the policy of
the liberal party, and found it not to differ from the ANC policy', he considered himself a liberal
and would thus work within the ANC to promote liberal ideals. 109 He did, however, wish the
Party every success. Mlahleni Njisane, referring to Africans in general, disagreed with those
106 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.187.
107 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 15 October 1953.
108 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Regional (Provincial) Committee, 7 & 28 June 1953; PC
2/9/26/1, H.S.Msimang to P.Brown, 23 May 1953.
109
APC, PC 2/9/12/1, F.Bhengu to P.Brown, 22 September 1954.
64
who felt that they could serve no useful purpose in the LP. 110 To him, converting Africans to
liberalism was as important as converting the white electorate.
Active encouragement of a non-racial membership and involvement with black community
issues by members of the Natal Division resulted in a change of direction for the Party at an
early stage. The LP had begun as, and at this time its main purpose was still that of, a
parliamentary political party, However, the white electorate was not the only group which the
Party focussed on, as would be expected, and since the main problems facing the disparate
groups of white and black were so different, the Party was pulled in two different directions.
The course along which the Nationalist government was taking South Africa no doubt nudged
the Liberals in the direction of the voteless majority. That people like Jordan Ngubane and
Elliot Mngadi had joined the Party showed that it was beginning to move in a direction in which
Africans felt was the right one.
There were concerns that black membership, whether in the ranks or in. the leadership, should
be genuine and not token. 111 In this the Division appears to have been successful, as black
members came to participate fully in the activities of the Party. According to Dr D.M. Bassa, an
Indian member of the Durban branch, the LP carried out its policy of a common franchise in its
domestic affairs as well, for 'non-white members of the Party actively and fully participate[d] in
shaping its policy at all levels - national and provincial' .112 Members such as Selby Msimang,
Elliot Mngadi and Jordan Ngubane were 'not men to be patronised' .113 Patrick Duncan
remarked after the Natal Provincial Congress in October 1955 that all races had been
represented and that he 'saw no signs that those present gave thought to their racial group'. 114
Although black members could not stand for provincial and parliamentary elections, election
platfonns were shared by LP speakers of all races. 115
110 APC, PC 2/9/23/2, Minutes, Pietennaritzburg branch, 16 May 1955.
III Contact, January 1954.
112 Quoted in Leader, 26 March 1954.
113 D.Irvine, 'The Liberal Party, 1953-1%8' in lButler, RElphick & D.WeIsh (eds), Democratic
Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospects (Cape To~ David Philip, 1987), p.l19.
114 Quoted in C.J.Driver, Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan-African (London, Heineman, 1980),
p.128.
115 APC, PC 2/9/26/1, Secretary's Report, Pietermaritzburg branch AGM, 9 March 1955.
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The LP in Natal was especially successful with rural African communities. Indeed, the majority
of the expanding black membership consisted of rural African people. The LP's involvement
with African communities threatened with removal, especially the so-called 'black spots', began
in late 1953 when not much was known about the government's proposed rural resettlement
schemes nor the communities involved. This was to become a vital part of the Party's activity.
'Black spots' were African freehold areas that, due to the Nationalist government's policy,
were now in areas that had been proclaimed as 'white areas' and therefore the communities
needed to be moved into an area reserved for black settlement. The largest number of 'black
spots' were found in Natal, and in many cases the communities had been established during the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
Initially research into the affected areas required the gathering of infonnation from both the
threatened residents and government departments. This meant several journeys had to be made,
.mostly by Brown. He was often accompanied by other prominent Natal leaders. Although
several areas were under observation, Charlestown was the first and perhaps the most well-
known case. Selby· Msimang had investigated the problem when he was a councillor in the
NRC. Peter Mtimkulu, a member of the ANC but working under the auspices of the LP, spent
two weeks in April 1955 investigating residents' claims to property and the possible effects of
proposed removals. In a letter to Walter Stanford about Charlestown, Brown expressed his
fears about the government's removal plans. He felt that the 'most dangerous feature ... is that
this process is going along slowly while nobody knows about it. Even ifwe can only give it
publicity it will be something. '116 The Natives Representatives who were members of the LP,
such as William and Margaret Ballinger, Leslie Rubin and Walter Stanford, were briefed to raise
the question in Parliament and in the Senate.
The LP in Natal had some early success in recruiting Indian members. 117 Paton records that by
1955 one third of the party's membership was Indian. lls Although Paton felt that the party had
116 APe, PC 2/9/17/1, P.Brown to W.Stanfor~ 31 August 1955.
117 There is a lack of infonnation on the attraction of liberalism amongst the Indian population in
Natal in the general sources consulted. This topic is a point for further research.
118 Paton, Journey Continued, p.68.
66
'a~ appeal' to Indians119, the LP was more likely to attract the more conservative, middle-
class group threatened by the Group Areas Act, as opposed to the intellectually-inclined
members of the NIC, from which the newly-formed LP had received some of its harshest
criticisms. There were also those in the LP who were very opposed to the communist influence
in the NIC, such as Pat Poovalingham (Durban member). 120 Manilal Gandhi joined in late 1954,
and the following year invited members to contribute to the columns of Indian Opinion, of
which he was editor. 121 He corresponded frequently with Patrick Duncan and Jordan Ngubane.
He was perhaps the most likely Indian member who could have become influential in the LP,
but he unfortunately died prematurely in 1956. E.V.Mahomed, who joined in 1954, established
a successful branch at Stanger, served on the National Committee and later became National
Treasurer. He had a close relationship with Lutuli, which was useful in co-operation efforts
between the LP and the ANC.
It was not expected that the LP in Natal would be successful when contesting elections. In the
Election Commission Report given at the First National Conference in 1953, the UFP was seen
as a 'complication'· and, furthermore, the white electorate was 'on the whole not very liberal' .122
It appears that earlier fears that the UFP would rob the LP of potential votes were realised. In
the 1954 election for provincial seats, Peter Brown stood in Pietermaritzburg, while Violaine
Junod and Ronald Morris contested two seats in Durban. Brown polled the most votes with
154. 123 Of the 1954 election, Brown maintains that although the Party expected to do better in
Durban, they never expected much. 124 There was a major contest between the UP and the UFP,
and people voted for the UFP because they feared that the UP would win and vice versa. 125 In
this contest the LP's issues were seen as irrelevant. 126 But, according to Brown, gains were
made, such as publicity and the training of speakers of all races who shared election platforms.
119 Quoted in Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.203. Paton's emphasis.
120 APe, P.B£Own interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 3.
121 APC. PC 2/9/12/2, M.Gandhi to P.B£Own, 12 March 1955.
122 APC, PC 2/2/8/1, Minutes, First National Conference, 11-13 July 1953.
123 Brown, 'History', pAO.
124 APC, PC 2/9/12/1, P.Brown to C.Biggs, 22 June 1954.
125 Ib·d B 'Hi ' 401.; £Own, story, p. .
126. APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, 10-12 July 1954.
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He added that members should not be discouraged. 127
The Natal Division had an active and able leadership which was, overall, neither radical nor
conservative, but was progressive enough to move in the direction which its increasing contact
with the disenfranchised was taking it. The Division had gained the reputation on a national
level as a stable and dynamic branch; a reputation it deserved from the perseverence and hard
work of its members. A further positive point was the relatively good relations it had with the
Congresses in the province.
2.5 Relations between the Natal Liberal Party and the Congress Alliance
Party leadership in Natal had been in favour of co-operation with black political organisations
from the outset, and constant efforts were made to improve relations with the NIC and the
ANC. The issue was discussed in depth at the first Provincial Congress in November 1953,
where the 'importance of regular consultation with all representative Non-European
organisations, and of collaboration where possible' was identified. u8 Brown, in early 1954,
suggested that the LP should 'increase [its] knowledge of and strengthen connections with non-
European political organisations' and recognised that these connections were 'likely to be
informal rather than alliances' .129 Of the regions, the Natal Division of the LP developed the
most cordial relationship with the Congress Movement, especially the ANC in Natal. This was
not the case initially, and members in the LP in Natal worked actively to improve relations and.
to build-up a working relationship with the ANC. This took longer to achieve with the NIC.
The first important meeting between the ANC and members of the Natal Division of the LP
took place at Lutuli's home in Groutville on 14 October 1953. Pato~ Brown and Msimang
attended, while Jordan Ngubane was one of the ANC representatives. Bo Although the
discussion was fiiendly, the ANC made their position clear:
'There could be no complete identification between the two organisations but
127 APC, PC 2/9/26/1, Secretary's Report, Pietennaritzburg branch AG~ 9 March 1955.
128 APC, PC 2/9/4/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Congress, 7 November 1953.
129 Contact, January 1954.
130 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 15 October 1953; Contact, October 1953.
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there could be profitable co-operation on specific issues.' 131
The stumbling blocks included the franchise issue and the fact that the LP had limited itself to
'constitutional means' only while the ANC was committed to using 'non-constitutional, but
non-violent, methods', It was reported at the National Congress in July 1954 that the 'Franchise
Policy and the policy re Constitutional Action had proved a barrier' in efforts to improve
relations with the Congresses. 132 Significantly, too, Msimang had been concerned at the LP's
launch in May that consultation with Afiican leaders should take place before the franchise
policy was finalised. 133
Although the policies of the LP in 1953 'were consistent with those of the A.N.C in the mid
forties' and were 'not compatible with the outlook of the A.N.C.' in 1953134, there was
common ground between the two organisations, and the ANC was eager to gain white support.
However, communists within the Congress Alliance were hostile towards the Liberals. After the
October meeting Paton reported that it was 'the Communist element which is bitterly opposed
to the Liberal Party' ,135 Brown identified two factions within the ANC in early 1955: one
leaning towards communism which 'won't have anything to do with [the Party] at any cost',
and one which was liberal and would have liked to work more closely with the LP. 136 The
situation in Natal was shaped by the weakness of communist influences in the region, and Lutuli
was friendly towards the LP. He even went as far as saYing at an ANC Congress that he was
'grateful for the existence of the Liberal Party' .137 But there were pressures within the ANC
which were progressively beyond his control. 138
Although the ANC was officially boycotting elections for Natives Representatives, certain
members approached the LP in Natal through Msimang in early 1954 about the forthcoming
election. They wanted the present representative, Senator Cowley, replaced and they were
131 Quoted in Brown, 'History', p.42.
132 APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, Provincial Report for Natal, National Congress, 10-12 July 1954.
133 B 'Hi ' 27rown. story ,p. .
134 Robertson, Liberalism, p.119.
135 A.Paton to L.Rubin. 22 October 1953, quoted in Alexander, Pa/on, p.290.
136
APe, PC 2/9/1212, P.Brown to J.E.Stanley, 4 February 1955.
137 Ibid.
138 Alexander, Pa/on, p.291.
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hoping to find a LP candidate to replace him. The ANC could not, however, publicly support
this candidate. Every effort was made to find a suitable Liberal candidate who would also be
acceptable to the ANC, but unfortunately none was found. 139
The NIC had· initially been extremely hostile towards the Party, with harsh criticism coming
from its leaders, who criticised the Party for its franchise policy and its commitment to
'constitutional means,.14O However, at the NlC Annual Conference in early 1954 IN.Singh, a
member of the NIC Executive, stated that this would not stop the organisations from co-
operating on issues which they did agree on. 141 Relations between the two organisations became
progressively more cordial as co-operation increased. Leo Kuper was mainly responsible for
initiating meetings with and improving relations between the LP and the NIC. In addition to the
Natal Division's Indian membership, Party members had good relations with individuals in the
community and within the NIC. Liberal speakers from Natal addressed NIC rallies in 1954 and
1955.142
The LP's relationship with the ANC and the Congress Alliance was weakened by its non~
participation in the Congress of the People (COP) in 1955. The COP was an idea ofProfessor
Z.K.Matthews, a liberally-inclined but relatively middle-road member of the ANC, that the
opinion of all people in South Africa be sought to draw up a 'Freedom Charter for the
Democratic Future of South Africa'. The idea was for discussions to take place throughout the
country and for delegates to be sent to a national convention. The ANC did not have a clearly
articulated ideological position in the early 1950s and were looking at ways of sustaining the
following they had gained from the Defiance Campaign. 143 The COP took place in Kliptown, a
township near Johannesburg, in June 1955.
The LP had been invited by the Congress Movement during 1954 to participate and had initially
139 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 19 February & 11 March 1954.
140 B 'Hi ' 43TOwn, story, p. .
141 Leader, 12 February 1954; Indian Opinion, 19 February 1954.
142 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.20l.
143 Lodge, Black Politics, p.69.
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agreed, while the question of co-sponsorship would be debated further. 144 The fact that the LP
had been invited was an indication that relations between the organisations were improving.
Already at this point, however, there was concern amongst certain members over the
participation of the COD. The Cape, in general, was opposed to any contact with that
organisation, while certain members of the Transvaal and Natal Divisions were not eager for
co-operation. 145 Jordan Ngubane had recently joined the LP, and warned the Party not to
collaborate with COD members who in this view were turning the ANC towards communism. 1~
However, there existed a number ofParty members who saw the potential benefits of
participation. The reason given for the Liberals' reluctance to fully support the proposed event,
and the Party's subsequent withdrawal, was a distrust of COD members and a suspicion that
they were running the COP. 147 The COD, according to the Liberals, had a disproportionate
influence in the drafting of the Freedom Charter (the form in which it was presented at the
COP), which prevented it from being'genuinely representative' .148 According to Robertson,
the Party's 'reputation was to suffer immeasurably' from its decision. 149
Although the general consensus of opinion in Natal was to proceed with the co-sponsorship, it
was not unanimous. ISO According to Paton, a number of members including Brown, Meidner
and Junod, 'were not enthusiastic' .151 However, there is evidence which suggests that this was
not the case in the initial stages. Robertson concludes that there appeared to be little dispute
amongst the Natal leadership over co-operation with the Congress Alliance as the COD was
less active in Natal, and relations between the leaders of the LP, the NlC and the ANC were
good. 152 Liberals attending COP meetings in Natal were welcomed, 'especially by the
144 APe, PC 2/2/1111, Minutes, National Committee, 9 July 1954.
145 Paton, Journey Continued, p.135.
146 Ibid.
147 For discussion on the LP's role in the COP: Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', pp.249-252~ Irvine,
'The Liberal Party', pp.127-128~ Lazerson, Against the Tide, pp.164-167~ Lodge, Black Politics, p.72~ Paton,
Journey Continued, pp.135-136~ Robertson, Liberalism, pp. 161ft'; Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp.44ff
148 Robertson, Liberalism, p.165.
149 Ibid.
150 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 30-31 October 1954.
151 Paton, Journey Continued, p.135.
152 Robertson, Liberalism, p.I66.
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moderates' in the Alliance. 153 It was a dilemma for Liberals who wanted closer relations with
the ANC and the NIC but who were concerned at the same time about the communist
influence.
Brown had been concerned that a genuinely representative consensus of members' views in
Natal on the COP should be taken to the National Committee meeting, not just a decision
reached by the Provincial Committee. 154 He had attended a meeting in Kokstad, where the
opinion was about evenly divided, and was hoping to attend meetings in Ladysmith and the
Midlands. He suggested that Junod organise a similar meeting of the Coastal Regional branch.
Ismail Meer, a member of the NIC Executive, came to address Liberals on the COP at a joint
meeting of the Edendale and Pietermaritzburg branches in mid-October 1954. 155 A resolution
was moved by Meidner at this meeting: 'That this branch of the Liberal Party recommends that
the Party accept the invitation to co-sponsor the Congress of the People.' Co-sponsorship
received overall support as the motion was carried by 33 votes to five, with a number of
abstentions.
Junod had supported the idea at the National Committee meeting in late October 1954 as she
felt that the Party could play a significant role in the COP and that it could lead to closer co-
operation with the Congress Movement. 156 Msimang and Njisane believed that this was an
opportunity for co-operating with the Congresses which should not be missed, but added that
the conditions under which the Party was prepared to do so should be stated. 157 Ken Hill (a
leading Durban member) supported Msimang, and he felt that this was an opportunity to
counter the communist influence in the Congress Movement. 158 Paton had supported co-
sponsorship 'without any strings attached' at the National Committee meeting, but later felt that
the party had perhaps been 'wise to stay out' .159 Brown himself had afterward become
153 APe, PC 2/2/1l/1, Minutes, National Committee, 30-31 October 1954.
154 APe C,P 2/9/12/1, P.Brown to V.Junod, 1 October 1954.
155 APC, PC 2/9/23/2, Minutes, Combined Meeting of the Pietermaritzburg and Edendale branches,
12 October 1954.
156 APC, PC 2/2/1l/1, Minutes, National Committee, 30-31 October 1954.
157 Ibid
158 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', pp.248-249.
159 APC, PC 2/9/1212, APaton to M.A.Wilson, 4 February 1955.
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somewhat disillusioned with the whole affair, as the ANC in Natal appeared not to have had the
organisational capacity to carry out the idea properly. 160
It seems that although the three Divisions all agreed that the party should co-sponsor the COP
in late October 1954, there was nonetheless a degree of uncertainty in each. 161 The Cape was
largely against the ide~ while the strongest support came from the Transvaal, with Natal not far
behind it. There were certain conditions that the Party felt ought to be met before it could give
its full support, as the following National Committee resolution states:
'The Liberal Party ... is not prepared to accept the invitation to co-sponsor the
Congress of the People without qualification. '162
The Party heard nothing from the organisers of the COP for some time until two weeks before
the event was due to take place. The LP had therefore not been consulted on any of the
arrangements.
There is controversy over ~he withdrawal of the Party from the COP. It would appear that
certain conservative members orchestrated the move because of their fears of COD control and
the lack of LP control over the COP. They managed to rally enough support, and it was
decided at a National Executive Committee meeting on the 6 June 1955, which was attended by
Cape members only, to neither participate i~ nor to co-sponsor, the COP. The Transvaal and
Natal Divisions were not consulted in the NatIonal Executive Committee's decision. According
to Brown, 'Natal didn't even know what was happening' .163 The Transvaal members wanted to
defy the National Executive's decision, but then decided to abide by it in the interests ofParty
unity. The disagreement over the COP helped to widen the gap between radical and
conservative wings in the LP even further.
The LP's withdrawal resulted in some hostility towards the Party from the Congresses. This
was an opportunity to identify with the African cause which was missed because of the Party's
160 Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998.
161 B 'Hi ' 62ro~ story , p. .
162 APC, PC 2/9121/1, Motion adopted by the National Committee, 30-31 October 1954.
163 B 'Hi ' 65ro~ story ,p. .
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ideological stand against communism. The leadership of the ANC had accepted the necessity of
working with the communistsl64, and Lutuli warned the LP that' Africans will judge you by
what you do for them~ not by your ideologies' .165 According to Paton~ the Party's decision to
withdraw in June 1955 'displeased' Lutuli. l66 He suspects the reason for this being that Lutuli
was 'pushed ... further into the arms of the left'. In retrospect, many Liberals feel that the Party
should have taken part. 167
From 1954 the Party became involved ~ and supported campaigns in opposition to, specific
aspects of apartheid policy. (Such co-operation had nothing to do with the COP.) The basis of
future co-operation with the NIC and the ANC was laid during these early years. The Division
as a whole had pushed for closer relations with the Congresses in Natal at the fonnation of the
Party, and it continued to do so. Relations however, remained on an informal basis. The
campaigns were mainly against the Group Areas legislation, but also included protests against
education and influx control or 'pass' laws. The avenue of protest was seen as an opportunity
for co-operation with black political organisations as early November 1953, in discussion over a
resolution at the first Natal Provincial Congress rejecting the Group Areas Act. 168
Conclusion
Liberals in South Africa had been shocked by the 1948 election victory of the Nationalists.
Although some liberals had already lost faith in the UP and were considering forming a separate
party, they nevertheless banded together in support of the UP in the 1953 general election.
Their confidence that the UP would win was shattered' and they were forced into action. The
alternatives open to them were either to join the Congress Movement, to stay with UP and
attempt to influence it and the white electorate by forming liberal associations, or to fonn a new
political party. To most liberals, joining the Congress Movement was not an option mainly
164 Robertso~ Liberalism, p.167. Also discussed in Lodge, Black Politics.
165 Quoted in Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.253.
166 Pato~ Journey Continued, p.136.
167 For example: Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998, & C.Brubeck, 19/2/1998; APe, M.Dyer
interviewed by R Vigne, 28/3/1995.
168 APe, PC 2/9/4/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Congress, 7 November 1953.
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because of the communist influence and its multi-racial structure. The route of' liberal
influence' in parliamentary politics was, for obvious reasons, outdated, and the UP was no
longer capable of rendering effective opposition to the apartheid government of the NP. Thus
the decision to adhere to their principles and to form a new political party seemed the only .
choice, although liberals knew that such a party had little hope of ever gaining political power.
It was against this background that the LPSA was formed in May 1953.
The Natal Division of the LP had established itself in the political sphere of the region by the
end of 1955. This is noteworthy since the largely reactive white population ofNatal did not
have the reputation ofbeing liberal, and even the liberal establishment had been relatively
conservative. It had progressed from the smallest and least-prominent Division of the LP to an
active, stable and progressive Division. Although its paid-up membership of over four hundred
"at the end of 19~5 hardly constituted anything close to a mass movement, the fact that the Party
leadership thought"this an important achievement gives an idea of the difficulty of the Liberals'
task.
The central issues around which internal disputes had arisen were the franchise question and the
perception of the Party's main role: should it proceed as a conventional parliamentary party
appealing to the white electorate or should it become more involved in black politics by
encouraging the growth of its own black membership and co-operating with black political
organisations? These decisions were particularly significant in Natal, as this Division of the LP
suffered appalling election defeats, and was unlikely to attract large-scale white support but had
a growing black membership. The foundations had been laid for co-operation with the
Congresses, especially the ANC (despite the LP's decision not to participate in the COP), with
the LP taking on causes related to apartheid legislation. By late 1955 the Natal Division ofthe
LP had begun a process ofmoving in a more radical direction - a process which accelerated
in the years to come.
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CHAPTER THREE
Choosing the extra-parliamentary option:
the Natal Liberal Party's radicalisation and ascendancy, 1956 - 1958
Introduction
Liberals' experiences in the mid- to late-1950s, coupled with the changes in the composition of
membership of the Liberal Party (LP) and closer ties with the Congress Alliance, gave cause
for the re-examination of some of the Party's policies and drove them in a direction of
fundamental change. This process was no doubt influenced by events and the changes in the
political situation in South Africa. The Party began to move along an increasingly radical path,
and Liberals became more actively involved in publicising and opposing the enactment and
enforcement of oppressive apartheid legislation under the Strijdom government. Dr
H.F.Verwoerd's succession as Prime Minister after Strijdom's death in August 1958 left South
Africans under no illusion that government policy was now apartheid policy.l
The year 1956 proved to be a turning point for the LP in Natal. The Division established a firm
regional foundation during the latter half of the 195~s which provided a basis for change within
the Party on a national level. With the moving of the Party's national office to Pietermaritzburg
during 1956, prominent Natal members became increasingly involved in the national
leadership. By this time Party membership was becoming progressively radicalised and
members began looking beyond the confines of previously accepted political boundaries in an
effort to bring about change in South Africa. The effect ofthis was to transform, and to shift
the focus of, the LP during the following years, a change which occurred despite some
opposition from within. The Party's disastrous election results in the general election in April
1958 and Peter Brown's election as national chainnan in mid-1958 cemented the
transformation of the LP.
1 Verwoerd had been Minister of Native Affairs since 1950 and had been responsible for drafting
much of the.existing apartheid legislation.
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3.1 Opposition beyond Parliament?
Up until 1956 there had been a series of checks and balances on more radical tendencies within
the Party. This was a watershed year in the LP in the sense that there was a noticeable shift
towards a more radical position which began with the first real forays into the uncharted
territory of activity which was not strictly 'constitutional'. There were, too, increasing calls for
the policy of the qualified franchise to be dropped and for closer relations with the Congress
Movement. From 1956 onwards there was a movement for Liberals to become directly
involved in active opposition politics to an increasing extent, and to move away from their
previous concentration on debating party policy. However, policy issues remained contentious
within the Party as a whole. By the latter 1950s consensus had been reached in Natal on the
franchise issue and on opposition outside of parliament. This was also the case in the
Transvaal, but certain prominent western Cape members were unhappy with the direction in
which the Party was going.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the question of the franchise was put 'on hold' after the
National Executive Committee meeting in late 1954.2 It had been a victory for the more radical
section of the Party when the official policy acknowledged that a universal franchise was the
ultimate aim of the Party. However, the franchise question remained a contentious issue and
was brought up again in 1957, where it was discussed at the National Committee meeting in
January. Resolutions were put forward by the Transvaal and Cape Divisions which highlighted.
their differences. 3 While the former wanted, in effect, the immediate introduction of a universal
adult franchise, the latter wished to re-introduce the qualifications from the 1953 policy
statement. The leadership and a majority of the membership ofNatal Division were, by 1957,
in favour of the adoption ofa universal franchise. 4
At the Natal Provincial Congress in November 1957, there was considerable discussion over a
2 APC, PC 2/9/28/1, Minutes, Natal Coastal Region branch, 2 November 1954.
3 APC, PC 2/2/11/1. Minutes, National Committee, 11 January 1957.
4 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
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resolution dealing with this issue. 5 The resolution called for all qualifications to be dropped and
it was passed by 43 votes to eight. Alan Paton proposed that the debate over the franchise
resolution be held over until the 1958 Provincial Congress for further discussion and possible
forwarding to the National Congress. This suggestion was made by Paton in his role as
'peacemaker' in the Party and owing to his awareness of the sensitivity of the issue amongst
the prominent older liberals on a national level. The section of the Division which had been
more conservative in the early 1950s, including Paton and Brown, had changed their views
remarkably quickly 'to catch up with the accelerating pace of change' in the party.6 They had
no doubt been influenced by the increasing number ofblack people who were joining the LP in
Natal. Although the adoption of a universal franchise seems to have received considerable
support in the Party on a national level by this time, the official policy remained that of a
qualified franchise.
The other issue which was vigorously debated in the Party during these years was the question
ofextra-parliamentary activity. This was partly because of increasingly closer co-operation
with the Congresses, and partly because of the burgeoning numbers of black members within
the LP. The question ofwhether or not the LP would restrict its activities to the parliamentary
arena became increasingly important. The Party's lack of electoral success and its growing role
in black politics contributed to a shift in focus away from white parliamentary politics.
Obviously, the more conservative members wished to remain within the boundaries of
parliamentary politics, while the more radical members supported activities outside those
boundaries. Since the LP was started as a political party which sought to gain power through
the established channels, this meant focussing on the white electorate. However, an increasing
number of members felt that the Party should have closer ties with black political organisations
and develop in such a way as to appeal to black people.
Patrick Duncan, who joined the Party in 1955 while attending the Natal Provincial Congress,
felt that the LP needed to move away from seeing itself as an essentially white parliamentary
5 APC, PC 2/9/1012, Minutes, Natal Provincial Congress, November 1957.
6 R Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid: A History ofthe Liberal Party ofSouth Africa, 1953-68
(London, Macmillan, 1997), p.30.
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party and to look to black South Africans for the power for change. 7 To this end he
corresponded with a number of LP members, especially Paton., Manilal Gandhi and Jordan
Ngubane in Natal, before and after he joined. Duncan became the Party organiser, a post
created for him during 1956. His main functions were fund-raising and co-ordinating the Party
on a national level, and for this reason he travelled throughout the country visiting LP
branches. Duncan was known for his comparatively radical line within the LP. His views were
often contrary to Party policy, and his open expression of them frequently resulted in an uproar
from more conservative members. He also espoused strong anti-communist sentiments. He
resigned from this position in 1958 to take up the editorship of Contact.
A shift in the general view in the Natal Division about the Party's participation in extra-
parliamentary activity was evident during 1956. At the Natal Provincial Congress in October,
the overwhelming majority voted for the deletion of the clauses in the Party's manifesto about
the use of 'constitutional means' only.8 During 1956, too, there was a feeling of frustration
amongst those LP members who wanted closer ties with the Congress Movement, but felt
restricted by the Party's policy on extra-parliamentary activities. Jordan Ngubane, in a public
speech entitled 'African Political Movements', remarked that the phrase 'constitutional means'
needed further discussion as it was a point of concern to many people.9 It seems that by 1957 a
consensus had been reached in the Natal Division which supported such activity. This was also
the case in the Transvaal Division and the eastern Cape branch. There was no general
agreement, however, from Liberals in the western Cape.
Paton's views had changed since 1953, coming more into line with a growing number of
members in the Party. This is significant, as he became the national chairman in 1956 when he
took over from Margaret Ballinger, who shared the views of the conservative Cape Liberals.
By May 1956 the change in Paton's views was already clear in a letter to Leslie Rubin where
he stated that 'he was sorry the Liberal manifesto had ever committed its members to
emploYing only constitutional means in achieving its objects, and would like to take out that
7 C.l Driver, Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan-African (Londo~ Heine~ 1980), p.127.
8 APC, PC 2/9/4/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Congress, 27 October 1956.
9 APC, PC 2/9/10/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Executive Committee, 21 March 1956.
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clause' .10 Furthennore, he was leaning towards the left in the LP and wanted closer ties with
the African National Congress (ANC), despite the latter's co-operation with the Congress of
Democrats (COD).
Towards the end of 1956 there were two incidents involving prominent Natal members which
brought to the fore the whole issue of extra-parliamentary activities and the Party's role in the
struggle against apartheid. The Nationalist government showed its intentions towards extra-
parliamentary political opposition with the arrest in December 1956 of 156 members of the
Congresses who had taken part in the Congress of the People. This demonstration of the
arbitrary power by the state was a shock to Liberals. 11 Paton and Leo Kuper were arrested in
Durban under a municipal by-Iawl2 after speaking at a meeting about the creation of the
Treason Trial Defence Fund, which was established to support the trialists. The other incident
involved Violaine Junod and six other Liberal women, who were arrested in Pietennaritzburg
in November 1956 for taking part in a protest march against passes for African women. Both
events were organised in conjunction with the Congress Movement. For the LP, this was
breaking new ground. However, these examples of extra-parliamentary activity did not receive
the support of more conservative members. According to Brown, they were 'enough to make
the more sober Party members' hair stand on end' .13 Junod assured the Party that their arrests
had not been deliberate on their part, and Paton concluded that the arrests were a fonn of
intimidation, as those detained had been released without charge. 14 Paton and Kuper's trial
attracted much publicity during 1957. They were charged and fined, but later won the case on
appeal 15
10 A.Paton to L.Rubin, 19 May 1956, quoted in P. Alexander, Alan Paton: A Bibliography (Oxford,
OUP, 1994), p.307.
11 Interview with C.Bmbeck, 19/2/1998.
12 Natal Provincial Notice No. 78 of 1933, which prohibited a meeting of Africans without first
obtaining the permission of the Mayor of Durban.
13 APC, PC 2/6/6/1, P.M. Brown, 'A History of the Liberal Party of South Africa', unpublished
manuscript, p.82.
14 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 11 January 1957.
IS A. Paton, Journey Continued (Cape Town, David Philip, 1988) pp.161-162. See also reports in the
Natal Mercury and the Natal Witness.
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As the Party in Natal became increasingly involved \liith the Congresses in protest campaigns,
so the likelihood of its becoming involved in extra-parliamentary activity increased. The march
in which Violaine Junod and several other Liberal women took part had been inspired by the
demonstration led by the Federation of South African Women, a non-racial organisation
affiliated to the Congress Alliance, through the streets of Pretoria to the Union Buildings in
August 1956. The march in Natal had been organised in association with the Congress Alliance
and was clearly beyond the limits of constitutional action as then defined. That these Liberals
were prepared to work with black political organisations and face possible arrest by protesting
against apartheid laws made an impression on the black community: 'The effect on non-
Europeans could without exaggeration be described as sensational. '16 Party members also
participated in another Pietermaritzburg march in January 1957, which proceeded without
incident.
Junod's views give an idea of the thinking of many Liberals at this time. She regarded the
'participation ofwhites in the extra-parliamentary front' as vital in preventing the conflict
becoming purely racial. 17 Such a white person had to 'be prepared firstly to identify fully with
the non-whites and secondly to accept readily any hardships or restrictions on [their] personal
freedom which the Government may see fit to impose'. She further points out that whites
would more than likely be ostracised in their own communities for their participation in the
liberation struggle, while blacks would be hailed as heroes in theirs.
The Party's collaboration with members of the Congress Movement in establishing the Treason
Trial Defence Fund involved Liberals in an appeal for funds for the defence of those Congress
members who had taken part in the Congress of the People. The state had considered the
Congress in Kliptown a serious enough threat to initiate charges of treason against those
involved. 18 The Freedom Charter was central to the state's argument that the Charter's aims of
the elimination of all racial discrimination and the granting of equal rights to all was
16 The Pietermaritzburg Arrests' by Chundra Gesa in Contact, December 1956.
17 Africa South, 1, 3 (April - June 1957), p.26, quoted in Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.88.
18 Many of those arrested never stood trial. The Trial eventually came to an end in 1961 with no
convictions.
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unattainable in South Africa without the use of violence. 19 One of the main points of the trial
was whether nor not ANC policy was non-violent. By supporting the accused, the LP was
clearly siding with the extra-parliamentary opposition movement. This, together with Paton's
and Kuper's arrests in Durban in December after attending the inaugural meeting of the Fund,
did little to allay fears amongst the more conservative members, especially in the Cape, that the
Party was becoming increasingly involved in extra-parliamentary activities.
The Party had taken a major step in the process of its transformation when a consensus was
reached in early 1957 that extra-parliamentary activity should be seen as complementary to
activity in the parliamentary field. 20 This was after much debate at the National Committee
meeting prior to the National Congress in January 1957, and a split in the party was averted.
Again, the conservative Cape members had their reservations, but had modified their views 'in
the face of the insistence ofNatal and Transvaal members that the Party's extra-Parliamentary
function was as important as its electoral function' .21 Paton felt that parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary activities should not be divided; both could be used to achieve the Party's
goalS.22 The Party"s representatives in Parliament, especially Margaret Ballinger and Leslie
Rubin, continued to fight government legislation. However, Parliament had become
increasingly hostile to liberals since 1948. By the late 1950s it was no longer perceived as a
democratic organ for the white electorate by Liberals, but rather as a Nationalist rubber-stamp
which gave a 'mark of respectability to their obnoxious laws'.23
The National Committee ofthe LP expressed its concern in mid-1957 at the indications that
the government might ban the ANC and considered that such an action was likely to 'drive
many of the African people into a position where revolution [would have appeared] to them to
19 T. Karis & G.M. Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, Volume 3 of T.Karis & G.M.Carter
(eds), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964
(California, Stanford University, 1977), p.64.
20 APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, January 1957; PC 2/9/28/1, Minutes, Natal Coastal
Region Committee, 28 January 1957. My emphasis.
21 Quoted in Brown, 'History', p.85.
22 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 11 January 1957.
23
•Contact, 4 October 1958.
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be the only way of achieving social and political change'.24 During 1957-1958 the ANC was to
come under increasing legislative and judicial attacks from the Nationalist government. The
organisation even drew up plans in case it had to go underground to survive. 25 Not only was its
leadership incapacitated by the Treason Trails, but rising dissent from the group of Africanists
caused rifts within the organisation. This faction eventually broke away in November 1958.
However, the Natal branch of the ANC remained united and was not affected by internal
disputes. 26 Lutuli was still in command and was re-elected for a third three-year term as ANC
national president-general in December 1958, with no opposition.
There is evidence that by 1958 a good working relationship had been established between the
ANC and LP in Natal. Lutuli had proved to be an influential figure among Liberals and had
encouraged the trend towards closer relations. In his speech at the 1958 Natal Provincial
Congress, Lutuli expressed the wish of the ANC to work with the LP: 'we do usually co-
operate in those matters where we agree and as the years have gone by, we have found
ourselves more and more in agreement with the Liberal Party' .27 He added that he welcomed
the presence of the LP as it stood for and represented 'lasting values, values which would .
make South Africa a country to be honoured' .28
The LP in Natal increasingly collaborated and shared platforms with the Congresses from
1956. They were very often called upon to organise these events. Members were invited to an
ANC Study Conference on the Tomlinson Report in Durban in October 1956, where four of
the eight speakers were from the LP. 29 Ngubane and Msimang attended and spoke at the
Interdenominational Afiican Ministers' Federation's (IDAMF') Conference of Afiican leaders,
in Bloemfontein in October 1956, to discuss the implications of the Report. It was attended by
24 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 27-28 April 1957.
25 Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, p.273.
26 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (London, Longman, 1983), p.80.
27 Quoted in Alexander, Pafon, p.290.
28 Quoted in G. van der Westhuizen, 'The Liberal Party of South Africa, 1953-1968' in I.Liebenberg et
ai. (eds), The Long March (pretoria, HAUM, 1994), p.89.
29 Contact, October 1956; J.Robertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1971), p.177.
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almost every prominent African figure. 30 The Party assisted in organising, and participated in,
protests with the ANC and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) in Natal against the extension of
passes to women (in Pietermaritzburg), and against the proposed 'Verwoerd Bill' (Native Law
Amendment Act) (in Pietermaritzburg and Durban).31 It was this participation in extra-
parliamentary opposition politics which was a factor in changing the policy of the Party when
the leadership began to realise its effectiveness in gaining a foothold in the arena ofblack
politics. This is substantiated by Junod's comment on her experience in the November 1956
march, that white Liberals', 'readiness to identify to the hilt with Africans in their protest and
face the consequences immediately made for a warm atmosphere of solidarity which no
amount of talking could previously encourage' .32
Experiences relating to the Treason Trial drew the LP and the Congress Alliance closer
together. It was also a chance to mend relations after the withdrawal of the LP form the
Congress of the People.33 LP members got involved in practical problems relating to the
detainees and their families, such as organising cases for the defence and organising
accommodation and meals. Paton was a trustee of the Treason Trial Defence Fund and used
his reputation as a well-known liberal and literary figure in collecting funds in South Africa and
abroad. According to Lutuli, the difference the Fund made to the detained members' lives was
'beyond calculation'. 34
The Indian community ofNatal, in particular, was threatened by the Group Areas Act. Since
the Party had a number of Indian members, the Act and its possible effects was a matter of
concern to it, although it no doubt would have opposed it regardless. The main area of co-
operation between the NIC and the LP was in campaigns against such legislation, and relations
between the two organisations in Natal grew stronger. The NlC invited the LP to send
delegates to the All-In Group Areas Conference in Durban in May 1956: 'We are looking
forward to a close co-operation from members ofyour Party in making this conference a
30 Contact, October 1956.
31
Contact, December 1956, January 1957, May 1957, & July-August 1957.
32 Quoted in Robertso~Liberalism, p.177.
33 Robertso~ Liberalism, pp.161,179~ Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, p.274.
34 A. Luthnli, Let My People Go (Glasgow, Collins, 1962), p.15l.
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success and we are keeping in contact with Professor Kuper in Durban. '35 Brown reported that
the conference had taken place in a 'friendly atmosphere' and commented on the 'unanimity of
views expressed' .36 Paton and Ken Hill became members of the Group Areas Vigilance
Committee and travelled throughout Natal speaking on the Group Areas Act with other
Congress members. Paton recalls how he spent many weekends travelling to towns in Natal
and speaking at large protest meetings against the Act, which were supported by almost the
entire Indian population of the town and usually a few white people.37 The Natal Division was
invited to send delegates to NIC annual conferences. In a message of goodwill to the NIC
Provincial Annual Conference in November 1957 Brown noted that relations had grown closer
during 1956-1957, and he hoped they would continue to do SO.38 Paton was invited to open the
NIC Annual Conference in late 1958.39
The results of the 1958 general election, and their implications, had a role to play in the
transfonnation of the LP. This election had been important for those who were in opposition
to apartheid in light of the.further development of this policy by the government. Lutuli had
urged Africans not to be indifferent to this election: even if there were no African voters the
'whole of South Africa's immediate future' would be 'determined by these white voters'.4O
Furthennore, it was becoming increasingly obvious by the late 1950s that the United Party
(UP) was no longer able to offer any effective opposition to the Nationalist Party (NP)
government. By this time the UP could no longer be described as 'broadly liberal' (as 'liberal'
was understood at the time) - its colour policy was only progressive when compared to that
of the Nationalist government. 41 In addition, the UP had been subject to increasing internal
strain over differences ofopinion on the colour question before the election.
As might be expected, the LP did not fair well in the general election. The Party contested
35 APC, PC 2/9/13/1, N.T.Naicker, General-Secretary of the NIC, to P.Bro~ 5 March 1956.
36 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Executive Committee,18 May 1956.
37 Paton, Journey Continued, p.158.
38
APC, PC 2/9/13/3, NIC to LP, Natal, 8 October 1957 and LP reply (message), 7 November 1957.
39 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.l00.
40 Luthuli, Let My People Go, p.162.
41 Robertson, Liberalism, pp. 185-187.
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three seats: Sea Point in Cape Town, Orange Grove in Johannesburg, and Pietermaritzburg.
Brown stood for the Pietermaritzburg District seat which included the city and the outlying
smaller towns, and was therefore a mixed urban and rural seat. Five public meetings were held
in Pietermaritzburg and were well supported.42 But a public meeting held in Howick proved to
be the greatest success. Besides about 100 white voters, there were many African and Indian
factory workers who attended. Since the hall was filled to capacity, a second meeting was held
outside, which Jordan Ngubane addressed. The campaign was run on a non-racial basis and all
public meetings were open to people of all races, which created problems as some small towns
did not have halls to accommodate multi-racial audiences.
The general election in April 1958 was the third successive victory for the NP (under the
leadership of Strijdom), and the UP's defeat further divided that party. After the election,
Paton wrote in his column in Contact that he never expected the UP to be in government
again. Furthermore, he did not see it as 'an opposition with any future' .43 What the result of
the general election also indicated was that the majority of the white electorate supported the
apartheid policies of the Nationalist government. This was a blow to the minority of the white
electorate, such as the Liberals, who actively opposed apartheid. The NP victory thus proved
to be a 'decisive factor' in closer relations between the Congress Movement and the LP. 44
The Cape and Transvaal candidates achieved better results than did Brown in Natal, although
both he and the Transvaal candidate lost their deposits. Judging from the result, it seems that
the Party had made very little impact on the white electorate in Natal. Brown received 604
votes to his opponent's approximate 6000. 4S The majority of the white electorate, not only in
Natal, were indifferent to an active involvement in anti-apartheid politics.46 What Paton found
while canvassing in the Pietermaritzburg district for Brown's candidacy was that voters were'
42 APC, PC 2/9/4/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Congress, 17-18 October 1958.
43 A.Paton, 'Liberals and the Nationalist Party' in E. Callan (00.), A/an Paton: The Long View
(London, Pall Mall Press, 1968), p.70.
44 J.Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid (Boulder,Colo.,Westview,
1994), p.206.
4S APC, PC 2/2/1111, Minutes, National Committee, 31 May 1958.
46 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Bmbeck, 19/2/1998.
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either'kwaai nasionalis {hotly nationalist}' while others were' staunch United Party' .47 The
prevailing consideration amongst the more liberally-inclined voters was still to support the UP
in the hope of defeating the NP. Some understood that the real issue was the future
relationship between black and white in South Africa, but most of these would vote for the
UP: why 'swop horses in midstream, when they expect to be swamped anyway?' Although the
UP lost seats to the Nationalists in Natal, the party retained its dominant position in Natal
under the leadership of Douglas Mitchell. 48
The Congress Movement organised a national stay-at-home over the three-day election period.
This was intended to highlight both the absence of political rights and the 'inadequacy of
prevailing wage rates among a population to whom the right of collective bargaining was
denied' .49 The purpose of Government Notice 526, which was imposed during the general
election period and which restricted the number of Africans attending an unauthorised meeting
.to ten, was to prevent a possible strike. However, the planned stay-at-home was a failure and
was called-off after the first day. This was more likely the result of a lack oforganisation and
interest than any intrinsic observance of Government Notice 526. It seems that the worlds of
white and African politics were too removed from one another for a national demonstration by
Africans to take place because ofa white election. 50 The failure of the national strike lowered
morale inside the ANC and discredited the reputations of its leadership on both national and
local levels, at a time when the organisation was fighting dissension from within the ranks. It
also cast doubt amongst Liberals over the organisation's abilities.
One important implication of the general election result for the transformation of the LP was
that it reinforced the belief that the LP had a negligible chance ofgaining any political
influence through parliamentary means. The Party had thus to find alternative means offinding
political influence. According to Brown,
'From the later 1950's it was clear to the leadership of the party that the
47 Pato~ 'A Calm View of Change' in Callan(ed), The Long View, p.68.
48 P.S. Thompso~ NataJians First (Johannesburg, Southern Books, 1990), pp.57-59.
49 M. Ballinger, From Union To Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation (Cape Town, Ju~ 1969), pA18.
50 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.75; Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, pp.283-284.
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emphasis should be much more on extra-parliamentary pressures. The hope was
still one of eventually attaining power, but by a different route. '51
The position ofnational chainnan became vacant with Paton' s decision to stand down in order
to pursue his literary career. At the National Congress in May 1958 Brown was the only
nomination for the chainnanship. He wished to make it clear that he held certain views which
might differ from others in the Party and would only accept the position ifhis standpoint was
acceptable to the National Committee. He felt that the main role of the Party was extra-
parliamentary, although the Party would still continue to contest elections. The Party would
still take part in elections 'simply to prepare White minds for change', and he felt that the Party
should become more closely identified with 'existing Non-White political movements'. 52
Furthennore, ifit became necessary, the Party should defy the ban imposed by Government
Notice 526. 53 Brown 'was elected unanimously, with Leo Kuper as deputy national chainnan.
Paton became national president, a non-executive post created for him, and was still very
involved in LP affairs.
The Party had thus; under the leadership ofBrown, made a stand on the extra-parliamentary
issue. The Liberals conceded their failure in the parliamentary field - -the path chosen at the
LP's fonnation. This step had the effect of releasing the Party from the constraints placed on it
by having to attract white voters. There had always been the dilemma of trying to keep and
encourage the support of the white electorate while promoting policies likely to alienate it. One
of the advantages was that the Party's position would now allow for closer identification with
the Congresses. The extra-parliamentary option was not straightforward, however, as
consensus was needed on which alternative means (in line with the party's principles) would be
selected.
To have got to this point was a natural progression for Brown and many other Liberals, as they
had been influenced by their experiences and the manner in which the country was being
51 Quoted in Alexander, Paton, p.287.
52 Quoted in Bro~ 'History', p.llS.
53 Brown, 'History', p.116.
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governed by the Nationalists, and they could see it going in no other direction. 54 This came
with the acknowledgment by Liberals of the fact that, in Paton's words, '[they were] not living
in a democratic society'. 55 They had accepted the necessity of political action outside of
Parliament. But pursuing such activity did not mean that the leadership had a clear vision of
where it would take them - it was something they felt impelled to do once they sensed that
the impetus for change came from black pressure, which needed to be harnessed. 56 The
decision to break from 'constitutional means' only led to debate within the party and raised
questions about how the LP now perceived change to come about (i.e. no longer simply a
question of constitutional gradualism). Some members maintained that the path of extra-
parliamentary opposition was followed by those who favoured revolutionary means, rather
than the evolutionary means which were the liberal ideal. 57 They saw such activity as illegal as
it entailed breaking the law. Paton, and the emerging new leadership of the Party, believed that
this view was hypocritical. Remaining with' constitutional means' was plaYing into the
government's hands and only lent credence to its farce that 'it [was] really a constitutional
game we are plaYing in South Africa'. Paton believed that 'massive evolutionary changes must
come' and that a non-racial body like the LP should be'instrumental in providing guidance in
this process of change.
Although the situation looked somewhat bleak after the general election, there was a prevailing
mood of hope during the late 1950s after the gaining of independence by Ghana in 1957 and
the possibility that this would precipitate changes throughout the continent. Liberals were also
encouraged and influenced by events in the rest of Africa after Ghanaian independence. 58
Jordan Ngubane attended the All-African People's Conference in Accra in December 1958 as
the official LP representative, while Patrick and Cynthia Duncan attended in a private capacity.
The Congress Alliance delegation was headed by Ezekiel Mphahlele, .who lived in Nigeria. The
54 Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998.
55 A.Paton to M.Ballinger, 27/12/1956 (emphasis in original), quoted in D. Everatt, 'The Politics of
Nonracialism: White Opposition to Apartheid 1945-1960.', D.Phil.Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990, p.217.
56 APe, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 3, 1995.
57 For the following discussion, correspondence between A.Paton and L.Marquard, quoted in Everatt,
'Politics of Nonracialism', pp.217-218. .
58 Robertson, Liberalism, p.195.
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message of the Conference expressed the preference for a non-violent option in gaining
independence and the positive rise of Pan-Africanism. 59 It boosted a sense of identity among
Africans in South Africa with movements in the rest of the continent for independence and for
ending racial discrimination. 60 Ngubane and Duncan spoke about the Conference at a series of
public meetings on their return, and this brought the LP publicity and boosted its prestige.
According to Brown, 'Africans could not hear enough' about it. 61 The impact of this
Conference on the people of South Africa, both black and white, was 'immense' in Lutuli' s
opinion.62
The LP had progressed along the path which had led it away from parliamentary politics and
closer to its new role in the arena of extra-parliamentary opposition. The transfonnation of the
Party and the development of a more radical liberalism came about as a result of changing
attitudes in the Party with regard to its main purpose and how to achieve its goal of a new
society in South Africa. This must be seen against a background of the political situation in the
country. The question of the franchise and the party's decision to follow the extra-
parliamentary path remained, however, contentious issues. This showed that the voice of
prominent conservative Liberals could not yet be discounted despite the radicalisation of the
majority of the membership.
3.2 The Natal Division: transformation from within
The changing composition and outlook of the Party leadership in Natal was reflected in the
change of focus of the Party towards the extra-parliamentary arena. A number ofother factors
contributed, such as the lack ofelectoral success and political developments in the country
which caused Party members to re-consider the question of non-parliamentary political
activity. Natal was the first region to attract a significant African membership. The change in
the composition ofParty membership was a crucial factor in its radicalisation, and was at the
59 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp.82-83.
60 Karis & Ger~ ChaJienge and Violence, p.286.
61 Brown, 'History', p.126.
62 Luthuli, Let My People Go, pp. 187-188.
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same time a result of the radicalisation process. Why did the Party move in the direction it did?
The seeds for the process may well have been sown in the earlier years, but from 1956 the
Division made a more distinct move along this path.
The Natal Division had been at the centre of the LP's political spectrum on a national level in
the early 1950s, as it contained a mixture ofboth radical and relatively conservative members.
By the mid-1950s there were still members who saw the Party's primary role as a
parliamentary political party, while increasing numbers campaigned for the Party to develop
along a different path more in line with black political organisations. However, differences of
opinion which had arisen had been successfully resolved, and the Party had avoided internal
divisions. It seems that the leadership made an effort for various viewpoints to be
accommodated:
'Natal might have [had] its fair share of conservative opinion but at least its
membership represented a cross-section of all views within the Party and these
members were able to discuss their differences amicably and without building
up the tensions and frustrations which seemed to result in Cape Town from the
differences of opinion which existed there. '63
The change in the composition of the membership in the Natal Division, the growing
proportion of African members in particular, was reflected in the change of composition of the
leadership, as well as the outlook of certain members who remained in the leadership. The
number ofblack members represented on the Provincial Committee increased. Furthermore,
the changes in the attitudes of key figures such as Brown and Paton, who must be seen as two
of the most important figures in Natal, and later in the LP nationally, must be taken into
account.
Paton and Brown were most certainly more conservative in the initial period, although both
had altered their views by the mid-1950s and had moved with developments in the party.64
Commenting on the change in policies and the increased emphasis on extra-parliamentary
63 Quoted in Brown, •History', p.70.
64 InteIView with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
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politics in the Party, Brown noted that there was no doubt that this new orientation was partly
due to changing composition, but also that older members had changed their views since
1953.65 In a letter to Jack Causton, the Cape vice-chairman, Brown noted that his 'own
personal views [had] changed a great deal since [he had] been in the Party' .66 Although not a
conservative in 1953, he was definitely not on the left-wing of the Party (he supported a
qualified franchise but wanted closer ties with the Congress Movement). His increased
exposure to discrimination against black people and his growing belief that they had the right
to be full-scale citizens modified his views. 67 In addition, he was influenced by articulate people
like Ngubane who convinced him that a qualified franchise was not acceptable.
The addition of African personalities like Jordan Ngubane and Elliot Mngadi to the Provincial
Committee pushed the Party further in this direction. That Ngubane had joined in 1955 was
evidence of the change in the LP towards the left. He also preferred the non-racialism of the
LP as opposed to the multi-racialism ofthe Congress Movement, and his anti-communist
sentiments and his dislike of the communist influence in the ANC were well-known. Ngubane
provided a crucial stimulus to the radicalisation process of the LP, not only because of his
extensive writing in a number of publications, but also his frequent public speaking, at which
he was exceptionally talented.68 He influenced the thinking of Liberals of all races in Natal, not
only white members. 69 He was an outspoken critic and sought to change the Party further
when he joined.70 Mngadi was neither the political sophisticate nor the public speaker that
Ngubane was, but he and others like him nonetheless contributed in their individual ways to the
transfonnation of the LP in Natal.
The Natal Division had begun to attract increasing numbers of African members. It was the
start of a development in which the results were really only seen in early 1960s when Africans·
joined the LP in substantial numbers. To what extent did having an increased proportion of
65 'Long View' in Contact, quoted in Bro~ 'History', p.137.
66 P.Brown to lCauston, 18 June 1959, quoted in Bro~ 'History', p.139.
67 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
68 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.67.
69 APC, P.Poovalingham interviewed by R Vigne, 1/4/1995.
70 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
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African members' contribute in the radicalisation of the Natal Division of the LP? There is no
doubt that having black members created a certain pressure for change. According to
Ngubane, the increase in African membership 'started a series of tensions that were to lead [the
LP] through a number of crises and in the end left it a changed body'.71 The views of the
majority of the African membership, who were from rural communities, were not radical when
compared to that of their urban counterparts. Through personal contact, white members
became aware ofblack members' hardships and were to experience first-hand the
discrimination endured by them. Thus it was more likely the response of white members to
this exposure which led to the radicalisation of the Division, rather than the views of the
majority of the African membership. 72
It was this political responsibility which impressed white members and convinced them of the
unfairness of the qualified franchise. Part of the change in Paton' s views came from meeting
.ordinary African People, like the residents at Charlestown. 73 Although Brown had started off as
'a strong advocate of a qualified franchise on a high basis of qualification', he had been
persuaded by the nlid-1950s that it was 'impossible to lay down a franchise qualification that
will guarantee a responsible electorate'. 74 What he had found while canvassing for elections
was that most white South Africans voted out of habit. What he encountered amongst the
increasing number ofblack people that he had come into contact with was a degree of
responsibility in discussion which the white electorate, on the whole, lacked.
Most analyses of the LP concentrate on the influence of prominent black people and a growing
black membership as the main forces behind the radicalisation of the party in Natal, and on a
national level. However, a closer look needs to be taken at the existence of the more
progressive faction amongst the white members in the Division whose contribution should be
noted. Those who had espoused more radical tendencies in the initial period included
prominent members such as Leo Kuper, Violaine Junod, and Hans Meidner. They wanted to
71 1. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (London, Pall Mall Press, 1963), p.195.
72 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Brubec~ 19/2/1998.
73 APe, 95APA16, Alan Paton Lecture by P.M.Brown, 'Alan Paton:The Man and the Politician'.
University of Natal, Pietennaritzburg, 6/9/1995. .
74 P.Brown to lCauston, 18 June 1959, quoted in Brown, 'History', p.139.
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identify strongly with the Congresses from the beginning, and disagreed with the qualified
franchise. 75 Meidner and Kuper, in particular, were articulate intellectuals whose importance in
the Party cannot be underestimated. According to Brown, this so-called left-wing in the Natal
Division began to have 'more clout' from 1954.76 Their radical voice was then joined by other
like-minded individuals from all races. Catherine Shallis joined the party in 1955 and describes
herself as part of a younger generation which bolstered the radical faction in the LP in Natal. 77
It was difficult for the LP to attract white members in Natal. Thus it was encouraging that the
number ofyounger, more progressive white members, mostly students from the University of
Natal, had increased. It was noted from the Party's participation in the 1958 general election
that 'the younger generation is far more sympathetic to us than their parents' .78 This trend was
especially evident in Pietennaritzburg, where membership had increased dramatically during
1958.79 (However, overall numbers were small.) These students mixed with others of all races
who belonged to their respective Congresses in Durban and Pietennaritzburg.80 There were a
number of debating-type societies where discussion of political topics took place. They were
thus exposed to a number ofviews which were more left-wing than their own, and which
proved to be intellectually stimulating and thought-provoking.
Judging from the lack ofelectoral success (provincial and general), the LP in Natal failed to
make an impact on the white electorate in the region. The policies of the 'middle-of-the-road'
political parties at the time, such as the UP and the Union Federal Party (UFP), proved
progressive enough and not as far-reaching as those ofthe LP. The Natal Division contested
fewer seats and had worse results than the Cape and the Transvaal. What this highlights is the
lack of appeal of liberalism in Natal, largely because it had no tradition amongst the white
population. That the Party leadership in Natal was 'very agreeably surprised when Peter
75 Evera~ 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.201.
76 Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998.
77 Interview with C.Bmbeck, 19/2/1998. Catherine Brubeck was fonnerly Catherine Shallis.
78 APC, PC 2/9/28/1, Chairman's Report, Natal Coastal Regional branch AGM, 30 September 1958.
79 Bro~ 'History', p.122.
80 Interview withC.B~ 19/2/1998.
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Brown secured 604 votes' in the 1958 general election is testament to this. 8I A consequence of
the Natal Division's poor election record was that in its search for greater membership
amongst all race groups, it came closer to the non-racial ideal than either the Cape or the
Transvaal. 82
The substantial growth of African membership in Natal was not matched by Indian
membership, which showed no appreciable growth. Although there were some prominent
members, they were not as influential as the African members in the LP. 83 The most politicised
Indians were in the NIC while those who joined the LP tended to be more conservative. This
does not mean that they had no part to play in the Party. For example, E.V.Mahomed was a
close friend and a 'virtually...unpaid, spare-time secretary' ofLutuli's in Natal84, and he was
often consulted and requested to liaise and to set up meetings with Lutuli. 8s Sam Chetty, from
the Edendale branch, was an active member in the Division who was thanked personally at the
Provincial Congress for this help during the 1958 general election. 86
Another factor which influenced the transformation of the LP to some extent was the
connection maintained by African members with the ANC by means of their dual membership
or otherwise. That the ANC had an impact on the LP was to be expected from the closer ties
which the organisations continued to form. The joint membership for the Party's African
members with the ANC proved useful in Natal, as members retained their memberships and
therefore their contacts within the other organisation. For instance, a prominent local ANC
leader in Pietermaritzburg, Archie Gumede, was a member ofboth organisations. Although he
was more involved with the ANC, he maintained close contact with local Liberals. 87 It became
increasingly obvious during the late 1950s that the two organisations shared many of the same
81 APC, PC 2/9/28/1, Chairman's Report, Natal Coastal Regional branch AGM, 30 September 1958.
82 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.67.
83 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Brubeck, 1912/1998.
84 B 'Hi ' 43ro~ story , p. .
8S
APe, PC 2/9/12/1, P.Brown to E.V.Mahomed, 24 August 1954 & 18 February 1956.
86 APC, S.Chetty interviewed by R Vign~ 10/411995; APe, PC 2/9/411, Provincial secretary's Report,
Natal Provincial Congress, 17-18 October 1958.
87 APC, A.Gumede interviewed by RLundie, 12/4/1995.
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basic goals, and the leadership of Lutuli was a factor here, too. Africans in the LP had to
justify their point ofview and reasons for joining the LP to members in the ANC, since the
more intellectual Africans and people of Jordan Ngubane's and Hyacenth (Bill) Bhengu's (a
lawyer in Durban) political standing were more likely to be in the ANC than the LP. Sg
Liberalism had also acquired a bad name amongst politically sophisticated urban blacks, and
consequently membership was difficult to build from this group. 89
A further indication of the Natal Division's move to the left was the decision, strongly
endorsed by Paton, to ignore the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1957. A clause in the
proposed Bill (known as the 'church clause') was intended to prevent racial association in
'church, school, hospital, club or any other institution, or place ofentertainment' .90 The
restriction on the holding of non-racial meetings in certain areas would have severely affected
the LP. The decision by the Natal Provincial Executive Committee was unanimous in refusing
to accept provisions of the Bill, 'even if this should involve certain members in prosecutions'.91
The intention of the government was clear. According to Verwoerd,
'In view of the Liberal Party's attitude of coming with threats about causing mixed
conditions in various spheres of social life, it is not at all unnecessary for Parliament to
take steps timeously to curb these activities oftheirs. '92
Amendments were made to the Bill before it was passed through Parliament which lessened its
impact somewhat. However, the Act resulted in the closure of the International Club in
Durban, as the Minister refused to issue a permit as required under the new law.
g8 APC, IDidcott interviewed by R Vigne, 22/6/1995.
89 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp. 67,69.
90 Quoted in Paton, Journey Continued, p.164.
91 PC 2/96/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Executive Committee, 5 March 1957.
92 Quoted in Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid, p.357.
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3.3 Gaining newfollowers and meeting new challenges
Why was the Natal Division so successful in recruiting Afiican members? The Division had a
wide range of members, and this was also true when one looks at the composition of the
African membership in particular. It is essential to distinguish between rural membership and
that of prominent educated urban Afiicans, like Jordan Ngubane, Bill Bhengu, Selby Msimang
(a moderate compared to the previous two), and Mlahleni Njisane. Besides the more
prominent members mentioned, the Natal Division began to recruit increasing numbers of
'rank-and-file' working-class, predominately rural, African members during the late 1950s. The
recruitment ofblack members had been a policy of the Division from the start and members
actively worked at it, which was a contributing factor to the subsequent success of the policy.
This view was echoed by Ngubane, who felt that if such a party were to make real progress
amongst Afficans, Liberalism should be taken 'to the man in the Location' .93 Also, there was
the fact that a number of prominent black people had joined, such as Msimang and later
Ngubane, which must have been a further drawcard. Members held meetings in around the
province and acted on interest shown. Rural Africans joined the party in Natal mainly as a
result of the LP's involvement with communities on a grass-roots level, especially when the
threat of 'black spot' removals took the Party into the northern Natal countryside. Members
from rural communities may not have been au fait with the ideological debates, but they had a
clear idea of their problems and, understandably, were keen to take advantage ofoffers to help
them. Within the national LP, Natal was the most successful region in multi-racial joint
enterprises in the 1950s (good relations between the ANe and the LP in the region no doubt
helped).
Liberals identified themselves with the needs ofAfiicans through protest or publicity and a
'basic kind of social work,.94 According to Bro~ it was generally accepted that the
'straightest road to Afiican hearts was by taking up issues which affected them directly and
93 Quoted in Robertso~Liberalism, p.l77.
94 Robertson, Liberalism, p.l76.
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immediately in their daily lives' .95 This is what Lutuli had tenned 'Ambulance Work'.96
Ngubane emphasized 'the need for a crusading spirit as is the work of the Liberal Party' .97
Specific issues were taken up, mostly dealing with the Group Areas Act and forced removals.
The strategy adopted by the party in Natal was to go into the community where interest was
shown, to focus on the problems, and then engage the local leaders in dealing with these
problems.98 By 'involving themselves in the mundane problems of non-whites... , they short-
circuited the whole system ofapartheid' and 'came to know Africans on their own tenns, as
individuals rather than representatives of a racial group'.99
One of the most successful aspects of the Natal Division was its involvement in campaigns
against the destruction of African freehold rights and the forced removal of communities in
accordance with the Group Areas Act. The main focus of the LP amongst the African people
in rural areas ofNatal was the 'black spot' campaign, which really made progress during 1958
with the fonnal establishment of the Northern Natal Afiican Landowners' Association
(NNALA). Elliot Mngadi was offered a pennanent position as an organiser for the LP's
campaign against removals in northern Natal in late 1956, which he took up in April 1957. His
salary was paid by the LP, although the campaign had the dual support of the ANC and the
LP. 100 The party in Natal was careful to consult with the ANC in these areas before
progressing, and the official stamp of approval from Lutuli and the ANC Executive for ANC-
LP co-operation had been obtained. Both Brown and Kuper had on separate occasions been to
see Lutuli, and Brown had also spoken to Gabriel Nyembe, the ANC' s leading figure in
northern Natal. Both were eager to work with the LP in publicising and opposing removals. 101
Although Mngadi liaised with local ANC representatives, the ANC was never actively involved
in these rural areas. Urban issues were more of a priority with the ANC and although the
9S B 'Hi ' 78rown, story ,p. .
96 Quoted in Robertson, Liberalism, p.178.
97 APC, PC 2/9128/1, Minutes, Natal Coastal Regional branch AGM, 11 August 1955.
98 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Brubeck, 19/2/1998.
99 Robertson, Liberalism, p.178.
100 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Executive Committee, 6 November 1956.
101 APC, PC 2/9/1012, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 5 March 1957; PC 2/9/10/1, Minutes,
Natal Provincial Committee, 21 March 1956.
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organisation was not active in this campai~ it took an interest in it.
Mngadi organised landowners and tenants in opposing the destruction of African freehold
rights in the 'black spots' and to tried prevent the government from proceeding with its plans
to remove established communities. He visited threatened areas, informing the people about
the government's intention and about the proposed landowners' organisation, and made
contact with the local ANC representatives to enlist their support. 102 Mngadi had done a survey
during 1958 of the 'black spot' communities in northern Natal and had estimated that
approximately 100,000 to 250,000 people were threatened with removal. 103 The Party in Natal
organised frequent meetings and protests addressed by leaders such as Brown, Ngubane and
Msimang. Catherine Shallis often accompanied them as provincial secretary. Community
forums were set-up to inform people of their rights and to try to stall removals. Simon
Roberts, a lawyer and Liberal from Pietermaritzburg, acted as the Party's legal adviser.
Mngadi's work amongst the threatened communities proved so effective that 'the party was
flooded with Africans' applications for membership' 104, and the Party opened several new
branches in northern Natal. The LP's involvement in Charlestown, for instance, led to the
establishment of a branch consisting ofonly African members. The Party did much in this area
to increase the political awareness of the local people, and according to Brown, most rural
Africans joined the LP rather than the ANC. 10S There is no doubt that the residents threatened
with removal were grateful for the work that the LP did. The provincial secretary recalls how
she got the feeling that the Liberals, white ones in particular, were the first 'outside' people to
take any notice ofthe communities' problems. 106 In a letter to Brown, Jeremiah Mkwanazi, a
Charlestown resident, thanked him for his help: 'I greatly appreciate the services you are
prepared to render me and thank you for all the trouble you have taken on my behalf' 107
Mngadi became the Party's organiser in northern Natal in October 1958 as there was a need to
102 APC, PC 2/9/14/1, Monthly Reports by E.Mngadi, 1957.
103 Bro~ 'History', p.122.
104 Robertson, Liberalism, p.178.
105 Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998.
106 Interview with C.Brubec~ 19/2/1998.
107 APe, PC 2/9/17/1,J.~ to P.Bro~ 11 February 1956.
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co-ordinate the Party's efforts here due to the increase in membership. The ANC was
consulted and agreed, providing that he remained secretary of the NNALA. 108
Much of the Natal Division's success in rural areas and the recruitment of African members
can be attributed to Brown, who spearheaded the LP's involvement here. He made an impact
on Africans, especially since he could speak Zulu fluently. 109 He was thus able to communicate
on a level at which racial differences became less distinct. According to Pato~ he 'certainly
had the gift of communicating with black people' .110 It was the 'unequalled dedication'
(Mlahleni Njisane's opinion) 111 and the quiet and patient political work 112 of Brown that
resulted in the party's success with rural communities. This view is substantiated by many LP
members. 113 Brown was held in high esteem by these people. Pat Poovalingham recalls a
certain meeting where the African delegates waited for Brown to vote before casting theirs in
accordance with his. 114
There was a concern that .the politics of the LP was too intellectual for a certain section of the
African population as it lacked a more emotional appeal. For example, political meetings
amongst the 'rank-and-file' Africans were often characterised by singing and dancing. LP
meetings tended to be more serious affairs and the party never really 'struck an emotional
cord' with Africans. 115 This is a criticism that Msimang had of the LP, that it did not have a
'dynamic programme' to really 'captivate' Africans. 116 In other words, African members would
not join the LP as they would the ANC, and the LP would never become a mass movement.
Didcott had commented in 1956, and Ngubane agreed, that more 'militancy' was needed in the
Liberal progr~ such as popular slogans, as the Party was in danger ofbeing too purely
108 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Congress, 17-18 October 1958.
109 This is the opinion expressed by many Liberals in the interviews listed.
110 Pato~ Journey Continued, p.142.
111 Quoted in Robertso~Liberalism, p.178.
112 D . D 1nver, uncan, p. 40.
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intellectual in certain quarters. 117
Besides increasing involvement in rural areas the Party was also active on the urban front. The
Durban and Pietermaritzburg (including Edendale) branches were the only real urban branches
in Natal. The focus of the Durban branch was more on urban issues than that of the
Pietermaritzburg branch. Much LP activity involved holding both protest and party meetings.
The Party tended to focus on specific issues, such as the Group Areas Act, and one of its main
goals was consciousness-raising, especially amongst the white population. The enforcement of
the Group Areas Act and Native Affairs legislation directly affected the Party, as it
discriminated against many of its members. In their total rejection of these government
policies, the Party became involved in protests and campaigns against it. However, protests
were not only limited to the Group Areas legislation, but also included issues such as 'Bantu
education'. This brought about closer co-operation with the NIC and with the ANC.
There were a number of districts where Party activity increased and new branches were
established. These were mainly in the rural areas ofNatal, and the overall number of
predominately African branches increased. 118 In the Bergville area, new branches were
established at Khumalosville by Michael Ndlovu and at Rookdale by Roy Coventry, a local
farmer, during 1958. 119 The branch at Charlestown had a completely African membership,
while other new branches, such as Greytown and Kokstad, had a mainly black membership. By
1958 two predominately black urban branches had been formed. In Durban, the members of
the Red Hill branch were mostly workers from the nearby te~ factory, while those in the
Howick branch were mainly from the local rubber works. The Howick branch was thriving
under the leadership ofChristopher Shabalala, a local factory worker who later became party
organiser for the Midlands region.
The Natal Provincial Congress in October 1958 was the largest and most representative to
117 APC, PC 2/9/28/1, Minutes, Natal Coastal Region Committee, 18 September 1956.
118 B 'Hi ' 124rown, story , p. .
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date, and was an indication of the success of the party in the region. 120 It took place at the
Pietermaritzburg City Hall, and over 400 people arrived to hear Lutuli give the opening
address. Ngubane thanked him sincerely, despite the differences between them over the
influence of communists in the ANC. The growth in the membership of the Natal Division had
been the most consistent nationally - it had increased from its approximately 400 members in
1954 to over a thousand in 1958.121 By the end of 1956, Natal had overtaken the Cape
(western and eastern Cape branches) with over 700 members to its 500. Activity in the
Transvaal was high and the membership had increased to 412. 122 During 1957 the figure for the
Transvaal had doubled to over 800,123 with the total number of members for Natal also
exceeding 800. 124 The Free State Division never had a significant number of members
compared to the other regions.
There is evidence that by late 1958 the LP was beginning to make a noticeable impact on the
African population on a national scale. Besides Natal, the Transvaal and Cape Divisions had
also experienced an increase in African membership.12s The latter Divisions never experienced
this influx on the same scale as Natal, though. The Transvaal Division saw the benefits of
grass-roots involvement with the considerable increase in African membership during 1957
after the Party's involvement in the protests against the removals at Sophiatown, a suburb of
Johannesburg.
Amongst other difficulties faced by the Natal LP as a non-racial organisation in South Africa at
this time was finding suitable venues for meetings. These became more and more difficult to
organise as the Party's non-racial character became established. Multi-racial audiences could
not be accommodated in venues normally reserved for white people. A meeting of the
Midlands branch had to be postponed as the Nottingham Road Fanners' Association refused
120 Bro~ 'History', p.123.
121 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.66.
122 APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, Janwny 1957.
123 APC, PC 2/9/13/2, National secretary to provincial secretary, Cape Division, 9 July 1957.
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permission for the use of their hall. 126 During 1957 the Winterton branch had to hold its
meeting in a cowshed which belonged to its only white member. Later that year Brown,
Ngubane and Paton addressed a meeting of about 90 people (including members of the
Security Branch police) in the saleyards adjacent to the Mooi River Farmers' Association Hall.
The Association refused to allow the meeting to be held in the hall after it was discovered that
the audience would be multi-racial, but then allowed it as it began to rain heavily. 127 There
were also other difficulties. For example, in the so-called Native Reserves no more than ten
Afiicans could attend a meeting without first obtaining permission. 128
As the Party in Natal attracted more African members and became more involved in black
politics, so it attracted the attention ofan increasingly repressive government. A police
presence became more frequent, with the names and car registration of people attending LP
meetings being taken. These members were then later questioned by the police. 129 For example,
members in Kokstad were visited and questioned by police after they had attended a LP
meeting, on the pretext that permission had not first been obtained from the Native
Commissioner. 130 The names of those attending the trial ofPaton and Kuper in early 1957 on
charges of holding an illegal gathering in Durban in December 1956 were also noted. 131
The government's clamp-down in April 1958 on opposition, with Government Notice 526 and
a ban on all political meetings over the general election period, was only lifted country-wide in
September. This created problems in Pietermaritzburg as the branch's Annual General Meeting
was due to be held in the City Hall in May 1958. Since the Native Commissioner refused
permission, the meeting was held at the home ofthe Browns in partial defiance. 132 Permission
for a house-meeting was also refused at the home ofthe Patons in Kloof
126 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 28 April 1955.
127 B 'Hi ' 89 90rown, story, pp. - .
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3.4 Taking the lead on the national stage: the ascendancy ofthe Natal Division
The Natal Division made an impact on the Party on a national level as it became increasingly
radicalised from 1956 onwards, and the 'most significant pressure for change from party
activists came from Natal' .133 That Natal was relatively free of internal division, as well as
having active and committed members, was certainly a factor in allowing for a transformation
to take place without jeo'pardizing the functioning of the Division. A combination of factors
had allowed for its radicalisation and from the mid-1950s the Natal Division of the LP was
consistently the most stable and dynamic Division. By contrast, the other Divisions tended to
have periods of high and low activity. 134 The Natal Division played a role on a national level in
that it provided a firm foundation which helped transfonn the Party. The leadership of the
Natal Division had moved with developments in the Party, and as such played a vital role in the
adoption of a more radical line.
The Division in Natal was to set the tone when the national office was moved to
Pietermaritzburg from Cape Town in early 1956. The National Committee had taken the
decision in late 1955 that the national office should be rotated around the Provinces. 135 Brown
in particular expressed his hope that by moving the national office to Pietermaritzburg the
Natal Division would influence the way in which the party was developing:
'It~ mean, I hope, that we will be able to guide it in the way we have been
trying to guide developments in Natal during the last couple of years. ' 136
During 1955 the Natal and Transvaal Divisions had complained that the National Executive
Committee was loaded with conservative Cape members who did not reflect the views of the
Party as a whole. 137 With the move to Natal the Party began to take on a more radical
complexion, and this was reflected in the election ofJordan Ngubane and Patrick Duncan to
the National Executive Committee. 138 Thus Ngubane not only had an effect on the
133 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.20l.
134 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998. & C.Brobeck, 19/2/1998.
135 The national office remained in Pietennaritzburg until the party was dissolved.
136 APC, PC 2/9/26/1, P.Brown to H.Meidner, 3 February 1956. Brown's emphasis.
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radicalisation of the Natal Division, but also of the Party on a national level.
There was a difference in opinion between Natal and the Cape over the role of the Party: the
latter wanted an orthodox political party which appealed to the white electorate whereas the
former had supported a non-racial image and a multi-racial membership from the beginning.
From the early days of the Party, the Natal leadership was 'seeking a way towards a non-racial
movement which would set an example in the first instance and grow into a major political
force in the country' .139 National policy was therefore bound to change, and the Transvaal felt
more at ease with the new national leadership. Natal, too, increased its representation on a
national level. Paton accepted the national chairmanship in June 1956, with Brown and Kuper
as deputy-chairmen. In 1954 black representatives from Natal had been elected onto the
National Committee, and this number was to increase. In mid-1958 Brown became the national
chairman and Paton the national president, and Hans Meidner took over the provincial
chairmanship from Brown in late 1958.
The Natal Division 'had a role to play in the radicalisation of the Party, but it also had an impact
because ofway the party head office was run from Pietermaritzburg. The provincial head office
was also there, so it was a practical consideration that both offices were run from the same
venue. According to Catherine Brubeck, who was provincial and then national secretary in the
late 1950s, it was more than just a question ofwhere the party national office was. 140 The Natal
Division tended to lead the way and this vibrancy was projected onto the party on a national
level.
According to Brown, Natal's takeover of the national leadership in early 1956 'proved decisive
in holding the party together' over the following two years. 141 By 1956 there were still very
divergent views within LP, ranging from conservatives (mostly in the Cape) like Margaret
Ballinger, Donald Molteno and Oscar WolIheim to more radical people like Patrick Duncan,
139 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.30.
140 Interview with C.Bmbeck, 19/2/1998.
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Jock Isacowitz and Violaine Junod. 142 Furthermore, the growing black membership, which
ranged from moderates to more radical figures, also created tensions. Brown attributed some
of this success to Paton as '[his] influence... in the chair was to hold meetings together and his
infinite capacity to bring together conflicting views into a resolution acceptable to all, was to
carry the day' .143 Paton writes in his autobiography that his and Brown's opinions were
respected and that they 'played the major part in holding' the disparate groups of the Party
together. l44 According to Douglas Irvine, Brown 'exercised a profound influence through his
good humor [sic], his sanity, and his dedication' .145 Patrick Duncan, as Party organiser, paid
tribute to Brown for his 'indefatigable work on behalfof the Party' .146 The Natal Division as
well as the LP in general were fortunate to have the membership ofPaton and Brown. Not
only did they both work tirelessly for the Party, but were to also to donate a considerable
portion oftheir income to it. 147
Another area where the LP in Natal influenced the Party on national level was its development
of a good working relationship with Congress Movement in the region. Relations between the
LP and the ANC in Natal were more cordial than in the other regions from the start and ties
between them were strengthened from 1956. 148 Although relations with the NIC had not been
as friendly, they improved after 1956. The LP in Natal collaborated with both organisations in
campaigns protesting against the government's apartheid legislation. According to Brown,
relations between the LP and the Congresses in Natal had their 'ups and downs' .149 Overall and
especially compared to the other regions, there were very few problems with collaboration
between the LP and the NIC and the ANC in Natal. Lutuli encouraged this, and friendships
between Liberals and Congress Alliance members helped relations. An obstacle to closer
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144 Paton, Journey Continued, p.12!.
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relations with the Congress Movement on a national level was the anti-communist inclination
of many Liberals. However, the COD was neither as active nor influential in the Congress
Alliance in Natal as it was elsewhere. The hostility which had been a feature in the Transvaal
and the Cape was not present in Natallso, and several Liberals had contact with COD members
as part of the Congress Movement in Natal. lS1 The COD in Natal's telegram to the LP in Natal
to wish the Division every success at its 1958 Provincial Congress read: 'Look forward to
cooperation between all Democrats working for a South Africa where all people can enjoy
freedom in every sphere of life, '152
The working relationship which continued to develop in Natal between the Party and the
Congresses was not matched in the other Divisions. Official relations between the ANC and
the LP in the western Cape remained cautious. There was, however, some co-operation later
between the two in joint ventures such as the Group Areas Co-ordinating Committee. lS3 The
radicals in the Cape LP were in direct conflict with the majority of the conservative Cape
leadership in wanting closer relations with the Congresses. 154 The COD presence was a
problem, too. The LP branch in the eastern Cape, fonried in the mid-1950s and based in East
London, established good relations with the local ANC. 155 The Transvaal Division had great
difficulty in "making contact and maintaining a working relationship with the Transvaal Indian
Congress (TIC) and the ANC in the region. 156 The head offices ofboth the ANC and the COD
were based in Johannesburg, and these organisations were very active there. Co-operation with
the black organisations was often blocked by the LP's antipathy towards the COD and the
latter's criticism ofthe former. 157
In Natal, both formal discussions and informal social meetings took place with members of the
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Congress Movement. Although it is difficult to single out members from the Natal leadership
who were responsible for improving relationships with the Congresses, particular mention
should be made ofBrown and Leo Kuper. Mlahleni Njisane and Violaine Junod also
participated in many of the meetings. Junod attributed the 'present close relations with the
various congresses' in late 1956 to Kuper, as he had assisted in the breaking-down of
suspicions. 158 Paton's close personal relationship with Lutuli was an influential factor in the
cordial relations enjoyed by the ANC and the LP in Natal. 159 The personal friendships between
certain members from the different organisations played an important part in helping to foster
closer relations and meant that these members met on an informal social basis as well. A
number ofLiberals in Durban had fonned fiiendships with members of the NIC at the
International Club even before the formation of the Lpl60, such as the Kupers and the Meers
(members of the NIC). Paton and his wife, Dome, often dined at the home ofDr G.M.
(Monty) Naicker, president of the NIC. 161 ANC and NlC members attended a 'braaivleis' held
in July 1956 at the home of Sam Chetty, an LP member in Edendale. 162 Lutuli attended
informal gatherings at the home ofE.V.Mahomed in Stanger. 163 There was frequent socialising
on the University campuses, particularly in Durban, between Liberal and Congress students. 164
Conclusion
If one compares the LP in 1953 to that organisation which had emerged by late 1958, the
transformation of the Party with the adoption of a more radical liberalism can clearly be seen.
This phase of transition in the LP's history began in 1956 and was completed by 1958.
Developments, such the growth in the Party's black membership and the increase in its co-
operation with black political organisations, led to inevitable policy changes. The Natal
Division ofthe LP had established itselfin the political sphere of the region by 1958. It had
158 APC, PC 2/9/28/1, Minutes, Natal Coastal Region Committee, 11 September 1956.
159 Robertson, Liberalism, p.176.
160 This is mentioned by several LP members in the interviews listed.
161 Paton, Journey Continued.
162
Contact, September 1956.
163 APC, PC 2/2/5/2, National Organiser's Report, December 1957.
164 Interview with C.Brnbec~ 19/2/1998.
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also progressed from the smallest and least prominent Division of the LP to the largest, most
stable and progressive one, virtually providing the main leadership of the Party.
The seeds of change had been sown earlier in Natal, but the turning point signifying its change
in direction·came in 1956. The Party in Natal had come to the realisation by this time that in
order to fight apartheid legislation the path of extra-parliamentary politics was fast becoming
the more effective option. The Party had moved away from primarily debating party policy to
an active involvement in extra-parliamentary opposition by 1958. It was a combination of
factors which allowed for the Natal Division to transform itself: and to develop a dynamism
which led to its ascendancy and influence on a national level. Its membership base had been
broadened, with the increase in Afiican membership in particular, and the Party progressed to a
truer non-racialism. Notable achievements had been attained in evoking black responses
through concerted campaigns against forced removal and Group Areas policies, usually in co-
operation with the Congresses, especially the ANC.
Although the LP had started out as a strictly parliamentary party and was seen by critics on the
left in almost the same genre as the UP and the OFP, differences soon became apparent as the
LP became increasingly involved in black politics, ofwhich the other parties wanted no part.
By 1958, the LP had moved significantly away from the Cape Liberal Tradition and towards a
non-racial democratic stand which 'was to give the Liberal Party its later validity' .165
165 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.32.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Testing times: Liberalism pushed to new limits
in Natal and elsewhere, 1959-1962
Introduction
From the evidence gathered for Liberalism in South Africa, Janet Robertson claims there was
'common agreement among leading Liberals that the years 1960 and 1961 saw their party at
the height of its achievement'. 1 It was also a dramatic period in the history of South Africa.
The Liberal Party's (LP) response to the almost revolutionary political climate of the early
1960s played a role in the Party's further radicalisation and its closer identification with the
causes ofblack politics.
Extra-parliamentary political opposition in the country entertained cautious expectations about
the new decade on the eve of 1960. It had been influenced by events in the rest of Africa (the
actual and impending independence of many states) and the international interest in South
Africa.2 In the country there was, on the one hand, an increasingly repressive regime
entrenching white power, and on the other, Afiican leaders were struggling to keep up with
popular frustration and impatience. However, after Sharpeville (March 1960) and the
declaration ofa state ofemergency, it became increasingly obvious that the government would
no longer tolerate the opposition from extra-parliamentary political organisations. Sharpeville,
in the context ofthe time, can be seen as the event which 'burst the bubble' that had hitherto
contained Afiican discontent. The banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in early April 1960 was testament to the government's
intolerance, and the gulfbetween it and black opposition widened.
1 J.Robertso~ Liberalism in South Africa. 1958-1963 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971), p.215. This
claim is supported by evidence gathered from interviews and research done by myself.
2 T.Karis & G.M.Ger~ Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, Volume 3 of T.Karis & G.M.Carter
(eds), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964
(California, Stanford University, 1977), pp.295-296.
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The two most important developments in the LP during these years were the further
radicalisation of the Party as it continued to re-examine its policies, and the substantial increase
in African membership. Also, during these years the leadership of the Natal Division
established its presence in the national leadership. The decision taken during 1958, that the
main role of the party was no longer in the electoral field, became a reality as the Party became
increasingly involved in extra-parliamentary opposition politics, which took the fonn of direct
protest and the use of the method ofboycott. The franchise issue was finally resolved in the
interests of the majority of the LP's membership. The increase in African membership and the
changing composition of the Party was both a cause and effect of its transfonnation. One of
the consequences of the LP's opposition to the government was an increase in intimidation and
harassment by the state, which began with the detention of a number of prominent members,
mostly in Natal, during the state of emergency. The continued involvement of Liberals in
protests against Group Areas, especially the 'black spots' in Natal, was no doubt a reason
behind this. It was only from 1963, however, that this attention took on the fonn of a
systematic campaign and began to seriously affect the Party.
4.1 The boycott issue and the universalfranchise
Despite the radicalisation of the LP on a national level and the consensus reached by the
majority of the membership on transfonnation in Party policy, the two contentious issues of the
Party's main role and the franchise still dominated discussion among members during 1959.
Both these issues brought out the still divergent views within the Party. The decision that it
would concentrate on extra-parliamentary opposition politics raised questions about its choice
of protest methods, and the use ofboycotts in particular. The influence of the conservative
group gradually faded as members left the PaI"tf because they were unable to reconcile
themselves with the growing radicalism within the LP, or alternatively, were outvoted.4
The Party's commitment to extra-parliamentary opposition and to the struggle to achieve
3 Some joined the Progressive Party, formed in November 1959. See later discussion.
4 D.Everatt, 'The Politics of Nonracialism: White Opposition to Apartheid 1945-1960.' D.Phil.
Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990, p.186.
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social and political change in South Africa was tested with a new tactic adopted by the
Congress Alliance, namely the use of boycotts as a means of political protest. This had been
under discussion at the ANC's annual Congress in late 1958, and the organisation had initiated
a boycott of 'Nationalist products' in mid-1959. The topic of boycotts was first discussed by
the LP in early 1959 and, as was to be expected, there no overall agreement. This was
covering new ground in the area of political protest, and supporting such means was not a
decision to be undertaken lightly. Peter Brown, as national chairman, supported the idea in
principle. 5 The Pietermaritzburg branch decided by the 'narrowest of margins' to support the
boycott initiative but support was to be on an individual basis.6 Brown informed the ANC of
the Natal Provincial Committee's decision to give its support, but not wholeheartedly, as it was
felt that no preliminary survey had been done to establish the effectiveness of the campaign. 7
The Transvaal Division was prepared to give its cautious support, while the Cape was divided
on the issue.
The Congress Alliance .announced its intention to launch a boycott of South African goods
overseas during mid-1959. The leadership of the LP, after some initial uncertainty, decided in
November 1959 to endorse the method ofboycott as a legitimate means of political protest. 8
They envisaged short-term economic boycotts which would have a political effect rather than
an economic one. The Party had thus moved a step further along the extra-parliamentary path
and closer to identifying with the Congresses by giving the use ofboycotts its official stamp. In
their Statement on the Overseas Boycott, Alan Paton and Brown saw passive resistance and
boycott as the last two remaining non-violent political weapons left to Africans. 9 The LP did
'not like the use of the boycott weapon' but believed that 'under certain conditions its
employment [was] justifiable' as it was the 'only effective form of expression left' to the
majority of South Africans who were excluded from political activity. to However, not all
5 P.Brown to O. Wollheim, Apri11959, quoted in APe, PC 2/6/6/1, P.M.Brown, 'A Historv of the
Liberal Party of South Africa', unpublished manuscript, p.140. ~
6 APC, PC 2/9/23/2, Minutes, Special Meeting, Pietermaritzburg branc~ June 1959.
7 Brown, 'History', pp. 140-141.
8
APC, PC 2/4/1112, Statement by P.Brown and A.Paton.
9 Robertson, Liberalism, p.196.
10 APC, PC 2/2/5/3, Statement issued at National Congress, May 1960.
112
boycotts would necessarily be supported by the Party. Each would be considered as a separate
case.
The National Committee carried Brown's request that the Party should give its consent to
Patrick van Rensburg, a Transvaal member, to represent the LP in organising the ANC-
sponsored Boycott Movement initiated in London. 11 It was to be launched in late February
1960 and to last for four weeks. The LP issued a statement which described the attitude of
most members. Although the p.arty was aware of the shortcomings ot: and the hardships
caused by, boycotts, the use of the method was one of the few non-violent means available in
influencing the government. Therefore the party approved of its use in South Africa and
abroad as a legitimate political weapon. 12 Brown and Albert Lutuli signed a joint statement at
the launch of the overseas boycott on 20 February 1960, which was published on 1 March
1960 in the Rand Daily Mail. 13
The majority of the African membership supported the use ofboycotts and there is no doubt
that this influenced the leadership of the LP, especially 'in Natal. Brown had spoken to number
of Afiican members - they supported the use ofboycotts and wanted the LP to support it. 14
In fact, the Party supported this means of protest partly at 'the insistence of its Afiican
members' .15 Those who did not support the use ofboycotts pointed out the hardships to be
experienced by Afiican people as a possible result. According to Selby Msimang, Afiicans
were prepared to bear the hardships ifit would lead to ultimate improvements. 16 Jordan
Ngubane, in an article in Indian Opinion, said that Africans '~hould be lucky merely to starve
in order to break apartheid's back' .17 It was felt that Africans had no duty to protect an
economy which paid 80% of its labour force less than a living wage. The overseas boycott was
11 D.Irvine, 'The Liberal Party, 1953-1968' in lButler, R.Elphick & D.Welsh (eds), Democratic
Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospects (Cape Town, David Philip, 1987), p.126; Robertson,
Liberalism, p.196.
12 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 6 April 1959.
13 APC, PC 2/4/11/2, Statement signed by A.Lutuli and P.Brown, 20 February 1960.
14 APC, PC 2/2/5/3, Statement issued at National Congress, May 1960.
IS
APC, PC 2/4/11/2, Statement by P.Brown and A.Paton.
16 Brown, 'History', pp. 141-142.
17 APC, PC 2/4/11/2, Quoted in statement by P.Brown and A.Paton.
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also supported by the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The general feeling
was that even if Africans were to lose jobs it was better than apartheid. Lutuli did not view the
economic isolation of South Africa as 'desirable from every point of view' but it seemed the
only chance for a 'relatively peaceful transition' .18 Furthermore, he did not doubt that it would
entail hardship for Africans but it was the price that had to be paid to shorten the days of
suffering under apartheid.
The overseas boycott campaign had received overall Liberal support in Natal. 19 A resolution
was passed, with two dissentients, by the Natal Provincial Congress in March 1960 which
backed the boycott: 'general approval of the campaign was shown, especially by the African
members' .20 A resolution for National Congress was submitted by the Edendale branch which
welcomed the use of boycotts in the struggle against apartheid and thanked the leadership of
the party for the stand they had taken. 21 However, the use of the method of boycott did not
find support among more conservative white members, especially in the Cape. Brown was
aware that the Party was divided on this and that it might lose members. However, he felt at
the time that 'one had reached the point where one felt enough accommodation had been
made'.22 As mentioned, the initial boycotts were supported on a local Party level or on an
individual basis only, but from late 1959 the use ofboycotts gained the Party's official support.
The boycott issue was one of several ofwhich certain white members disapproved and which
resulted in a number of resignations. 23
Brown personally did not like boycotts but '(liked) apartheid less' .24 He pointed out that it was
better that such non-violent methods that remained be used now rather than later when it might
be too late, for how much longer would black leaders stay non-violent? This echoes a sense of
18 A. Luthuli, Let My People Go (Glasgow, Collins, 1962), p.186.
19 Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998. Brown does not recall any particular opposition here, and
mentions the support of the Africans members for the use ofboycotts by the Party.
20 APC, PC 2/91317, Minutes, Natal Provincial Congress, March 1960.
21 APC, PC 2/2/5/3, Resolutions for National Congress, May 1960.
22 Everatt's interview with P.Brown (1987) quoted in Evera~ 'Politics of Nonracialism' , pp.259-260.
23 Irvine, 'Liberal Party', p.125.
24 'Long View' in Contact, quoted in Bro~ 'History', p.160.
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urgency and frustration felt by the ANC leadership, most ofwhom were tied up with the
Treason Trials (which ended in 1961) or were restricted under the conditions of the
Suppression of Communism Act. Furthermore, there was the mounting pressure of popular
African discontent. Oliver Tambo, an ANC leader and a Treason Trial detainee, warned in a
speech in Alexandra in 1959 that whites in South Africa should follow the policy of the LP as
soon as possible, 'before Africans reach a point of no return',25 There was a general feeling of
frustration amongst those opposed to the government at its unwillingness to meet African
leadership. Paton and Brown gave this as a reason for their support of the overseas boycott. 26
For, what other avenues were left open for political protest? Had the government taken note of
other protests held so far by the Congress Movement? It had 'made impossible any kind of
democratic action by non-white people' and even 'crippled white democratic opposition'. In
their opinion, it was thus necessary to apply pressure to the government to avoid a
revolutionary situation from developing.
The LP was widely criticised by the white electorate and parliamentary political parties in
South Africa for its support of the overseas boycott. This boycott was an important
development in the political history of South Africa - '[n]o other single campaign has caused
so much and such prolonged concern amongst those who support white supremacy in South
Africa as has this one'.27 Amongst the critics (besides the Nationalist government) were the
United Party (UP) and Dr. AJ.R. van RhYn, the South African High Commissioner in London.
That the boycott had received the support of the Labour Party in Britain was one of the latter's
major concerns. The Johannesburg-based newspaper, The Star, accused the LP of 'plaYing
with fire' .28 According to Ernie Wentzel, a member of the national and Transvaal leadership,
the Party's support of the use of boycotts as a means of protest changed the party irrevocably
from 'a moderate party devoted to constitutional change' into a player 'in the mainstream of
black power-politics' .29
25 Quoted in Contact, 2 June 1959.
26
APC, PC 2/4/11/2, Statement by P.Brown and A.Paton.
27 Ibid.
28 The Star, 7 January 1960, quoted in R Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid: A History ofthe Liberal
Party ofSouth Africa, 1953-68 (London, Macmillan, 1997), p.l06.
29 Ernie Wentzel Papers, Memoir, quoted in Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.l09.
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While the debate on the use of boycotts was progressing, the still-contentious question of the
franchise was raised again. Although it seems that the general consensus throughout the Party
by this stage was for universal adult suffrage, it was not yet official Party policy. The
membership of the Natal Division was by the late 1950s overwhelming in favour of a universal
franchise. 30 The 1957 resolution of the Natal Division dealing with the franchise, whereby all
'explanatory paragraphs' (qualifications for the franchise) were to be deleted, which Natal had
agreed in 1957 to postpone sending to the National Committee, was discussed at a National
Executive Committee meeting in January 1959. It was decided that the Natal Division should
not press the issue at the National Congress to be held in April. The Cape Division was divided
on the issue and was the stumbling block to further change, and the leadership wanted to avoid
a possible split.31 The Natal Division did not press the issue in the interests of Party unity at the
request of Hans Meidner, "the Natal provincial chairman.
However, problems arose at the National Congress in Johannesburg in April 1959. Although
Meidner had persuaded the Natal Division to withhold their resolution on the franchise, it
appears that a resolution from the Alice branch, in the eastern Cape, by-passed the normal
channels by being sent directly to the national office and was thus included in the agenda. 32
This resolution was similar to that of the Natal Division - deletion from the policy of any
references to possible transitional steps to a universal franchise based on certain qualifications.
The resolution was withdra~ but it had resulted in heated debate over the issue and had
shown the diverse opinions still held.
As decided at the 1959 National Congress, there was discussion in and between branches and
between Divisions to clarify opinion on the franchise issue. The results of these interchanges
would be considered at the 1960 National Congress. 33 The only area where problems arose
was, predictably, in the Cape. The western Cape branch was, on the whole, more conservative
than the eastern Cape branch. The former still contained a number of distinguished older
1959.
30 See discussion in Chapter 3. Interview with P.Brown., 25/3/1998, & C.Brubeck, 19/2/1998.
31 Brown, 'History', pp.127-128~ Interview with P.Brown., 25/3/1998.
32 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.l09~ APC, PC 2/2/5/2, Resolutions, National Congress. April
33 For the following discussion: Bro~ 'History', pp. 138-140.
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liberals who were most opposed to a universal franchise, while the eastern Cape was more
radical. Oscar Wollheim was pushing for a return to a qualified franchise and the view that the
Party's electoral role should be its main one. This view also clashed with that of the younger,
more radical Liberals in the Cape Town branch, such as Peter Hjul, Joe Nkatlo and Randolph
Vigne. Hjul, in a letter to Brown, predicted that the Cape Division could lose between 100 to
200 members ifWollheim left the Party and a universal franchise was accepted. A Franchise
Committee was set-up at a National Committee meeting in October 1959 with representatives
from all regions with the purpose of reaching some consensus between Divisions.
The transition within the Party towards the adoption of a universal franchise had taken place
from the mid-1950s and was thus a continuation of a process rather than a new development34,
although it was no doubt influenced by the political atmosphere at the end of the 1950s and
early 1960, and the Party's desire to project a more radical image. The National Committee
~et before the National Congress in Cape Town at the end ofMay 1960. A Franchise
Commission was elected on which Natal was represented by Selby Msimang, David Evans, and
Jack Spence.35 The'overall consensus of the Party in favour of scrapping the qualified franchise
was the verdict, and the desire ofParty members for this to become official Party policy was
realised. The 'right of franchise ~on a common roll to all adult persons' was adopted by
Congress.36 In accepting the resolution for Natal, Leo Kuper (acting provincial chairman)
stressed that his Division was firmly in favour ofa universal franchise. 37 He did not want to
leave any loophole in the policy whereby a qualification could be introduced via the 'back
door'. The Party had thus taken the step ofremoving one of the remaining obstacles to its co-
operation with the Congress Alliance and in identifying more closely with black people in
South Africa.
With the shift in focus to the voteless majority, the Party began to increase its extra-
34 In interviews with P.Brown (25/211998), C.Gardner (6/2/1998), and C.Brubeck (19/2/1998), they all
stress that the majority of the Party, and Natal in particular. supported a universal franchise by the late 1950s
and it was a mere fonnality that it became official Party policy in 1960.
35 APe, PC 2/2/1111, Minutes, National Committee, 28 May 1960.
36 APC, PC 2/2/5/3, Franchise Resolution, National Congress, May 1960.
37 APe, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, May 1%0.
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parliamentary activities and gradually ceased to function as a parliamentary political party. The
party in 1959 was still endeavouring to influence the white electorate and the decision was
.taken to contest the provincial elections in that year. Lutuli had made a public statement
supporting the LP candidates and urging people to vote for them. 38 A large number of Liberals
in Natal had felt it better not to take part in the election in the province. Nevertheless, the
election in Natal was contested by Guinevere Ventress, while three other seats were contested
nationally: Sea Point, Houghton and Pretoria. The Natal Division's set-back in this election
served only to highlight its lack of support amongst the white electorate. The number of votes
received in each of the three other seats was close to 1,500, but only 150 were received in
Natal. 39 To be fair, Ventress had to change the seat being contested from Pinetown to Ixopo
and had to fight candidates from the UP and the Union Federal Party (UFP), and an
Independent.
The 1959 provincial election was the last election to be fought by the Natal Division as it did
not contest a seat in the general election in October 1961. However, the general election was
contested by Liberal candidates in Cape Town and Johannesburg. 4O A further blow to the LP's
diminished parliamentary role was the loss of the only Liberal Members ofParliament. The
Party was represented by four Natives Representatives, Margaret Ballinger and Walter
Stanford in the House of Assembly, and Leslie Rubin and William Ballinger in the Senate. In
early 1959 Verwoerd introduced a Bill which aimed to give Africans self-government in
independent homelands, also known as 'Bantustans'. A consequence of the 1959 Promotion of
Bantu Self-Government Act was that the Native Representatives seats in Parliament would be
abolished in mid-1960.
38 Bro~ 'History', p.148.
39 Ibid, p.143; Irvine, 'Liberal Party', p.123.
40 See later discussion.
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4.2 Closer identification with black political movements
As extra-parliamentary opposition became increasingly central to the LP's activities, so co-
operation with the Congresses continued. In Natal, relations between them were not much
different to any other year and it seems that the question of closer co-operation remained
unchanged during 1959.41 At a national level, the relationship between the LP and the ANC
was complicated by the formation of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PACt2, and the communist
presence in the Congress Movement was still a stumbling-block to closer relations. This is
something which frustrated Lutuli in his efforts at closer relations with the LP. He saw the
primary aim of the Congress Alliance as that of attaining liberation, and the role of communists
was to assist in that aim, but this did not mean that the ANC had adopted communism. ~3 In
early 1959 Lutuli had appealed to the LP in the COD journal, New Age, to drop its anti-
communist stance in the interest of co-operation with the Congress Alliance. 44
Relations between the LP and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the ANC in Natal
remained cordial. The party worked closely with the NIC in protest against Group Areas in the
Durban area, which was particularly affected. As previously discussed, members of the party
were supportive of the ANe boycott initiatives in the region. Besides sharing platforms and
organising protests, there was co-operation on a more local and low-key level. For instance,
during 1959 Meidner and Archie Gumede from the local ANC held talks with the
Superintendent at Edendale Hospital where it appears that nurses were being pressured to join
a government organisation which subscribed to apartheid's principles. 45
Lutuli continued to encourage closer relations. He saw the LP as a source of encouragement to
Africans as it provided evidence that there were white people who shared the belief in a non-
41 Brown, 'History', p.148.
42 A section of the ANC, describing themselves as Africanists who resented the communist influence
in that organisation, had broken away in late 1958. They formed the PAC under the leadership of Robert
Sobukwe in March 1959.
43 Luthuli, Let My People Go, pp. 138-139.
44 A. Paton, Journey Continued, (Cape Town, David Philip, 1988), p.191.
45 Brown, 'History', p.130.
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racial democracy: 'The LP has striven fearless[ly] for the extension of democratic rights and
civil liberties to the Afiican people.'46 He was banned again in late May 1959 after a successful
tour of South Africa. Brown and Paton issued a statement condemning the ban by the
government as 'cruel and stupid' .47 Protest meetings were organised by the Congress
Movement and the LP in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, while a LP one was organised at
Stanger by E.V. Mahomed.48 The meeting in Pietermaritzburg was chaired by Brown and
addressed by Meidner, FJ. Sithole (a member of the LP and the ANC in Natal), and Dr M.M.
Motala from the NIC. About 2000 people, mostly Afric~ turned up in support at the City
Hall.
In late 1959 Paton, Lutuli and Dr G.M. Naicker wrote an open letter to Harold Macmillan (the
Prime Minister of Great Britain) in the London Observer over his proposed visit to South
Africa in 1960.49 The three leaders expressed their concern that the rest of Africa and South
Africans might interpret the visit as support for apartheid. When in the country, Macmillan
refused to meet with representatives from the LP and the ANC. His famous 'wind of change'
address to the South African Parliament on 3 February 1960, however, was a source of
encouragement to opposition and an indirect indictment on the policies of the Nationalist
government.
Overall, the relationship between the LP, the Congress Alliance and the PAC was complex and
fluctuated over time and in various parts of the country. The rivalry between the ANC and the
PAC was intense and there was no co-operation between them. The PAC was never a strong
presence in and did not have an impact in Natal. 50 Its support was concentrated in parts of the
Witwatersrand and the Western Cape, which were traditionally not ANC strongholds. 51
~ Quoted in Brown, 'History', p.148.
47 Quoted in Ibid, p.147.
48 Reported in Umh/anganisi, July-August 1959.
49 For the following discussion: Pato~ Journey Continued, p.192.
50 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Brubeck, 19/2/1998; APC, J.Didcott interviewed by
R Vigne, 22/6/1995.
51 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (Londo~ Longman, 1983), p.85.
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Lutuli's popularity in Natal may have been a factor for its lack of support in the region. 52
However, Jordan Ngubane had been involved with members of the movement and supported
the formation of the PAC. He was well-known for his outspoken criticisms of the communist
influence in the ANC, which had resulted in his estrangement from Lutuli and elicited hostility
from ANC. It was Ngubane's support of the organisation which was responsible for the
complications between the LP and the Congress Alliance, especially with the ANC in Natal.
The inaugural Conference of the PAC was held in Orlando, a suburb of Johannesburg, at the
same time as the National Congress of the LP in Johannesburg in April 1959. Ngubane had
been invited by the Natal delegation of the PAC as an observer. The National Committee was
aware of this as the Natal Provincial Committee had given its approval. 53 The complication was
that an observer could not attend the closed session and thus Ngubane was given delegate
status. It was therefore reported in the Rand Daily Mail that he had attended as a delegate.
John Didcott, a member of the National Committee from Natal, felt that Ngubane had
embarrassed the Party and· complicated relations with the ANC (which Didcott supported).
Following a discussion on the issue, certain members expressed fears that Ngubane was'indeed
an Afiicanist. Sometime afterwards H.S. Ngcobo, the leader of the Natal PAC, wrote to
Contact confirming that Ngubane was not a member ofhis organisation. 54 However, the harm
had been done as Ngubane was criticised by certain leaders in the Congress Alliance and the
ANC Youth League for his attendance at the PAC Conference. 55
There was also discussion over the perception that the PAC endorsed an anti-white and anti-
Liberal policy, and that the Party should steer clear of any co-operation with the organisation.
The majority of the National Committee, including Brown, and other members of the Party in
Natal, wanted the party to keep an open mind and co-operate where possible with both the
ANC and the PAC. 56 Ngubane stressed that he wanted closer co-operation with the ANC and
52 Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, p.313.
53 APe, PC 2/2/5/2, Minutes, National Congress, April 1959.
54
Contact, 25 July 1959.
55 B.rown, "History', p.147.
56 Ibid., pp. 135, 148; Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Brubeck, 19/2/1998.
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the Africanists (in the PAC). 57 He saw the PAC as a counter to, as he perceived it, the
communist-dominated ANC.
Turning to white parliamentary politics, the UP split in August 1959 opened up a number of
possibilities. A group of liberal UP members, unable to tolerate that party's vacillation on the
race question, resigned and formed the Progressive Party in November 1959. 58 Members of the
LP had been hopeful that' the breakaway members should either join the LP or that they form a
party which differed significantly from the UP on race policy. Although the Progressive Party's
policies were a liberal step forward compared to what the UP had offered in the past, its
qualified franchise policy was almost identical to the LP's in 1953. 59 Paton and Brown, as well
as Lutuli, Ngubane and other prominent African leaders, tried to get the party to accept a more
liberal franchise policy, possibly a universal franchise, but in vain. 60 The LP's relationship with
the Progressives varied. Since the LP's focus had shifted to the extra-parliamentary arena and
it no longer entertained the hope of an electoral victory, the Progressives were not a direct
threat to it. The official policy of the LP to the Progressive Party was critical but not hostile. 61
Relations in Natal were reported as 'friendly' during 1960 after an initial strain. 62
What the Progressives did offer was a more viable option as a parliamentary political party.
Hence, it was joined by those who felt the LP had no chance of ever gaining an electoral
victory, and by disillusioned Liberals who were dissatisfied with the radical direction in which
the LP was developing. The emphasis on extra-parliamentary activity and the acceptance of a
universal franchise, coupled with loss of the only Members ofParliament, signalled that the
Party was functioning mainly as a political pressure group as opposed to a parliamentary
political party. An African person, writing in the December 1959 edition of the Congress
Alliance journal Liberation, felt that although the Progressives were saYing nothing to white
57 APC. PC 2/2/5/2, Minutes, National Congress, April 1959.
58 See: H.Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1993).
59 Robertson, Liberalism. pp. 192-193.
60 Brown, 'History', p.186.
61 Reponed in Umhlanganisi, November-December 1959.
62 APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress. May 1960.
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South Africans which the LP or the COD had not said already, the former party offered some
assurance of respectability and security to a predominately 'timid and conventional' white
public. 63 Colin Webb, an academic at the University ofNatal in Pietermaritzburg and an
associate of Colin Gardner, felt that, although he largely agreed with the policies of the
Liberals, he would rather support a party that had some hope of electoral success. 64 Judging
from the 1961 general election results, the Progressives had won considerably more electoral
support than the Liberals ever had.65
4.3 Liberals in the battlefield: Sharpeville and the state ofemergency
The year 1960 proved to be a watershed in the history of South Africa. 66 The beginning of the
new decade ushered in a dramatic period where the climate was ripe for political change,
although normal legal constitutional political activity was ineffective. Black opposition leaders
hoped for fundamental changes during the decade, influenced by events in the rest of Africa. In
South Africa, there were signs of increasing grassroots discontent as ordinary African citizens
endured the everyday hardships of apartheid. The increasing fiustration ofblack leaders
coupled with the political agitation amongst the masses threatened to spill over into open
violence. The incidents of violence at Cato Manor in Durban in late 1959 and early 1960, and
later at Sharpeville and in the Cape in March 1960, were symptoms of this African discontent.
These events and the subsequent state of emergency changed the political scenario in the
country. The effects of Sharpeville were 'immense', both inside and outside the country.67
There was massive world-wide attention and the withdrawal of foreign capital. However, far
from bringing down the government as some had hoped, especially after the pass laws were
briefly suspended, it recovered and proceeded to implement even stronger measures against its
opponents.68 The economy improved and continued to grow. This shattered any illusion that
63 Quoted in Robertson, Liberalism, p.193.
64 Interview with C. Gardner, 6/2/1998.
65 Robertson, Liberalism, pp.209-210. See later discussion for results.
66 Paton, Journey Continued, p.219.
67 Ibid., p.202.
68 Robertsoa Liberalism, p.204.
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apartheid was about to crumble.
Neither the PAC nor the Congress Alliance leadership had abandoned their stance on non-
violence in early 1960. Both organisations had plans for a campaign against influx control and
the compulsory carrying of passes. The PAC announced their plans first and the demonstration
held as part of its campaign resulted in the police shootings at Sharpeville near Vereeniging on
the Witwatersrand on 21 March 1960. People were to leave their passes at home and surrender
themselves for arrest. However, police panicked as a crowd gathered and this led to a loss of
control. The police fired indiscriminately on the crowd killing 69 people and wounding many
more. Sharpeville was followed by violence breaking out in Langa near Cape Town. (The
Vereeniging area and the townships of the western Cape were PAC strongholds.) The ANC
blamed the PAC for launching their campaign before that of the ANC's proposed anti-pass
campaign in order to get the upper-hand. Nevertheless, Lutuli burnt his pass and declared a day
of mourning for those killed at Sharpeville. 69
'The events of the next three weeks', writes Vigne, 'shook South Africa to its foundations' .70
In the weeks that followed Sharpeville, the government declared a state of emergency on 31
March (lifted at the end of September 1960), and banned the ANC and the PAC in early April
by hurriedly passing the Unlawful Organisations Act. Members from the PAC, the Congress
Alliance and the LP were detained under the state of emergency. Those from the LP were
mostly from Natal and were part of the national and/or provincial leadership. This was the first
time that LP members realised the high price they may have to pay for opposing the Nationalist
government. According to Paton,
'One always expected to pay some kind of price for one's opposition to
apartheid; one has seen other people paying it, and one did not expect to
remain immune. But now for the first time some of our own friends, some of
our closest associates, have had to pay the high price of imprisonment, and of
separation from their families. ,71
69 Luthuli. Let My People Go~ G.Mbeki, The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa: A Short History
(Cape Town, David Philip & Mayibuye Centre, 1992), pp.85-86.
70 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.l 16.
71 Speech given by A.Paton, National Congress, May 1960, quoted in Contact, 18 June 1960.
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LP members of all races were detained on 30 March 1960. The list included some of those
active in the Transvaal and one member in the Cape, but consisted mainly of Natal members:
Peter Brown (national chairman), Hans Meidner (Natal provincial chairman), Derick Marsh
(Pietermaritzburg branch chairman), Elliot Mngadi (party organiser in northern Natal and
National Committee member) and Frank Bhengu (National Committee member from
Ladysmith). Three more were arrested in Ladysmith, and four members were arrested in the
Bergville area. However, the Special Emergency Regulations did not apply to the latter
magisterial district and the members were released. Numerous leaders from the Congress
Alliance, including Lutuli, and from the PAC, such as its leader Robert Sobukwe, were
arrested.
Brown was held together in a cell with Meidner and Marsh in the Pietermaritzburg Prison,
while the black members of the LP and the Congresses were held in a separate section. 72
Brown speaks of his detention as a painful but important experience, and adds that it was
'good for the party'. They were not treated badly nor interrogated harsWy, for these were
'early days' of the 'detention regime'. He was offered an early release but refused to leave
prison unless LP members of all races were also released. 73 According to Ngubane: 'This
showed the Africans that the white liberal was determined to destroy white supremacy. ,74 The
majority of Liberals were released by the end of July.
This was a time of action for the party and the work done by members during the state of
emergency enhanced the party's reputation amongst black people. 75 According to Brown: 'The
Liberal Party's reaction to the 1960 State of Emergency was quite magnificent ~ .76 The Natal
provincial chairman, Meidner, spoke of the 'magnificent response of the Party to the occasion'
72 APe, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 3, 1995.
73 P.Alexander, A/an Paton: A Bibliography (Oxford, OUP, 1994), p.318~ E.Callan (ed.), A/an Pa/on:
The Long View (Londo~ Pall Mall Press, 1968), p.35~ J.Ngubane, An African Exp/ains Apartheid (Londo~
Pall Mall Press, 1963), p.l%~ APC, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 3, 1995.
74 Ngubane, An African, p.196.
75 Robertson, Liberalism, p.215.
76 Brown, 'History', p.169.
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and expressed gratitude to all members involved in the Natal Division. 77 Members in all the
provincial Divisions were active in giving legal assistance and relief to detainees and their
families. There had been incidents of unrest in many urban areas, including Durban, since
Sharpeville, and more arrests were made across the country (18,011 by 6 May 196078). Due to
the party's activity during the state of emergency, there was an upsurge of interest in it.
Provincial Reports given in August 1960 at a National Executive meeting (held illegally at
Brown's house in Pietermaritzburg) spoke of'great activity and a growing interest in the
Party' .79
Despite the number of arrests and detentions amongst Natal members during the state of
emergency, the Division as a whole continued to run smoothly, as did the national office in
Pietermaritzburg. This was testament to good branch management in the Division, but Meidner
warned that organisation needed to be improved to withstand the anticipated trials of the
future. 8o Emergency funds were set-up for members who had been detained and their families,
and legal advice was also offered. Elliot Mngadi and Frank Bhengu thanked those who had
been active in organising funds in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, thus removing 'much of the
anxiety about their families from the detainees themselves' .81 Mngadi also thanked the Party for
paying his salary (as a Party organiser) and providing for his family while he was in prison.
Paton and other LP members were also involved in the Defence and Aid Fund82 which was
formed in June 1960 to provide funds for legal assistance and for the dependents of detainees
on a national and non-party basis. Kuper had been asked to establish a branch of the Fund in
Durban. 83
Paton stepped into Brown's position as national chairman while the latter was in prison. The
reason for Paton not having been arrested was most likely because of his internationally-held
77 APC, PC 2/9/3/8. Provincial chainnan's report for 1960, Natal Provincial Congress, 1961.
78 A Survey ofRace Relations in South Africa, 1959-1960. quoted in Robertson, Liberalism, p.205.
79 Minutes from National Executive meeting, quoted in Brown, 'History', p.179.
80 APC. PC 2/9/3/8, Provincial chairman's report for 1960, Natal Provincial Congress, 1961.
81 APC, PC 2/9/1011, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee. 20 September 1960.
82 This Fund differs from the Treason Trial Defence Fund. although fonned from the same basis.
83 APC, PC 2/9/10/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 22 November 1960.
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reputation as author ofCry, the Beloved Country and as a liberal, and the publicity that would
have been caused by arresting him. 84 He used his high profile to continue publicising events in
South Africa, both in and out of the country. He was kept under constant surveillance by the
security forces, and his passport was taken away in December 1960 after he returned from the
United States where he had received the Freedom Award in New York. Although shocked, he
supposes he 'should have expected it'. 8S
With the banning of the ANC and the PAC, and the restrictions placed on many members of
the Congress Alliance, a vacuum was created in black politics. This political vacuum was partly
filled by the LP which 'briefly inherited the political centre stage in South Africa'. 86 There
remained few avenues of expression open for Africans who wished to remain politically active,
and the LP was still legal. 87 Kuper urged the Party to take advantage of this 'vacuum' that had
been created, as it 'presented an opportunity for leadership which should be seriously
explored'.88 This new interest in the LP led Verwoerd to '[warn] the white community that the
greatest threat to its dominance came from the Liberal Party' .89
There was discussion within LP circles after the banning of the ANC and the PAC as to where
the 'political homeless' would go. 90 Perhaps some sort of new political organisation needed to
be created. Brown put the idea to Lutuli but there was no interest from the ANC and nothing
came from the move. He thinks that, in retrospect, Liberals were naive in thinking that the LP
or something similar would provide a home for banned Congress members. 91 Ngubane felt that
the vacuum needed to be filled and efforts made to consolidate, and build unity amongst, the
African opposition. 92 It seems that there were plans afoot amongst black opposition as a
84 Alexander, Paton, p.317.
85 Paton, Journey Continued, p.21!.
86 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism' , p.274.
87 Robertson, Liberalism, p.217.
88 APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, May 1960.
89 Quoted in Ngubane, An African, p.174.
90 Brown, 'History', pp. 190-192.
91 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
92 Ngubane, An African, p.168.
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Consultative Conference of African leaders was planned for the 16 December 1960 at Orlando
in Johannesburg with the aim of consolidating African unity. Some LP members were invited:
Selby Msimang, Jordan Ngubane, Hyacinth (Bill) Bhengu, Julius Malie (Party organiser for the
Transvaal) and Joe Nkatlo (ex-ANC member and national vice-chainnan from the Cape).
Msimang could not attend as he only received the invitation on 10 December. Ngubane was
elected as chainnan of Continuation Committee at the Conference, with Bhengu and Malie
serving on the Committee.93
A number of delegates, including the LP members, became convinced that the communists
from the Congress Alliance were in control of the Committee. The source of large sums of
money at the Committee's disposal was never disclosed and this served to heighten ·suspicions
and tensions. 94 According to Ngubane, the Committee was merely a rubber stamp to the
'invisible hand' which had its own agenda. 95 Ngubane and Bhengu resigned, after two
independent delegates and the PAC members had walked-out. All three LP members on the
Committee were arrested in March 1961 under the Suppression of Communism Act, but
managed to appeal "successfully against their convictions. 96
The All-In African Leaders Conference went ahead as planned and was held in Edendale near
Pietermaritzburg on 25 and 26 March 1961. It turned out to be an almost exclusively ANC
affair with Nelson Mandela as the main speaker, calling for the government to hold a national
convention. 97 One of the reasons behind Ngubane's resignation had been the refusal by the
Committee to consider postponing the event in order to convince the PAC delegation to
return. The LP did not give its official support but it did not repudiate the Conference either. 98
Some Liberals from the Springs branch (Johannesburg) did attend but the northern Natal
Liberals, probably the most organised body of African political opinion in that region, were not
93 I· 'L·beral P ,rvme, 1 arty ,p.129; Robenson, Liberalism, pp.217-218.
94 Ngubane, An African, p.170.
95 Ibid., p.169.
96 Irvine, 'Liberal Party', p.129.
97 Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, pp.357-358.
98 Brown. 'History', pp. 195-202.
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invited.99 There was dissatisfaction expressed amongst these members about their exclusion. 100
The Conference raised questions about the possibilities of African political unity in South
Africa. Brown wrote in the Natal Witness that there was' considerable disenchantment
amongst Liberals and others who, in spite of their earlier experiences, might still have been
sympathetic to the results of the Conference, if there had been any real [attempt] to achieve
unity' .101
Liberals realised the necessity of consolidating opposition to apartheid after democratic
opposition was all but destroyed by the government, and the idea of holding a national
convention was mooted. It had been one of the Liberals' objectives to hold such a convention
along the lines of the successful Multiracial Conference held in Johannesburg in December
1957. 102 It was decided at the Natal Provincial Congress in October 1960, on the suggestion of
the Pietennaritzburg branch (the 'moving spirit was Peter Brown' 103), to hold a non-racial
convention ofNatalians from different spectrums of public life to discuss the political future of
the country. The aim was an attempt to find solutions to the problems faced by South Africa. It
was to be a non-party affair with delegates attending on an individual basis. About 1000 people
attended the meeting in the City Hall to hear speakers from the LP, although not officially
speaking for the party, on the idea of such a convention. The floor voted in favour of such a
meeting. A working committee was elected under the chairmanship of Dr Edgar Brookes. 104
Natal had 'taken the first step in what was to become one of the most important opposition
political movements of 1961, the Convention movement' .105
The Natal Convention was held in Pietennaritzburg in April 1961 and, in Brown's opinion, it
99 Irvine, 'Liberal Party', p.129~ Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp.141-142.
100 APC, PC 2/9/10/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 29 March 1%1.
101 Natal Witness, 27 March 1961, quoted in Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.143.
102 Vigne. Liberals Against Apartheid, pp.77·78. The Multiracial Conference had been organised in
conjunction with the IDAMF and Paton had used his prestige to attract support.
103 Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, p.359.
104 See Chapter I. A leading Natal liberal who was to join the Party in 1962.
105 .Bro~ 'History', p.190.
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was a 'tremendous success' .106 It was attended by people of all races and a wide range of views
were expressed. The only group not represented was the conservative white right, including the
UP. That the official opposition to the government was not represented was a weakness of the
Convention. Brown described much of the Report as 'surprisingly radical'. For instance, a non-
racial franchise and an integrated education system were agreed upon. The need for a national
convention was emphasized and the possibility of achieving this was discussed. 107 According to
Brookes, the Natal Convention was a 'courageous and significant event' in the political
atmosphere of 1961, but it came to nothing in the end. 108 Colin Gardner agrees - in one way it
was a big event, while in another it was a non-event. 109 It was an important step in that from
the number of diverse views represented, a non-racial political system was agreed upon, which
showed that there was common ground between opponents of the Nationalist government.
However, without the forum of a national convention, the resolutions reached at the Natal
Convention could not become a reality. Unfortunately, such a national convention was never to
be held despite Liberal efforts. 110
The LP was involved in anti-government publicity before Republic Day (3 1 May 1961) but
ensured that these events did not clash with any ANC-planned activities. 111 The Action
Committee elected at the All-In Conference in March had planned a stay-away for 29-31 May
1961. A number of successful meetings were held in Natal by the LP. The Natal Division had
long been against the creation of a republic, not per se, but because o~ the manner in which it
had been brought about. The Party's objection was based on the decision having been made by
the minority of the population. Natal was the only province in which the majority ofwhites did
not vote for a republic in the 1960 referendum. 112 According to Brown, if a republic would
have led to a non-racial society then the Liberals would have no doubt supported it. 113 He,
106 For a detailed discussion of the Report: See Brown, 'History', pp.220-228.
107 Liberal Opinion, December 1961.
108 E.H.Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977), p.129.
109 Interview with C. Gardner, 6/2/1998.
110 See: Brookes, South African Pilgrimage, p.130~ Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp. 146-148.
111 Brown, 'History', p.204.
112 Robertson, Liberalism, p.208.
113 Brown, 'History', p.215.
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Paton and Ngubane wrote a open letter to Verwoerd condemning the new republic, especially
since Verwoerd had withdrawn South Africa from the Commonwealth in March 1961 because
of international criticism of apartheid. 114
There was increased tension countrywide during May before Republic Day as the Congress
Alliance organised its planned stay-at-home. Brown even prepared a statement to be released
in the event of his being arrested. lIS A Bill was passed through Parliament allowing detention
without bail for 12 days, and the government banned all public meetings before Republic Day.
Police made swoops in the townships where some LP members were arrested, while certain
other members' houses were raided. 116 The stay-at-home was a failure on a national scale,
although it was well supported in some areas, and Mandela called it off on 30 May. The strike
was successful in Howick, where both SACTU and the LP were popular.
The Nationalist government's policy of apartheid was gaining the approval of an increasing
number of the white electorate. The results of the 1961 general election showed a further
swing to the Nationalists and a massive defeat for the UP. The hardening of white political
attitudes allowed for the Nationalist Party (NP) to gain its greatest victory since coming to
power in 1948. Although the UP was the official opposition, it was by this stage no longer
advocating any progressive solutions for the future. Only one of eleven of the Progressive
Party's Members ofParliament, Relen Suzman, was returned. In sixteen urban, largely English-
speaking districts, the Progressives obtained about 56,000 votes to the 83,000 votes for the
up. 117 Surprisingly the two LP candidates, in Constantia and Hillbrow, managed to save their
deposits. The conclusion reached by Liberals from this was that it was obvious that opposition
had to be 'carried on outside of Parliament' (this was something the Progressive 'still had to
learn'), although they stressed that it should be non-violent and disciplined. 118 The UP was no
longer functioning as an effective opposition, and parliamentary politics in South Africa was
reduced to a white racialist government faced with a white racialist opposition.
114 Paton, Journey Continued, p.220.
115 B 'Hi ' 207rown,' story, p. a.
116 Ngubane, An African, p.196~ Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, p.363.
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The other important development in late 1961 were the first acts of'organised violence'
against property. 119 Additional pressure was placed on leaders to consider militant campaigns
by younger members and by '[p]opular impatience with ineffectual political action and danger
of all-out retaliation by the government in the wake of violent eruptions' .120 This was despite
the fact that· 'both ANC and PAC leaders had behind them·a long African tradition of public
commitment to nonviolence, as well as a record of action by leaders to curb and condemn
disorder and rioting'. There was much discussion in ANC circles during early 1961 on the
'apparent unavoidability and feasibility of violent methods' and growing criticism within the
ANC of non-violence. Mandela and some of his colleagues had decided, reluctantly, by June
1961 to abandon the ANC's policy of non-violence, although recognising that political action
was still essential, and to pursue violent methods of struggle with the fonnation of a military
wing. According to Mandela, five decades of non-violent opposition had brought the African
people nothing but more repressive legislation. It was decided to use sabotage only, in an
attempt to avoid civil war (which was considered a real possibility.at the time), and if this
option failed to produce results, other methods would have to be considered. Umkhonto
weSizwe was formed in November 1961 and its first acts of sabotage were on 16 December
1961. This organisation was not structured on the multi-racial basis as the Congress Alliance
had been and was open to people of all races, hence its ranks were joined by white communists
who had been in the COD. 121 It is not clear how Lutuli felt about this drift to violence. 122 It is
most likely that he understood the frustrations ofyounger members, although he did not
personally agree with the move. In any case, there was not much he could do by this stage to
influence the 'rank-and-file'.
In early 1962 the leadership of the LP re-stated its adherence to the principle of non-violence
and the use only of non-violent methods to bring about change in South Africa. l23 Those who
119 Reported in Liberal Opinion, March 1962.
120 Karis & Gerhart, ChaUenge and Violence, pp.645-648.
121 The South African Communist Party (SACP) became a separate and distinct political force during
1960. It had been formed in 1953 and had remained a secret organisation until 1960. Most of its members had
belonged to the COD. Lodge, Black Politics. p.87~ Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, p.350.
122 Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, pp.649-651.
123 Liberal Opinion, March 1962.
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were contemplating such steps were advised to leave the Party. In his provincial chairman's
report at the Natal Provincial Congress in 1961, Meidner highlighted the fact that the Party
was in danger not only from the government, but also from the 'plans, actions and tempers of
frustrated people' who would contemplate abandoning non-violence. 124 The Party's first
requirement remained 'to organise the people' in a political party 'which aimed at fundamental
change in society' and the LP could not' approve or participate in this type of political action'.
4.4 Heightened activism in the Natal Division
National membership grew significantly from 1960, particularly African membership. This was
especially true for the Natal Division, where a keen interest in the party had developed as a
result of the Liberals' activities during the state of emergency and their involvement in the
government's rural resettlement schemes. The substantial increase in African membership in the
Division, which begun in 1960 and continued into 1962, presented the leadership of the
Division with new challenges. A large percentage of the new recruits were ofworking-class
origin and predominantly rural in composition. By 1961 the majority of members in Natal were
no longer white, although the provincial leadership was still largely white. However, local
leadership often comprised only African people in the rural branches. As the number of rural
branches increased in Natal, so party organisation needed to be reconsidered. Local leaders,
often uneducated and often semi-literate, needed to be taught the basics ofbranch
administration. On-going programmes were held to raise political consciousness as well as to
teach the principles and policies of the LP.
The increase in black membership was somewhat counteracted by the loss ofwhite members.
Provincial reports from 1961 indicate the number ofwhite members on a national level was .
declining. The national chainnan stressed the importance of retaining white members to ensure
a non-racial outlook within the party.125 Although the Natal Division never had a significant
number ofwhite members, many of them were active and committed party members. The party
124 APC, PC 2/9/3/8, Provincial chairman's Report, Natal Provincial Congress, 14-15 Apri11961.
125 APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, July 1%1.
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lost a few white members to the Progressive Party126, while more were lost through emigration.
It was not a case of numbers, but rather that of active members lost. The Coastal Regional
branch reported that about 30 white members from that branch had left the country by late
1962, many of whom had been active. 127 The Division lost some its most able members from
1961 for academic reasons rather than political, such as Violaine Junod (who had spent 1958 in
the United States), the Kupers and Derick Marsh. Catherine Shallis had left for England in
1959, and returned to Durban in late 1963. There was also a loss of a few members who were
not prepared to become politically involved in the face of government persecution.
Dr Edgar Brookes joined the party in Natal in early 1962, and his membership was announced
at the Natal Provincial Congress to much applause. He had made the decision to join at the
Natal Convention the previous year, but had been persuaded to wait lest his affiliation to the
LP should jeopardise his neutrality as chairman of the Convention. Although the Progressive
Party also appealed to him, he found that the LP's unequivocal stand on non-racialism and the
'shining personality of its leaders, AIan Paton and Peter Brown, attracted [him] irresistibly'. 128
He had been to see Brown in prison during his detention in 1960, and was much impressed by
him. 129
As mentioned, the high level of activity in all provincial Divisions during state of emergency
resulted in a growing interest in the party and there was a general increase in membership in all
three from 1960, particularly amongst Afiicans. The reports of the National Congresses from
1959 to 1961 reveal a trend. The attendance at each increased, as did the proportion of black
delegates. In 1959 there were over 200 delegates, which exceeded all expectations130, and the
number increased to about 270 at the 1961 Congress. 131 At the time of the 1961 National
126 Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998. There were more defections from the Transvaal and
particularly from the Cape to the Progressive Party. Although there was no enonnous loss of members to the
Progressives, there were a number of prominent members, such as DollaId Molteno, Walter Stanford and Oscar
Wollheim, who had left.
127 APC, PC 2/9/28/1, Minutes, Natal Regional Committee, Coastal Region Report, September 1962.
128 Brookes, South African Pilgrimage, p.130.
129 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
130 Reported in Bro~ 'History', p.130.
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Congress, held in Durban, the national membership figure stood at about 5000. 132 The
membership of the Natal Division had increased each year from 1958, and stood at about 1100
paid-up members by mid-1960. 133 The membership for 1961 exceeded expectation and stood at
about 1600, although not all were paid-up. 134 The membership for 1962 remained about the
same, and the Division had 40 active branches. 135
The number of predominantly Afiican rural branches in Natal increased dramatically from
1960. 136 Branches were fonned in areas where previously there had been none, such as the
Himeville-Underberg region of southern Natal, while in other areas branches had to be split-up
to accommodate increasing numbers. This was the case in the Bergyille area, where there were
a number of 'black spots'. The branches in northern Natal continued to flourish. The number
and membership of predominantly African urban branches also increased. The branch at Red
Hill in Durban gained a considerable number of new members from the local Five Roses
factory during 1960.137 The branch at Howick continued to flourish under the charismatic
leadership of Christopher ·Shabalala. New branches at Umgeni and Congella were started by
Jack Nkosi, the Party organiser for the Coastal Region. 138
Although interest in the party in Natal increased dramatically during 1960, increasing interest in
the LP in Natal was already evident during 1959 with a number of successful public meetings
taking place. 139 Ngubane's speeches on the Accra conference, held in late 1958, were very
popular, especially in Stanger and Howick, where 60 people joined the party. The first public
meeting to be held in Ladysmith, at which Ngubane spoke, attracted a crowd of about 600
132 llvine, 'Liberal Party', p.1l9; Robertson, Liberalism, p.217.
133 APC, PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, May 1%0.
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people in June. 140 The Party's involvement in 'black spot' removals and Group Areas protests
continued in Natal and drew large audiences. Rural support from Afiicans was apparent-
about 500 residents at Charlestown assembled to hear Brown speak. 141 Rural areas continued
to draw good audiences especially after the state of emergency. 142
The LP in Natal continued its association with communities threatened with removal in the
'black spots'. The Liberals' involvement intensified with the passing of the Promotion of Bantu
Self-Government Act in 1959. -The government's intention to remove settled communities in
urban and rural areas were spelled out more clearly during the early 1960s. The Minister of
Bantu Administration and Development announced plans to get rid of all 'black spots' 143 and
opposition to these removals was a major concern for the party in Natal during 1962. 144 The
party continued to publicise the plight of these "black spot' communities in the press and to
provide legal assistance. Paton's booklet, The Charlestown Story, was published in 1959. The
party worked with the Northern Natal Afiican Landowners Association (NNALA) to try and
prevent or delay as many removals a possible. It was successful in preventing the removal of
residents, for example, from Charlestown in early 1959, when legal advice was sought on
notices that had been served on a number of the residents which were found to be invalid. 145
Again in 1960 the Party organised legal representation for residents of Charlestown to
participate in a Commission ofEnquiry into the affairs of the Town Board. l46 Similarly, legal
assistance was organised for people threatened with removal in Kokstad. 147
The Party in Natal was also active in urban areas where Party members, especially in Durban,
continued their co-operation with the NIC on the Group Areas Resistance Committee, which
organised protest meetings against the Group Area proposals which had been announced by
140 Umhlanganisi, June 1959
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the government for the Durban area in early 1959. Kuper stressed that this should become a
major concern for the LP during 1959, and plans on how best to protest and raise public
awareness were discussed. 148 Paton had been asked by the NlC to write a booklet detailing the
effects of the Group Areas Act on the Indian communities in Durban, which was entitled The
People Wept. 149
One of the remaining obstacles was removed to closer identification with black people when
the universal franchise became official party policy in May 1960. By 1961 there was a feeling
that policies should be more in line with many South Africans who lived at a poverty level,
since this group was increasing its representation in the Party, especially in the Natal Division.
At the National Congress in 1961, a number of the Party's policies were re-drafted in order
that it could become' a really effective force in South Africa' .150 The policies included
education, civil rights, forei~ land, economic and social welfare policies. Drafts for a land
policy spoke of the necessity of redistribution of land while the economic policy bordered on
that of a welfare-state. 151 The Party also supported an integrated school system. The Party's
economic policy proposals, somewhat ignored until now, began to take on a more socialist
tone. A 'minimum living wage' was accepted as party policy at the 1959 National Congress.
By 1961 the LP no longer had to tow a conservative economic line in the hope of attracting
white voters. Instead, it had to otTer something to counter the promises of the Freedom Charter
in order to attract and retain black membership. As it was, 'Africans already within the party
provided a crucial additional pressure' .152 Policy re-drafts at the 1961 National Congress
included the increase ofwages for semi-skilled and unskilled labour in order to bridge the gap
between white and black incomes, a comprehensive welfare programme, and non-racial trade
unions with the right to collective bargaining. 153
148 APC, PC 2/9/28/1, Minutes, Natal Coastal Regional Committee, 9 February 1959.
149 Paton. Journey Continued, pp. 180-182.
150 Report on the 1961 National Congress in Liberal Opinion, September 1961.
151 Everatt, 'Politics of Nonracialism', p.259~ Ngubane. An African, pp. 197-198; Robertson.
Liberalism, p.198.
152 Robertson, Liberalism, p.198. Also in Ngubane,AnAfrican, pp. 197-198.
153 Report on the National Congress, Liberal Opinion, September 1961.
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A new perspective was added to membership needs with the influx of Africans of working-
class origin who joined the party in Natal from 1960. The Natal Division had accepted the
necessity of a 'minimum living wage' in 1958 and had been part of a wage campaign initiated
by the Congress Movement in Natal. 154 The Durban office had received numerous requests for
assistance from African workers about possible unfair labour practices from the late 1950s155,
and these were to increase. In Pietermaritzburg, too, the assistance of the LP had been
requested after labour disputes. 156 Hence, members in the leadership of the Division began to
develop an active interest in trade unionism. David Evans, a National Committee member from
Pietermaritzburg, was assigned to investigate how the party could be most effective in this field
in Natal. 157 The branches at Red Hill and Howick formed a basis for trade union activity.
However, the initiative never really took off in Natal as it had in the Transvaal. 158 This interest
in trade union activity was likely to attract criticism from the government and cause
complications with SACTU. 159
Grass-roots discontent amongst the Afiican population during the late 1950s manifested itself
in a number ofwidespread, largely spontaneous demonstrations and sometimes violent
disturbances in both rural and urban parts ofNatal during 1959. 160 The most notable examples
were the violent clashes which occurred at Cato Manor, outside Durban. Incidents also
occurred in Sobantu Village, outside Pietermaritzburg, where no resistance had previously
been shown. 161 The unrest spread to the countryside, where incidents led by women were
reported, which was a new development. The conclusion by members of the Natal Division
was that one of the main causes of these riots was poverty, which was the result of a number
154 APC, PC 2/9/3/6, Minut~ Natal Provincial Congress, 1958; Reports in minutes of the
Pietennaritzburg and Natal Coastal branches for 1959.
155 APC, PC 2/9/10/2. Minutes, Natal Provincial Executive Committee, 31 July 1958.
156 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 28-29 January 1961.
157 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 21-22 October 1%1.
158 APC, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 4, 1995.
159 Irvine, 'Liberal Party', p.126. See later discussion on Natal LP and SACTU relations.
160 Reports in Umhlanganisi, September-october 1959 and January-February 1960. Also in Karis &
Gerhart, Challenge and Violence. p.291.
161 See: S.M.~ze. 'Contexts, Resistance Crowds and Mass Mobilisation: A Comparative Analysis
of Anti-Apartheid Politics in Pietennaritzburg during the 1950s and the 1980s', M.A. Thesis, University of
Natal, 1998.
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of other factors. Reasons other than poverty included the extension of the carrying of 'passes'
to women and dissatisfaction over the municipal beer-hall system, the state of the reserves,
influx control and increases in taxation. 162
In early 1960 the Pietermaritzburg branch undertook a study into the wages received and the
cost of living of African families living in the city and found that most wages fell below the cost
of living. The branch made a representation to the Wage Board, which was sitting in the City,
to increase wages paid to Africans. The deputation was received well. However, when the
second representation was to made, the LP spokesperson was refused permission to speak and
the members were ejected from the sitting. 163 The only tangible result derived from this effort
was the good publicity gained, as it was well reported by the press, but this was not the aim of
the exercise. The Coastal Region branch had also done similar surveys, such as one on the
working conditions of the stevedores on Durban's docks. 164 Resolutions submitted by branches
in Natal for Provincial and National Congresses continued to highlight the wage issue, as many
LP members were affected. Mngadi, in an address to the Natal Provincial Congress in 1962,
spoke of the questions concerning wages which were always raised when he toured the
province. 165
There had been some initial hostility from the ANC in Natal about the LP recruiting possible
Congress members in the early 1950s, and a similar situation developed between the Party and
SACTU in Natal. The increase in the 'industrial membership' of the LP was a development
which created some tension with SACTU. I66 There were reports in 1961 of SACTU elements
disrupting meetings at the Red Hill branch, which consisted almost entirely of Afiican factory
workers. 167 The Howick branch, which also consisted mostly of African factory workers, also
experienced problems with disruptive elements and conflicting loyalties between the LP and
162 Luthuli, Let My People Go, p.174.
163 APC, PC 2/9/23/2, Minutes, Pietennaritzburg branch AGM, March 1960.
164 B 'Hi ' 146ro~ story , p. .
165 APC, PC2/9/3/9, Copy ofElliot Mngadi's speech, Natal Provincial Congress, March 1962.
166 APC, PC 2/9/10/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 24 January 1961. Tension with SACTU
is discussed in my interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998, & APC, N.Bromberger's with P.Brown, Tape 4, 1995.
167 APC, PC 2/9/10/2, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 29 March 1961.
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SACTU amongst members. The ANC in Natal had come increasingly under the influence of
radical SACTU leaders, such as Moses Mabhida (once a member of the LP in Natal).168 Since
SACTU was well supported in Natal and Lutuli and his closest officials had been banned in
mid-1959, SACTU threatened to dominate the ANC completely.169 This left-wing of the ANC
in Natal was centred in Durban (where support for SACTU was strongest) and did not view
the LP favourably. Kuper reported that relations with the Congress Alliance were 'strained' in
Durban in mid-1960. 170
The Natal LP's close association with Lutuli continued. The party was involved in organising
meetings in honour ofLutuli when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961. Two
successful meetings organised by E.V.Mahomed were held in Stanger. l71 About 1000 people
attended the first at which Paton paid tribute to Lutuli in a speech, while Brown, Ngubane and
'Monty' Naicker from the NIC spoke at the second meeting to welcome Lutuli back from
.Oslo. Further meetings were organised in Durban at which the LP was represented. Lutuli sent
a personal telegram to the Natal Division of the Party wishing it every success at its Provincial
Congress in 1962. 172
The expanding membership in the Natal Division called for increased organisation, as the
leadership stressed the importance of keeping in touch with each branch and its members. Elliot
Mngadi had been the Party organiser for the northern Natal region for some time. The national
chairman, at the National Congress in 1959, attributed the success of the LP in outlying areas
ofNatal to the efforts ofMngadi. 173 As the Party grew in the province it became obvious that
more Party organisers would have to be appointed to cope with the influx of African members,
although the Division was not able to do this for some time due to financial constraints.
168 Mabhida was elected acting president of the Natal ANC in 1959 and chairman of SACTU in 1960.
T.Karis & G.M.Gerhart, Political Profiles, 1882-1964, Volume 4 of T.Karis & G.M.Carter (eels), From Protest
to Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964 (Californi~ Stanford
University, 1977), p.27. He was influenced by communism. Interview with P.Bro~ 25/3/1998.
169 B 'Hi ' 146ro~ story , p. .
170 APC. PC 2/2/4/1, Minutes, National Congress, May 1960.
171 Liberal Opinion, March 1962.
172 APC. PC 2/9/3/9, Telegram from A.Luthuli, Groutville, Natal Provincial Congress, March 1962.
173 APC, PC 2/2/4/1. Minutes. National Congress, April 1959.
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Branches in Natal had been divided into regional branches to facilitate the administration of the
Division. These were: northern Natal~ the Midlands and the coastal region (Durban and its
surrounding areas). A new regional branch was formed in southern Natal in 1961 as there had
been much interest in the party in this area. Three full-time Party organisers had been appointed
by 1961 (Mngadi in the northern Natal region, Christopher Shabalala in the Midlands and Jack
Nkosi in the coastal region) whose function it was to co-ordinate events and meetings, and to
cultivate new interest in the Party with the objective of starting new branches. The organisers
were an integral part of the Party's machinery in the rural areas~ and were a factor in the
success of the Party in these areas. Unfortunately the Division was always low on funds and
had to release Nkosi from his position in 1962, which was taken over by Shabalala. Mngadi
also served on both the National and Provincial Committees.
Raising, and even creating, political consciousness in the countryside became an important part
ofParty work from the late 1950s.174 This applies to Natal in particular. Meidner, who had
taken over the Natal provincial chairmanship from Brown in late 1958, realised that Party
organisation in the Division was a priority if the Party was to be effective in the region and
stressed the need for solid organisation. Despite the Party's performance during the state of
emergency, he warned that '[t]he Party in Natal [was] not strong enough yet by far, to
withstand the tests of the times to come' .175 He devised what became known as 'organisational
schools', where Party organisers and local leaders were taught English, basic administration
skills and the essential principles of liberalism. 176 These 'organisational schools' or workshops
were to be held in various parts of Nata! over the weekends and commitment was needed from
active members to run these. Neil Alcock (a white farmer active in the Underberg area) ran a
workshop in Bulwer during 1961 and reported that he 'found that there were big gaps in the
knowledge of [local] organisers, concerning the work of the Party and current political
affairs' .177 Both the local leaders and the instructor learned from this type of interaction. The
Natal Division took the lead with both Party organisers and workshops to train new members
174 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.163.
175 APC, PC 2/9/3/8, Provincial chainnan's Report for 1960. Natal Provincial Congress, April 1961.
176 Bro~ 'History', p.152~ APe, PC 2/9/25/3, Natal provincial chainnan's Report for 1960.
171. APC, PC 2/2/1 1/1, Minutes, National Committee, 21-22 October 1961.
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in positions of leadership, as similar events were later held in the Transvaal and the Cape.
These 'get-togethers' also served to break down barriers between members of different groups.
Political education campaigns were another part of Meidner' s efforts to build a strong and
effective organisation in Natal. He 'wanted to see a strong Liberal Party with mass support
doing re.al political work' .118 He felt that the Party needed a properly trained membership in
order to produce results, and thus leaders in a branch or an area needed to be given basic
training to enable them to organise the Party's growing African membership. By 1962 the
leadership of the Natal Division recognised 'that instead of expanding, we should, for the
present, build on what we have got' .179 This was echoed by Mngadi in his proposed organiser's
programme for 1962, that the Division should consolidate its membership and provide
intensive political training, especially in the country towns and rural areas: 'Some of our
members are really hungry for political education, [and] I think it is the duty of the Party to
satisfy this hunger.' 180
Meidner made a valuable contribution to the Natal DivIsion. More radical from the beginning,
his ideas and innovative thinking were influential in the growth and transition of the Division,
and thus ultimately of the Party. His fellow-Liberals in Natal praised his dedication and
commitment, as well as his organisational skills. 181 On a more practical note, a simultaneous
translation system was pioneered by him and was first used at the Natal Provincial Congress in
1962, as many members could not speak English very well or at all. The system was
subsequently used at National Congresses.
Despite the lifting of the state of emergency regulations at end of September 1960, the
government clamp-down on all political opposition continued. Some political activity now
became practically impossible for the LP. 182 Permission had to be obtained from the Native
178 APC, PC 2/2/5/2, Minutes, National Congress, April 1959. Emphasis in original.
179 APC, PC 2/9/1/2, Sub-Committee on Regional Organisation in Natal, .1962.
180 APC, PC 2/9/3/9, Copy of Elliot Mngadi's speech, Natal Provincial Congress. March 1962.
181 Infonnation gathered from my interviews and from other interviews consulted.
182 For the following discussion: APC, PC 2/9/10/1, N~tal Provincial Committee, Minutes for 1960
and 1961.
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Commissioner to enter African townships or to hold a meeting in a black area. These requests
were invariably refused. The problems with finding suitable venues, such as halls, for multi-
racial meetings increased. Venues, such as church, municipal or Farmers' Association halls,
which had been used before became more difficult to obtain for meetings. The Howick branch,
in particular, had trouble with the Town Board for the use of the local hall. It became even
more difficult after the successful strike in May 1961. 183 This was a problem as the branch had
no other meeting place. Meetings often had to be held in the open over weekends. 184
Members of the LP in Natal had become used to the presence of Special Branch police at
meetings and some form of harassment from the state. But the scale of state and police
harassment increased noticeably during 1960. Special Branch police attended meetings in
increasing numbers and frequency after the state of emergency. During 1962 they also began to
pay regular visits to and raid members' houses, including prominent leaders such as Ngubane
and Paton. 185
In January 1961, Mngadi reported an increase in police harassment in northern Natal. The
Special Branch attended meetings and reported those who had attended to their employers.
This was apparently a new tactic by the Special Branch. 186 There were similar incidents
elsewhere, for example in Kokstad where a police informer had been attending LP meetings.
Brown was charged with holding an illegal meeting in the Kokstad area, as there were more
than ten Africans present. He pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence. 187 Christopher
Shabalal~ the LP secretary in Howick, was under constant police surveillance. All public
meetings had been banned before Republic Day in 1961, and several members' houses had
been raided. Although membership had increased overall in Natal, there was a decline in
activity in certain areas due to intimidation by police. 188 The Southern Natal Regional
183 Bro~ 'History', p.210.
184 'Liberal Party News' in Liberal Opinion, December 1961.
185 Ibid.. October 1962.
186 APC, PC 2/211111. Minutes, National Committee, 28-29 January 1961.
187 Brown, 'History', p.239.
188 APC, PC 2/2/11/1. Minutes, National Committee, 28-29 January 1961.
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Committee reported in late 1961 that due to intimidation there were problems with branches in
the southern coastal area, which had previously been active. 1&9 The southern Natal region was
particularly affected, perhaps because of its proximity to the Transkei where there had been
political trouble. 190
A further threat to the LP were the restrictions contained in the General Laws Amendment Bill
(' Vorster Bill'), should this Bill become law. 191 The Minister of Justice would have increased
powers to ban meetings and organisations, and individuals from attending meetings, or to
confine them to a particular place. 192 Congress Alliance members had been banned since 1959,
and further restrictions would be placed on them. The Bill was 'a threat to everything the
Liberal Party stands for' and was meant to '[c]ow apartheid's opponents into silence'. The LP
in Natal initiated a campaign against the Bill together with remaining ex-Congress, Black Sash
and Progressive Party members. As was to be expected at some point, the COD was banned in
September 1962.
Conclusion
The year 1960 began 'almost hopefully for the opponents of apartheid' as the 'tide was moving
perceptibly in their favour' .193 However, as the months progressed after Sharpeville and the
cataclysmic events which followed it, the tide began to turn against them. The extra-
parliamentary political opposition in the country failed to consolidate after the banning of the
ANC and the PAC, as long-standing suspicions and differences undermined any momentary
unity amongst a diverse group of African leaders. Instead, members of these banned
organisations went underground and decided to abandon non-violent means of protest.
The LP was presented with a number of challenges during the turbulent years from 1959,
1&9 APC. PC 2/9/10/1, Minutes, Natal Provincial Committee, 8 August 1961.
190 Liberal Opinion, December 1961.
191 The Bill was passed during 1963.
192 Liberal Opinion, July 1962 & October 1962.
193 Brookes. South African Pilgrimage, p.121.
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especially after the state of emergency in early 1960. The party continued its transition and in
the process became more militant and reached a closer identification with black political
aspirations. Extra-parliamentary opposition had become central to its activities and it accepted
the universal franchise unconditionally. In its attempt to fill the political vacuum left by the
banning of the ANC and the PAC, the Party attracted substantial numbers of African members.
The early 1960s was a time of growth for the Party in Natal, and its leadership met well the
challenges created by a changing membership. The Division had weathered the storms of
having members of its leadership detained, some of its members arrested and the constant
attention of the Security Branch police. It had managed to organise a party consisting of a




The final years ofthe party, 1963-1968 :
l\founting odds against survival, and Natal's resilience
Introduction
It was during 1963 that the Liberal Party (LP) began to feel the full force of state persecution
as 'the government steadily applied to the Liberal Party the techniques of intimidation,
harassment, and repression the African movements had long suffered, until the party was
scarcely able to function' .1 The government's increasingly repressive laws to prevent the
organisation of effective resistance against it had begun to have an effect by 1964 - this year
'~arked the nadir ofblack resistance to the apartheid system'. 2 In 1963 the first members of
the LP were 'warned' and banned under the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), and a
smear campaign was instigated against the LP, linking liberalism with communism. The
functioning of the Party began to be seriously affected from 1964 with the number of bans
increasing and with widespread intimidation ofParty members, and further restrictions were
imposed through legislation against extra-parliamentary political opposition. The arrest of a
number ofyounger Party members involved in the African Resistance Movement (ARM)3 in
July 1964 gave the government justification to further persecute the LP. The death-knoll for
the Party came in early 1968 with the passing of the Prevention ofPolitical Interference Act,
which outlawed multi-racial political parties. Since to become a whites-only organisation (the
only way to remain a parliamentary political party) was not an option, the Party chose to
disband rather than comply.
1 T.Karis & G.M.Gerhart. Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, Volume 3 of T.Karis & G.M.Carter
(eds), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964
(California, Stanford University, 1977), p.655.
2 T.Karis & G.M.Gerhart. Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1990, Volume 5 of From Protest to
Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa. 1882-1990 (Pretoria, Unisa, 1997),
p.15.
3 Founded as the National Committee of Liberation (NCL) in late 1961, it was later renamed (in June
1964) and is better-known as the African Resistance Movement (ARM). Less than twenty of its members were
also members of the LP, and its existence was not known publically until July 1964. See later discussion.
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The bulk of the membership of the Natal Division was made-up of rural African people, and it
was against this group that much of the police intimidation was aimed. Members of the
leadership endured harassment of a more sophisticated nature, and many paid the price of
opposing the government, by being banned. The Division as a whole withstood the pressure
well and remained as active as possible until the end (unlike other Divisions of the party),
although activity was much reduced from the early· 1960s.
5.1 "Hard Times, Getting Harder'J4-
The Liberal Party as a target ofthe Nationalist government
By the end of 1962 the LP was the only remaining' active, legal, extra-parliamentary political
force in the country' .5 The level of public protest began to decrease amongst both black and
white people in South Africa during 1963.6 Natal Indian Congress (NIC) members were being
banned, the Congress of Democrats (COD) had been banned in 1962 along with its
publication, New Age, and a list of 'named' communists had been published. Members of the
banned African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), as well as the
South African Communist Party (SACpf, were arrested and there were numerous political
trials during the early to mid-1960s which politically disabled black resistance in the country.
UntiI the LP was systematically and ruthlessly immobilised by the banning and house-arrests of
its office-bearers by the mid-1960s, it was to some degree'able to step into the shoes of the
banned African liberation movements'. 8 According to Randolph Vigne, B.J. Vorster's policy of
'destroying the Party without actually banning it made it only a degree more viable than the
Congresses and the PAC,.9
The 'mopping up of the liberation movements proceeded' in the courts. 10 A number of
~ Article heading, Liberal Opinion, October 1964.
5 R Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid: A History o/the Liberal Party o/South Africa, 1953-68
(London, Macmillan. 1997), p.200.
6 Liberal Opinion, September 1963.
7 See Chapter 4. The SACP openly announced its existence in 1960.
8 'What Hope Democracy?', article in Contact. October 1965.
9 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.200. lB. Vorster was the then Minister of Justice.
10 ijJid.. p.219.
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Congress Alliance members (mainly ANC and SACP) and PAC members had been arrested
and 'political trials were many and widespread' during the early and mid-1960s. Many
belonged to the ANC's insurgent offshoot, [lmkhonto weSizwe (including SACP), and the
PAC's, Poqo. The government sent many of its opponents to prison for 'the broadly defined
crimes of sabotage, "communist activity" and attempting to further the aims of the banned
ANC and PAC'.l1 By the mid-1960s the state had destroyed the ANC's network in South
Africa. The internal leadership of the ANC was decimated after the Rivonia arrests, and
political leadership shifted to the movement that had been established in exile. 12 Alan Paton
spoke in mitigation ofNelson Mandela and his co-accused at the Rivonia trial in Johannesburg
during 1964. Paton was harshly questioned by the prosecuting counsel, Dr Percy Yutar, who
attempted to link Liberals with communists and force Paton to admit that he supported the
actions of the ANC. 13 Albert Lutuli was banned again in 1964, although he had been out of the
mainstream of Congress politics for some time due to the restrictions placed on him, and had
been virtually replaced by Mandela as the pre-eminent ANC leader. 14
The smear campaign started by Vorster against the LP during late 1962 became a systematic
campaign from 1963 onwards. Government persecution took the form of ceaseless and
increasing harassment and intimidation of members by the Security Branch police, while a
number of active leaders were banned. Such measures either frightened off: or hardened the
resolve, of Liberals.
The basis of the government-orchestrated campaign against L.iberals and the LP implied that
liberalism was in fact communism 'in disguise'. Vorster's accusations were followed by those
of other ministers, which were often broadcast by the South African Broadcasting Corporation
(SABC). Paton was denied pennission to speak on SABC radio to refute such allegations. IS
Vorster is reported to have said: Communism kills, but Liberalism leads into ambush in order
11 Karis & Gerhart, Nadir and Resurgence, p.14.
12 T.Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (London, Lon~ 1983), pp.295-297.
13 P.A1exander,Alan Paton: A Bibliography (Oxfor<L ODP, 1984), pp.335-336. Discussed in detail in
A.Paton, Journey Continued (Cape Town, David Philip, 1988).
14 Karis & Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, p.678.
IS Reported in Liberal Opinion, June 1963.
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to kill. 16 Paton refused to bow to this and prove to Vorster that Liberals were not communists,
as anti-communism should not be ~the sum and substance of our Liberalism'. On the other
hand, communists criticised the Liberals for condemning violence and sabotage in the name of
the liberation struggle. 17 According to Paton, it was not an option to Liberals, but many could
understand why others had chosen it.
The campaign was an attempt by the Nationalists to play on white fears, as they had done in
the 1961 general election, and to isolate Liberals from ~respectable' white opinion. It aimed to
scare off those who might think ofjoining the Party, or to at least to ignore Liberals' protests
about bannings, and to frighten uncertain members into inactivity. IS According to Catherine
Brubeck, a characteristic of the majority of white South Africans at this time was a ~knee-jerk
reaction' to any mention of the political left, whether communist or not. 19 They labelled them
as ~bad' without any further examination. The LP was, by this time, perceived to be ~beyond
the pale' as the Party had sided with the left and operated outside the arena of parliamentary
politics. It was reported that the UP had referred to the Progressives as 'extremist'. To the
Liberals, the Progressives were conservative. 20 Thus it follows that the LP should not have
expected much support from the white electorate.
The methodical campaign of police intimidation, reported in all Divisions, increased from 1963
onwards. 21 This intimidation took the form ofblatant 'scare tactics' to induce fear and
uncertainty. In Natal, such tactics were mainly used against the African members. The Security
Branch police would burst into Party meetings, attended meetings in increasing numbers, and
paid follow-up visits to members after meetings. They would take leading members to the local
police station for questioning in dramatic ways to maximise publicity. Members were often
taken from their places ofwork for questioning, or the police would speak to their employers
16 Speech by A.Paton, LP Meeting in Durban, quoted in Liberal Opinion, February 1963.
17 Ibid.
18 Report on intimidation, Liberal Opinion, June 1963.
19 Interview with C. Brubeck, 19/2/1998. Also interview with C.Gardner, 6/2/1998.
20 Liberal Opinion, April 1964.
21 APe, PC 2/4/16/1, 'Intimidation', Memorandum prepared by the LP detailing incidents of such
tactics from 1962 to 1965.
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about their membership. This was particularly successful if a government permit was required
for business. The homes of members of the leadership and LP offices were raided on a regular
basis, especially prior to meetings. The Natal Youth Group published a booklet on intimidation
in late 1963, detailing the experiences of Natal members at the hands of the Security Branch
police. 22
The majority of the membership in Natal remained undeterred, however, and party activity
continued as far as was possible under the circumstances. However, activity was gradually
reduced after the mid-1960s. Rural branches seemed to be a target, with incidents being
reported from the Underberg area from 1963, and a more persistent programme of intimidation
in northern Natal from 1964.23 Christopher Shabalala was detained for questioning while
travelling to Underberg by train, which the police stopped between stations. The secretary of
the Nongoma branch's house was raided everyday for a month by Security Branch police. The
home ofEnoch Mnguni of the Stepmore branch (a 'black spot' near, Underberg) was regularly
raided and he was taken in for questioning. He and the Nongoma branch secretary had been
members of the ANC before joining the LP. Before the 1964 Natal Provincial Congress, Roy
Coventry from the Bergville branch was raided three times in one week, while a lorry
transporting members from northern Natal to the Congress was stopped near Mooi River by
the police and was not allowed to proceed. 24 Members from Pietermaritzburg had to fetch the
stranded members by car. Urban branches were not immune either - members in one factory
in Durban asked to be taken off the Party's mailing list as members had been threatened with
dismissal if they continued their membership.25 Some measures were more malicious. For
example, Mike Ndlovu's car was petrol-bombed26, while Paton had his car windows smashed. 27
By early 1964 the national leadership of the Party was realising the destructive impact on the
22 APC, PC 2/6/6/1, P.M.Bro~ 'A History of the Liberal Party of South Mrica', unpublished
manuscript, p.298.
23 APC, PC 2/4/16/1, 'Intimidation'. The following examples are taken from here.
24 'Liberal Party News', in Liberal Opinion, April 1964; APC, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger,
Tape 4, 1995.
25 Reports in Brown, 'History', p.302.
26 APC, P.McKenzie interviewed by P.Merre~ 8/6/1996.
27 Paton, Journey Continued, p.243.
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Party as a result of magisterial warnings and banning orders given under the Suppression of
Communism Act. 28 While the aim of a banning order was to silence a political opponent, a
warning was aimed at frightening the opponent out of activity. The national leadership decided
to ignore warnings, but infringements of banning restrictions were far more serious. An article
was published in Liberal Opinion in January 1964 which explained the implications and
restrictions of warnings and banning orders. The Minister of Justice issued these orders at his
discretion, and no reasons, other than that the individual was somehow involved in activities
'calculated to further the aims of communism', needed to be given. 29 Furthermore, the order
could not be challenged in a court of law.
Certain Cape members of the LP, who had been involved in the Transkei independence
elections during 1962, were the first to be banned.30 The first member in Natal to be banned
was Jordan Ngubane in May 1963. Ngubane was an active and outspoken critic of apartheid,
serving on both national and provincial levels of leadership. He was a journalist and travelled
widely - now he was stripped of his means of livelihood as he could no.longer publish
anything or attend meetings, and was restricted to the Inanda district, north of Durban. Since
he was in Swaziland at the time, he stayed on there rather than return to South Africa under
these conditions. Later in that year, E.V.Mahomed (Party treasurer), David Evans (secretary of
the Natal Division) and Bill Benghu (national vice-president) were banned. All three were
active Provincial as well as National Committee members. A blow to the Natal Division's
efforts in the region was the banning ofElliot Mngadi in early 1964. He was an integral part of
the Division's machinery in northern Natal, particularly with the 'black spots'.
The banning orders received so far by LP members had had a serious effect on the Party, but a
bigger blow was to fall with the arrest in July 1964 of several members who had been involved'
with the ARM. 31 The national leadership had been unaware of the existence of this
28 Liberal Opinion, April 1964.
29 Liberal Opinion, January 1964.
30 Included Patrick Duncan. Randolph Vigne, and Peter Hjul. Duncan went into exile in Lesotho
rather than face a banning order in South Africa.
31 Twelve members were arrested in Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape on sabotage charges~ three
escaped into exile~ John Harris was prosecuted for murder after planting a bomb in the Johannesburg Station
(killed one person).
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organisation, which had begun its activities during late 1961. The majority of those involved
were younger, more radical members, and were mostly from the Cape and Transvaal.
According to Randolph Vigne, who was a member, Liberals were not the only members of the
ARM and the organisation did not actively recruit LP members. 32 Nevertheless, the leaders
were prominent LP members and thus the Party was associated with the ARM and its
activities. Although most of the membership of the ARM was against the communist influence
in the Congress Alliance, they had hoped to unite with Umkhonto weSizwe, but were rebuffed.
The ARM was not very active in Natal, with David Evans and John Laredo the only members
from here. Patrick McKenzie (a National Committee member from 1962), who was living in
Durban at the time, was approached by Laredo in late 1961 to join the organisation, but he
declined.33
The ARM reflected a 'transitional phase of confusion' in the history of the LP, as younger
white members became disillusioned with the realisation that the LP was no longer able to aim
for political power. There was a 'certain aimless confusion as to what legislatively ever-
shrinking role [the Party] could play' in the 'authoritarian environment' created by the
Nationalist govemment. 34 According to Brubeck, she and some other younger members in the
Natal Division 'remained confused about the issue' .35 They had become frustrated with the
restrictions on political activity, but felt that morally one could not betray their own and the
LP's principles on non-violence. Besides this, they questioned the possible achievements of
violence. However, there was a feeling that those involved with the ARM were'doing
something' at a time when it felt like the party could achieve nothing. Members such as herself
had supported the ANe in the past and could SYmpathise with the decision taken by certain
members of its leadership to resort to violence.
Many members of the Party were deeply shocked by the revelations about the ARM and angry
32 Vigne. Liberals Against Apartheid, pp.202-206. The ARM is also discussed in Karis & Gerhart.
.Vadir and Resurgence. pp.21-23~ Lodge, Black Politics, pp.240-241; A.du Toil, "Fragile defiance. the Mrican
Resistance Movement' in I. Leibenberg et al (eds), The Long March (pretoria, HAUM, 1994).
33 APC, P.McKenzie interviewed by R Vigne. 5/6/1995, & by P.Merrett 8/6/1996.
34 "What Hope Democracy?', article in Contact, October 1965.
3S Interview with C.Brubeck, 19/2/1998.
152
about the strain placed on the Party because of it. Paton was 'bitterly wounded by what the
Liberal members of ARM had done to him and to the Party' .36 In his speech at the 1964
National Congress in October he expressed his feeling that these members had betrayed the
Party and could not consider themselves liberals, and he suggested that any Liberal
contemplating such a move should resign from the Party immediately.37 Peter Brown seems
more understanding than Paton. 38 Although he was never tempted to abandon non-violence, he
could understand why others had. According to Vigne, a 'degree of sympathy and
understanding towards ARM Liberals was evident throughout', which he supports with
evidence, even from Paton.39
One of the most crushing repercussions for the LP, both on a national level and for the Natal
Division, was the banning of Brown on 30 July 1964.40 This was almost certainly because of
the ARM, although it probably would have happened at some point. ~l Other members of the
National Committee were banned, including Dempsey Noel, a prominent Coloured member in
Pietermaritzburg. Several meetings were held in Natal to protest against Brown's ban and were
especially well supported in Pietermaritzburg, Hambrook and CharlestoWll..J2 Hambrook (a
'black spot') was a relatively new branch in the northern Natal countryside, which had grown
considerably and consisted entirely of African members. Edgar Brookes stepped into Brown's
position as national chairman. Brookes was still considered a 'respectable' liberal of the older
generation of the Ballingers and was not as radicalised as the rest of the leadership.43
Nevertheless, it 'was a long road to have travelled for someone who had supported the
Hertzog Bills in 1926'.44 It was necessary in light of recent events that someone like Brookes,
36 Alexander, Paton, p.334.
37 A.Paton's speech, 'Liberals reject Violence', National Congress. 9-10 October 1964. quoted in
Liberal Opinion, October 1964.
38 APC, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 4, 1995.
39 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.205.
.w On the expiration of his ban in 1969, he was given a further 5-year banning order.
~l APC, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 4, 1995.
42 Liberal Opinion, October 1964.
43 Interview with P.Brown, 25/3/1998.
~ E.H.Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977), p.134.
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who was 'above suspicion', took over the national leadership of the Party..~5
The bannings in Natal from mid-1964 seemed to concentrate on those involved in the rural
areas and the 'black spots'. This is consistent with the increased intimidation reported in Natal
and the persistent programme of harassment in northern Natal. 46 John Aitchison, a
Pietermaritzburg member, had become more involved in rural areas and 'black spot' removals
since the banning ofMngadi. He and Selby Msimang, who had been involved since the early
1950s, were banned during the first half of 1965.47 During the second half of the year, the
Party in Natal suffered further blows to its efforts in the rural areas with the banning of
Christopher Shabalala, Michael Ndlovu and Enoch Mnguni. Shabalala was the Midlands Party
organiser and a very active member. Ndlovu, from the Bergville area, had become the Party
organiser in that region as well as in northern Natal, and had been actively involved in the
'black spots', as he came from Khumalosville (a 'black spot' near Bergville). Mnguni was the
chairman of the Stepmore branch, a freehold area near Underberg. The loss of these Party
organisers reduced the Party's work in the rural areas considerably, although meetings were
still being held. 48 In early 1966, Heather Morkill, the secretary of the Pietermaritzburg branch,
was banned. She had become increasingly active in visiting the rural areas, and this must be
assumed to be the main reason for her ban.
The banning of a Durban couple, Jean and Ken Hill, who had been active members from the
formation of the Party in 1953, should be mentioned. In October 1965 Jean Hill was banned,
most likely because she was the secretary of the Defence and .Aid Fund in Natal and the Fund's
office was in her home. 49 (The Fund itselfwas banned in March 1966.) She had also helped
E.V.Mahomed with Lutuli's correspondence after he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Ken Hill had
received a 'magisterial warning' in November 1963, and had written ~ 'Open Letter to the
.J5 Brookes, South African Pilgrimage, pp.133-136~ See also:Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid. p.212.
46 APC, PC 2/4/16/1, LP memorandwn,'Intimidation'; Brown, 'History', p.343 .
.J7 On the expiration of Aitchison's ban in 1970, he was given a further 5,:,year banning order.
48 'Liberal Party News' in Liberal Opinion, March 1966.
49 APC, J.Hill interviewed by R Vigne, 15/2/1995.
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Minister of Justice of South Africa - from one threatened with banning'. 50 He accused
Vorster of 'a deliberate campaign to destroy the Liberal Party', and that he had 'no alternative
but to continue my political activities in opposition to apartheid and to your government to the
best of my ability'. The letter was widely quoted in South Africa and abroad as 900 copies had
been sent to prominent people and journalists. 51 He received a five-year ban in April 1966, with
a twelve-hour house arrest.
The uncertainty of who was to be banned next and for what reason was a further strain on the
Party in Natal. 52 Why did the government not ban the LP outright? The most probable reason,
according to Leo Marquard, was because of the membership of too many well-known figures,
internationally and locally, like Edgar Brookes, Alan Paton and the Ballingers. 53 (Margaret
Ballinger and Marquard, amongst others, had become active in the Party again in order to step
into positions left open by bannings.) According to Paton, the government preferred to cripple
the Party by banning its most active and outspoken members, rather than ban it. 54 This
provokes the question of the~ danger that the LP posed to the Nationalist government.
Although the 'apartheid government of the early 1960s certainly regarded the Liberal Party as
significant', was 'that repression a true reflection of the challenge the Liberal Party posed?'55
This type of question is easier to ask in retrospect, and in answering it, the situation has to be
seen in context. The likelihood of a revolutionary-type situation breaking out was thought a
real possibility at the time. It seems that the government considered the LP a threat, not
necessarily to its existence, but to the acceptance and implementation of its policies.
The issuing ofbanning orders slowed down on a national level during 1966. Only two were
issued in Natal during the year. Just as no reason was given for issuing banning orders, so no
reason was given for lifting them. By late 1966 the bans on Mngadi, Ndlovu, Shabalala,
50 Correspondence, Office of the Minister of Justice, State Archives, Pretori~ quoted in Vigne,
Liberals Against Apartheid, p.194.
51 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp. 194-195.
52 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, C.Brobeck, 19/2/1998, & C.Gardner, 6/2/1998.
53 APC, PC 2/4/16/1, LP memorandum, 'Intimidation'.
54 Speech by A.Paton, National Congress, July 1965, quoted in Liberal Opinion, August 1965.
. 55 C.Saunders, 'The Liberal Party Reassessed', Review of Liberals Against Apartheid by Randolph
Vlgne, South African Historical Journal 37 (November 1997), p.202.
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Mnguni and Msimang had been partially or totally lifted. 56 Ken Hill and others had had theirs'
lifted by early 1968. Perhaps it had something to do with the new Minister of Justice, lC.
Pelser, and Vorster's succession as prime minister on the death of Verwoerd in September
1966. 57 The National Committee had written to Pelser him requesting clarity on the legal
position of those released from their bans, and requested a review on the lifting of all remaining
bans. 58 The Minister refused to give a general review, but invited individual applications.
Mngadi was thus able to attend a Pietermaritzburg branch meeting in October 1966, where he
thanked those Liberals from Durban and Pietermaritzburg who been to see him while he was
banned: 'Each visit had been widely noticed in his area, and had served to boost Liberalism. ,59
By 1966 the Party had reached its lowest point. The campaign by the government had all but
destroyed it. The Party had lost much of its vibrancy and its sense of purpose and hope gained
from the political climate of the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, there was no question of
giving up. According to Paton: 'Vorster did great damage to the ~iberal Party, not to its
principles or ideals but to its organisation.'6O About forty members had been banned by the end
of 1966, and thirty of these were active and influential.
The LP's policies had been re-drafted in 1961 in line with its radicalisation and transformation
along a social democratic path. Paton contemplated in his opening speech at the National
Congress in July 1963, the tenth anniversary of the party, how the LP had 'come a long way,
and done a great deal, during the past ten years' .61 But it seems that it had perhaps come as far
as it might as a radical liberal party. Ernie Wentzel, a prominent Transvaal member who held
the Labour portfolio in the National Committee, had the backing of a number ofyounger white
members who were responding not only to the substantial black, largely proletari~
membership that the party had attracted, but also to 'the atmosphere of political change which
56 Liberal Opinion, September 1966.
57 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.223. Verwoerd was assassinated on 6 September 1966.
58 APC. PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, National Committee, 25 February & 27 July 1967.
59 APC. PC 2/9/23/4, Minutes, Pietennaritzburg branch meeting, 19 October 1966.
60 Paton, Journey Continued. p.264.
61 Report on the National Congress, July 1963. in Liberal Opinion, September 1963.
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the early 1960s brought' .62 Although the party's policies had been re-drafted and taken on a
socialist bias in 1961, some felt that the Party should develop its social democratic character
further. However, any further radicalisation along this path was halted by the priority of the
Party's survival, as well as some opposition within the Party to the idea of it taking on an
overtly socialist character.
Wentzel's resolution at the 1963 National Congress suggested that the Party change its name
(to the Socialist Party of South Africa), and proposed a new and radical economic programme
with strong socialist overtones. 63 This resulted in heated and 'emotional' debate. 64 The party
was, after all, based on liberal principles, and was not a socialist party even though some of its
policies may have had a socialist slant. Although there was 'majority support' for a 'social
welfare tone'65, it \-vas widely felt that the primary aim of the party was to fight racial
discrimination and it should not divide on questions of economic ideology.
Paton and Brown had not supported Wentzel' s original resolution, alth9ugh they' supported a .
socialist bias in [LP] policy'. 66 Brown recalls that there was not the opposition that one might
have expected within the Party, which shows how much it had changed.67 Colin Gardner does
not recall any major ideological debates taking place in Natal during the 1960s, where the
Party concentrated its efforts on protesting against aspects of apartheid.68 Paton suggested
amendments and a 'watered-down' version of the original, which still allowed for the re-
statement of the Party's policies in light of its social-democratic character. The Party's role
would be to take 'the lead in the building of a non-racial democracy ... in which one of the
prime concerns [would] be the economic and social welfare of its citizens', but this would not
entail a name change.69 The resolution that a commission be appointed to look into this was
62 Emest Wentzel Papers, Memoir, quoted in Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp.207-208.
63 APC, PC 2/2/6/3, List of resolutions, National Congress, July 1963.
64 Brown, 'History', pp.329ff.
65 P.Brown interviewed by G.M.Carter. Durban, 29/1/1964, in J.Robertson, Liberalism in South
.1frica, 1948-1963 (Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1971), p.223.
66 Emest Wentzel Papers. Memoir, quoted in Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.210.
67 Interview with P.Browa 25/3/1998.
68 Interview with C.Gardner, 6/2/1998.
69 APC, PC 2/2/6/3, Minutes. National Congress. July 1963.
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passed with only one vote against. However, by the 1964 National Congress, '[s]urvival had
replaced social democratic restatement as the Party's priority' .70
5.2 The Natal Division: undaunted till the end
The rural African membership became the backbone of the Natal Division during the 1960s.
Overall, this group refused to be deterred and remained largely undaunted by police
intimidation aimed primarily at them. Although the combination of government pressure and a
shortage of funds affected the party's work in Natal, there remained a degree of activity, albeit
reduced from the early 1960s. By 1966 the Natal Division was still active compared to the
Cape and the Transvaal, where activity had ceased in the rural areas. The Natal Division
continued to hold meetings and Provincial Congresses up until 1967, although the number of
delegates dwindled.
No decline in the Division's membership was reported in 1963 despite the increase in
intimidation, although branch activity in certain areas had declined. 71 Natal still had the largest
membership. New members were still joining, a 'surprising number of whom were white,.72
The provincial chairman reported a '[s]mall but steady inflow ofwhite members' 73, which
Brown found 'astonishing' .74 After the banning ofBrown in July 1964, intimidation increased
and a 'systematic attempt' to destroy the party in Natal was made by the government75, but
ultimately failed. There were almost twice as many Natal delegates at National Congress in
October 1964 than at the 1963 Congress. The leadership of the Division had changed its
thinking in terms of membership in the face of increasing government repression, and efforts
were now concentrated on keeping in touch with existing numbers rather than trying to attract
new ones.
70 Vigne. Liberals Against Apartheid, p.211.
71 Liberal Opinion, June 1963.
72 Report on the Natal Provincial Congress, May 1963, in Liberal Opinion, June 1963.
73 APC, PC 2/9/3/10, Chairman's Report, Natal Provincial Congress, May 1963.
74 B 'Hi ' 340rown, story , p. .
75 Liberal Opinion. October 1~64; APC, PC 2/4/16/1, LP memorandum., 'Intimidation'.
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By 1967, remaining members were still standing firm against intimidation. Problems were
reported from rural areas in Natal after a series of meetings: 'The difficulties facing rural
members, mostly Africans' included 'the fantastic intimidation to which they were subjected
and the fantastic courage with which they faced it'. 76 Furthermore, 'Peter Brown had been the
core of these rural branches and, since the work was in danger of being banned, it was thought
that the PMB (sic) Branch should make every effort to maintain these contacts for as long as it
was possible.' The Pietermaritzburg branch, and the younger members in particular, had made
great efforts in maintaining contact with the mainly African rural branches. 77 The
Pietermaritzburg Youth Group (established in 1961) maintained activity from 1964, especially
by visiting outlying rural branches and attempting to keep members politically informed and
train them along the lines set by Meidner and his concept of the'organisational school'. These
political training exercises were being run on a regular basis in 1963 and early 1964 by
Meidner. 78 It was a great blow to the Natal Division when Meidner left for the United
Kingdom in mid-1964. 79 It is not entirely clear why he emigrated. The most likely reason is that
he had become frustrated by this time because he felt that there no opposition in the country to
really challenge the ·Government. 80 Since he suspected that he might be banned, he believed
that he could serve the liberal cause better from abroad rather than as a banned person in South
Africa. 81
It appears that, in Natal, African members generally experienced a more blatant form of
intimidation than that used on white members of the LP. 82 (However, there are no reports of
physical assault being used against any member.) Although the homes ofboth black and white
members of the Division's leadership were raided frequently, the raids on the homes of local
African leaders were usually followed by a questioning at the local police station. The police
76 APC, PC 2/9/23/4, Minutes, Pietennaritzburg branch meeting, 19 October 1967.
77 Provincial reports in 'Liberal Party News' in Liberal Opinion: APC, Pietennaritzburg branch
meeting minutes; Interview with Peter Brown, 25/3/1998.
78 'Liberal Party News', in Liberal Opinion, April 1964.
79 Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & C.Brubec~ 19/3/1998.
80 Interview with C.Gardner, 6/2/1998.
81 APC, P.Brown interviewed by N.Bromberger, Tape 5, 1995.
32 As discussed in section 5.1. For the following discussion: APC, PC 2/4/16/1, LP memorandum,
'Intimidation', and information obtained from the my interviews and R. Vigne's in the APC. .
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attended all LP meetings where they would take notes and record speeches. They also
followed Liberals around by car. Brown was continually harassed by the Special Branch. Colin
Gardner was charged for quoting Brown at meeting to protest Brown's ban in 1964, but the
charges were dropped due to a lack of evidence. According to Catherine Brubeck, it was
easier to be radical if one was white as the government was less harsh on whites than blacks.
Gardner, Brubeck and Marie Dyer all felt that white members were protected to some extent
by their occupations, especially those at university. According to Ken Hill, the management of
the University ofNatal in Durban 'made a fuss' when he was banned and this may have
contributed to his ban being lifted.
One of the Party's priorities in Natal remained its involvement in the government's rural
resettlement schemes, both in publicising and exposing the effects of 'black spot' removals and
opposing these evictions. This was to be expected, as many African members of the LP in
Natal were either directly affected by removals and/or belonged to the Northern Natal African
Landowners' Association (NNALA). The threat to 'black spots' in Natal intensified as the
government's efforts to remove and resettle residents ITom these areas slotted into its policy on
the formation of 'Bantustans'. It was estimated by the government that there were still about
250 'black spots' in Natal in early 1963 and every one had to be moved as soon as possible83
- black freehold areas could not exist within white areas under the proclamation of Group
Areas.
While most communities resisted the government's plans, some did not. 84 The community at
Besterspruit, near Vryheid., made no attempt to defy the government and they were removed in
February 1963. The freehold landowners of Charlestown, one of the first areas in which the LP
was active, gradually lost their fight and were moved to various areas surrounding Newcastle.
The fight was eventually lost, too, at Khumalosville, where the government began to remove
residents in late 1963. Landowners in Charlestown and Khumalosville fought for due
compensation and the right to move where they chose (in accordance with the Group Areas
Act) once they realised that removal was inevitable. Booklets were puplished by the party
83 'The Long View' in Contact, 3 May 1963.
84 For the following discussion: articles in Contact from 1963 and 1964.
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highlighting the peoples' plight in Khumalosville, Charlestown and Besterspruit, and articles
continued to be published regularly in Contact. The LP continued its interest with follow-up
stories on where the people had been moved and their continued hardships. Brown concluded
that "it [would] take a long, long time for any ""Blackspot" family to re-establish itself at
anything like the same level of life to which it has struggled up over the years' .85
The LP's "black spot' campaign was severely hampered by the banning of members active in
these areas, especially that ofElliot Mngadi in early 1964. In September 1963 Mngadi, as
secretary of the NNALA, had been instrumental in organising a prayer meeting at Roosboom,
a "black spot' near Ladysmith. 86 The meeting was very successful with over 1200 people, from
all over Natal, attending. The event was not even reported in the Natal newspapers and there
was little response to Mngadi' s letter, "Appeal to the white citizens of Natal', which had been
sent to many prominent white Natalians. It seemed that the government was trying to break LP
influence in rural parts ofNatal. Anonymous pamphlets, in English and in Zulu, smearing the
LP as "communist hangers-on' and urging the people to move, were distributed in areas like
Charlestown. 87 However, the party continued its involvement in the 'black spots', holding
meetings and infonning people of their rights. The objective was to try and delay removals, to
get due compensation if the removal was inevitable, and to put up a show of resistance,
especially to raise awareness amongst whites as to what was happening and that there was
resistance to it.
The Party in Natal continued to hold protest meetings over apartheid legislation, often
organised together with ex-Congress Alliance, Black Sas~ and even Progressive Party
members. For example, the General Law Amendment Act, which was changed from a 90-day
detention period without charge or trial in 1963 to a 180-day period in 1965, after which the
period of detention became indefinite with the Terrorism Act in 1967. The Bantu Laws
Amendment Act was also altered during 1964, adding further restrictions to the everyday
existence of African people. Already, 'the weight of discrimination '" fell on the Natal
85 'The Long View' in Contact, 3 May 1963.
86 'Liberal Party News' in Liberal Opinion, September 1963.
87 Reported in Contact, 4 October 1963.
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Division's predominately African membership' .88 The Party protested against the Group Areas
Act, which also affected Indians and Coloureds in Natal, and the 'Bantustan' policy. More
specifically, the LP and ex-ANC members opposed the formation of a 'Zulustan' (independent
homeland for ethnic Zulu-speaking people) proposed for Natal. 89
The banning of prominent members, either LP or Congress, were usually marked with some
sort of protest. Meetings were held for Brown and Mngadi, for instance. There was a joint
meeting held in Pietermaritzburg during 1963 to protest against the house arrest of Helen
Joseph (COD member from Johannesburg) by ex-Congress, LP, Black Sash and Progressive
Party members. 90 Members in Natal had maintained contact with Congress members, for
example Paton with Dr 'Monty' Naicker and Lutuli. Naicker received a year's suspended
sentence, except for one week, for breaking his ban by having Paton and his wife, Dome, to
dine at his home in Durban. 91 He was soon to lose his home in Innes Road under the conditions
of the Group Areas Act, and had to move to an 'Indian area'. Lutuli had been banned again in
1964, although he was no longer at the forefront of Congress politics. He was killed in a train
accident during 1967, and Paton was requested by Lutuli's wife and family to pay a tribute to
him at the funeral. 92
The resolve to continue despite the difficulties under which the Party was operating was re-
iterated from 1965 onwards. Years ofNationalist assault had decreased the area of Party
activity drastically. According to Brookes, the LP had 'reached its nadir' in 1966:
'Repeated bannings have deprived us of the instructed manpower which we
have built up and through which we were able to keep in touch with country
branches. Never have there been so many of our members under restriction as
at the present time. '93
He repeated the Party's stand not to dissolve, as the country needed liberal principles when
88 Brown, 'History', p.313.
89 APC, PC 212/7/1. National Chainnan's Report. December 1962-Apri11963.
90 Reported in Liberal Opinion. June 1963.
91 PatolL Journey Continued, p.256.
92 Reported in Liberal Opinion. September-Gctober 1967.
93 Article by E.Brookes in Liberal Opinion. March 1966.
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change came. It was not a question of if the Party should continue, but how it should proceed
under the circumstances.
By 1966 the loss of Party organisers had reduced branch activity considerably in Natal,
although meetings were still being held. 94 The Durban and Pietermaritzburg branches continued
to meet regularly. At the National Congress in July 1966 the Natal Division, and the
Johannesburg and Pretoria branches were the only really active areas remaining.95 There were
no Cape delegates and the Cape Division was reported to be in serious decline. During 1967
'general activity' was reported as 'low' on a national level, with a reduced membership.96 In
Natal visits to country branches had been continued by Mngadi (whose ban had been lifted)
and Ruth Lundie (a Pietermaritzburg member), while these had not taken place in the
Transvaal for the past two years and had been impossible to hold in the Cape for some time.
5.3 The Prevention ofPolitical Interference Act, 1968
The Nationalist Party (NP), under Verwoerd, won a landslide victory in the 1966 general
election. This was the first time that the LP had not put up any candidates in a general election.
(The Natal Division had not contested the previous one in 1961 either.) About sixty per cent of
the white population voted for the NP. The country had finally recovered from Sharpeville and
the economy was buoyant. The black resistance movement had been crippled within the
country, and it now remained for the government to silence its remaining opponents.
The Prohibition of Improper Interference Bill (later the Prevention of Political Interference
Bill) was first brought forward by the government for discussion during 1966. The main aim
was to prevent whites from participating in black politics ('Bantustan', Coloured or Indian
elections) and make it a criminal offence to belong to multi-racial political organisation. Since
this applied only to the Progressive and Liberal Parties, they were clearly the targets. 97 A
94 Provincial reports, 'Liberal Party News', in Liberal Opinion, March 1966.
95 Report on National Congress, July 1966, in Liberal Opinion, September 1966.




combined meeting of the Natal Provincial and National Committees was held in
Pietennaritzburg in September 1966 to discuss the bill and its implications for the LP. 98 A
resolution was needed from the national leadership, should the bill become law. The contents
of the bill posed a serious threat to the Party, as no mixed-race political parties would be
allowed. Clearly, then, LP activities would be illegal. The alternatives open to the National
Committee were that the Party become a whites-only political party, dissolve itself, or continue
as it was and defy the law. The first option was not a choice, as non-racialism was the basic
liberal tenet of the party and it would stand by this principle. The penalties would be harsh for
defying the law, and the party could not continue in this way. It was felt, too, that the African
membership would suffer more than white members. 99 Thus a resolution was passed by the
National Committee that should the bill become law, 'the Party shall be dissolved
immediately' .100 In the interim it would continue as actively as was possible. As it turned out,
the Party earned a reprieve as discussion on bill in Parliament was postponed until 1967.
However, the bill "was passed and became law in early 1968. The National Committee
resolution from September 1966 thus came into effect and the Party was to dissolve itself
before the enactment of the bill. 101 The Progressive Party decided to continue as a whites-only
parliamentary political party. The final meeting of the National Committee was held in
Johannesburg on 16 March 1968.102 Cotin Gardner, from Pietermaritzburg, was in the chair as
acting national chairman (as Brookes in the United States). Paton and another fourteen
members were present, and the party was officially dissolved. Its demise was to be publicised
in the press, and any remaining funds were to go to the South African Institute of Race
Relations (SAIRR) for educational purposes. Party papers of historical value were to be saved,
while everything else was to destroyed.
98 APC. PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, Combined meeting of National and Natal Provincial Committees, 25
September 1966.
99 Interviews with P.Brown. 25/3/1998, & C.Gardner. 6/2/1998.
100 APC, PC 2/2/11/1, Minutes, Combined meeting of National and Natal Provincial Committees. 25
September 1966.
101 Act NO.51 of 1968.9 May 1968.
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There were calls for defying the law and continuing as a non-racial political party by some of
the younger members in Natal. 103 However, the majority certainly wanted to dissolve the party.
It had been so weakened by this stage that continuation in defiance of the law was not a viable
option, and it would mean placing an unfair burden on the black membership. Deneys
Schreiner, however, felt that it was wrong to dissolve the party and that the LP should have
continued as a whites-only political party while having a non-racial liberal association affiliated
to it. 104 This constituted a compromise which was not supported by the majority of the
membership.
The closing meetings of the Party took place around the country during April and May 1968.
Paton spoke at the meeting held at Darragh Hall in Johannesburg, held together with the
Progressive Party, the Black Sas~ the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS),
and the Students Representative Council of the University of the Witwatersrand, which 600
people attended. 105 In Natal, meetings took place in Durb~ Pietermaritzburg and Hambrook
in northern Natal. The Durban meeting, held in the Caxton Hall where many National and
Provincial Congresses had been held, attracted a large audience. Paton, Ken Hil~ Elliot Mngadi
and Henry Pietersen (Pietermaritzburg branch) were the speakers. Paton recalls the meeting at
Hambroo~ a branch consisting of rural African people, clearly. 106 It took place in a humble
building used as both a school and a church. It seems that this meeting touched him the most
- the fact that the LP had brought people of such diverse backgrounds together. An African
woman asked after Peter Brown, and requested Paton to send her regards to him. It seems
unjust that he had put so much into the establishment of these rural branches, and yet was not
allowed to attend, nor to be quoted at, such final meetings.
103 For the following discussion: Interviews with P.Brown, 25/3/1998, & c.Gardner, 6/2/1998. APC,
R Vigne's interviews with S.Chetty, 10/4/1995: MDyer, 28/3/1995~P.Poovalingham, 1/4/1995.
104 APe, G.D.Schreiner interviewed by R Vigne, 12/4/1995.
105 Paton, Journey Continued, p.277~ Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.223.
106 Pato~ Journey Continued, pp.277-278.
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Conclusion
The Party had continued despite tremendous odds and a persistent attempt by the state to
destroy it. This was particularly true in the Natal DivisioI4 with police intimidation becoming
relentless after July 1964 and the Division losing the services of some its most able members
through banning orders. The Party's further radicalisation and its move towards social
democracy was halted by the repressive assault of the government, as ~ analysis and the
development of principles yielded to the more urgent business of mere survival' .107
Although restrictions on political activity must have been frustrating, the LP had stood by its
principle of non-violence in the achievement of social and political change in South Africa.
Furthermore, its decision to disband rather than comply with the Prohibition ofPolitical
Interference Act highlighted its commitment to its principle of non-racialism. These two
principles had been the part of the reason behind the continuation of the existence of the LP up
until it was forced to dissolve - the Party was the only example ofa genuine non-racial
political organisation remaining in South Africa which had not abandoned its stance of non..,
violence. Liberals had a strong conviction to uphold their liberal ideals in a hostile political
environment in the belief that these would be an invaluable contribution to change.
107 D.Irvine, 'The Liberal Party, 1953-1968' in J.Butle~, R.Elphick & D.Welsh (eds), Democratic
Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospects (Cape Town, David Philip, 1987), p.118.
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CONCLUSION
The main aim of this thesis was to examine the nature and activities of the Natal Liberal Party
(LP). Although this was the central focus of this study, the history of the Party on a national
level had to be included to give a contextual dimension. As a result of the extensive interaction
between regional and national, the histories of each overlapped to a large extent. Also, some
analysis of the black liberation movement in South Africa was necessary because of the Party's
involvement with the Congress Movement in struggles against the apartheid government.
In doing research for the first chapter, the problems of defining liberalism in South Africa
became clear. Such difficulties with interpretation have allowed for conflicting perceptions of
liberals to develop. There is an abundance of literature on liberalism in the period before 1950,
and it was difficult at times to limit the study to an overview only. The points which stood out
clearly concerning the modus operandi of the earlier liberals was that they could exert
influence, whether with the government of the day or with African politicians, and that they
were optimistic that they could bring about gradual constitutional change in the direction of
more liberal policies. When the idea of forming a new political party was mooted in the late
1940s and early 1950s, it indicated that many liberals had lost faith in such methods and in the
more enlightened currents within the opposition United Party. They were looking for a more
assertive approach.
The basic theme of the thesis was the process of transformation of the LP, how it moved in an
increasingly radical and activist direction over time. The best indicators of this are changing
policy stances over issues such as the franchise, extra-parliamentary activity, and co-operation
with the Congress Movement. The diversity of the Party's membership often threatened to halt
the radicalisation process, especially in the initial stages, and to split the Party. The prominence
within the Party of the more conservative Cape Liberals could not be discounted until the late
1950s. Reasons for the Party's changes in policy included the lack of electoral success in white
politics, the changing composition of the membership (both black and white), and closer co-
operation with the black liberation movement. Certain members of the leadership, Peter Brown
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and Alan Paton in particular, moved with these developments in the Party and so steered the
Party along a new path.
It is vital to see the transformation process of the LP against a background of the Nationalist
Party government's development of apartheid legislation and the ways in which this shaped the
political situation in South Africa. The year 1960 is taken as a turning point in the history of
the country, and this is also true for the LP. Although the process of radicalisation was already
under way, there is no doubt that it was influenced by the state of emergency and the political
atmosphere of the early 1960s.
The success of the Natal Division of the LP, as chronicled in this thesis, can largely be
attributed to its committed and active leadership. The Division had started off in the middle,
but closer to the conservative Cape, on the political spectrum of the LP. It is thus somewhat
surprising that its subsequent radicalisation was achieved so rapidly and with little conflict
within the Division. Instead of splitting the Division, the process served to strengthen it. It was
this dynamism of the Natal Division which was projected on to the Party at a national level.
The radicalisation of the Natal Division was due to a combination of factors. The composition
of the membership of the Party in Natal, both black and white, was crucial in its
transformation. The progressive white faction already in Party allowed for the injection of a
more radical line. The increase in the number of African members and the joining of prominent
figures like Selby Msimang and Jordan Ngubane influenced the Division in a number of ways.
Furthermore, white members' direct exposure to the discrimination faced by the black
membership served to radicalise their political standpoints. The above factors brought about
changes in the views ofwhite members who were initially more conservative. Indian members
made a valuable contribution to the Party in Natal, although the membership of this group was
not as influential or numerous as that of African members.
The good relations which developed between the LP and the Congress Alliance in Natal,
specifically the African National Congress (ANC) and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), had an
impact on the Party on a regional as well as a national level. The Natal LP had supported co-
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operation (mainly with the ANC) from the beginning, although it was not explicit at this time
that any collaboration would entail, or could lead to, extra-parliamentary activity. Perhaps this
was a somewhat naive view on the part of the Liberals. As it happened, the Division was the
first to co-operate with the Congresses in such activity during 1956. And with increased co-
operation, further changes in political outlook were inevitable. The personal contact between
members of the LP and the ANC and the NIC helped to break down barriers and build trust.
This is a sentiment expressed by many of the Natal members in interviews. There is no doubt
that Albert Lutuli had an influence on Liberals and on LP-ANC relations in Natal.
Furthermore, several African LP members had maintained their links with the ANC. Although
a hostility to communism was present amongst Natal Liberals, Jordan Ngubane in particular,
the absence of a strong Congress of Democrats' presence in the Congress Alliance in Natal
was certainly a factor in shaping good LP-Congress Movement relations.
Natal was fortunate to have people of exceptional ability in its leadership, as well as having a
'workforce' of committed and active members. It was due to this factor that the Party was able
to continue functioning so well in the region during the 1960s. To have made the Party a
success in Natal as the leading members did, as well as providing leadership on a national level,
was evidence to their dedication to liberalism and the LP's cause. Judging from the research
that I have done, the leadership qualities of AIan Paton and Peter Brown were instrumental in
keeping the Party, both in Natal and nationally, together. What was remarkable was how their
views changed. This had an impact on the Party, as it took a new turn with the addition of
more radical members to the National Committee after Paton took over the national
chairmanship in 1956, and the implementation of far-reaching policy changes when Brown was
elected to the post in 1958. They were, incidently, the only nominees for these posts. Brown
must also be singled out for the Party's success in building an African membership in Natal.
Jordan Ngubane's influence went beyond the Natal Division and was significant in the Party's
transformation. Another figure whose influence cannot be underestimated in Natal was Hans
Meidner. The radical trend he set was already evident in 1953 when he questioned the
adoption of certain South African Liberal Association principles. Besides this, his
organisational ability was a valuable asset to the Division. The role of Selby Msimang was also
important as he was one of the Party's founding members and had been the ANC provincial
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secretary in Natal, although he was comparatively moderate compared with the younger
generation in the ANC. There were others in the Division, too, who made valuable
contributions.
A further factor which pushed the Natal Division in the direction it took was its record of the
worst parliamentary election results amongst the Divisions. This influenced its change of
direction, and was a decisive factor in encouraging a black membership and the consequent
shift of focus away from the white electorate. The 1958 general election results gave impetus
to the movement towards extra-parliamentary activity in the Natal Division.
The Natal Division's direct involvement with rural African communities made a deep
impression on Africans and was largely responsible for its success in building its black
membership. The LP's grass-roots involvement in the Natal countryside not only attracted
~embers and established branches, but spread liberal ideas and helped foster a political
consciousness amongst the local people. The leadership in Natal was mindful of the ANC
presence when dealing with African communities, although that organisation had largely
neglected the rural areas. The Party's opposition to the Nationalist government's rural
resettlement schemes, in particular, brought in substantial numbers of African members,
especially during the 1960s. Furthermore, the Party's activity during the state of emergency in
early 1960 attracted much interest. The Natal Division had started out with the smallest, but
most racially representative, membership in 1953. By the late 1950s it had the largest
membership, with the largest percentage of black members. The majority of the Division's
membership was African by the mid-1960s. Much of this membership was rural and of a
working class nature, which presented the Division with new challenges. That the Natal
Division remained the most active in the final years was the result of effective party
organisation in response to such challenges.
Even though the LP followed an increasingly radical and activist pat~ Liberals never really
saw themselves as activists in the militant sense that communists might. They became involved
in extra-parliamentary activity in the defence ofvalues whic~ to them, were universal and
based on common sense. It was the political situation in South Africa and the development of
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apartheid which forced them into direct political action. They adapted to political
developments in the country in the search for political and social change, but still believed in
evolutionary change. In this sense Liberals had lost their' political innocence' from the
'conscience' politics of the early days of the Party. Liberals had the attitude that they were
compelled to act in a situation where apartheid was totally at odds with liberal western ideas of
democracy. Their feelings of compulsion had, by the late 1950s, moved away from primarily
trying to influence the white electorate to a closer identification with black political causes.
Another aspect of this study were the changing perceptions of liberalism as Liberals became
increasingly active in the extra-parliamentary field. This study has focussed on liberals in the
LP, and does not take into account liberals in the United Party, the Progressive Party or
elsewhere. This is an example of the problem of defining the meaning of 'liberal'. Furthennore,
little analysis is made of African liberals in the ANC. The liberalism of the LP by the 1960s
constituted a radical strand of South African liberalism. According to Everatt, 'the LP does not
offer the simple opportunity to analyse South African liberals and liberalism: rather, throughout
its existence, the Liberal Party maintained an internal critique of the methods and application of
liberalism in South Africa. '1 It was the evolution of a radical liberalism which was not simply
trying to preserve pockets of liberalism in an illiberal society, but one which sought to create a
new society. The Party's policies already had a socialist bias when the priority of its survival
cut short any possible further radicalisation along a social democratic path from the mid-l 960s.
A criticism of the Liberals' approach, even from within the LP's ranks, was they were good at
ends but it was the means which often created problems.
The role of the LP has been marginalised in the historiography of the liberation struggle.
Indeed, the Party did not develop into anything close to a mass movement and it could never
hope to have a following like that of the ANC. But the LP was more than just an irrelevant
pressure group. Although it was too small to ever make a dramatic impact on South African
politics, it was nevertheless the only liberal non-racial political party in South Africa. With
regard to liberals involved in political parties in South Africa, the liberalism of the Progressive
1 D.Everatt. 'The Politics of Nonracialism: White Opposition to Apartheid 1945-1960.', D.Phil.Thesis.
University of Oxford, 1990, p.219.
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and United Parties did not espouse non-racialism in the same sense as the LP did. Furthermore,
the radical liberalism of the LP fought for the unconditional freedom for all the citizens of
South Africa, which was not matched by the Progressive Party nor the United Party. Since the
LP was not controlled by capitalist interests (it was always short of funds and often relied on
contributions from its own members), it was relatively free to support whatever policies it
chose, even those with a socialist bias.
The LP was caught between the rivalries of Afiikaner and African nationalisms, and it could
not easily compete them once violence seemed to be the only answer in the revolutionary
climate of the 1960s. Alan Paton characterised liberalism as an alternative position in the
struggle between the two nationalisms. 2 Liberalism's contribution was to provide another
option in a situation of deepening, violent conflict and it was a 'voice of reason' in a potentially
revolutionary situation. The Liberals had become political activists while defending the values
of liberalism in an attempt to bring about change in South Africa. Liberals, with very few
exceptions, never doubted their adherence to the principle of non-violence. As another sign of
its principled approach, the LP chose to disband in 1968 rather than compromise its principle
of non-racialism. According to Irvine: 'Nonracialism was the Liberal party's guiding principle.
It was its great strength, in the end its only remaining strength. ,3 The Party had begun as a
matter of principle, and so it ended.
2 Quoted in D.Irvine, 'The Liberal Party, 1953-1968' in J.Butler. R.Elphick & D.Welsh (eds),
Democratic Liberalism in South Africa:lts History and Prospects (Cape Town,David Philip,1987),pp.120-121.
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1. Liberal Party Papers
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South African Liberal Association (SALA) and early Liberal Party (LP) (1952-3):
PC 2/2/1/2 Correspondence; Minutes SALA Council meetings in Cape Town.
PC 2/2/1/3 Correspondence over origins ofLP (conducted by Peter Brown).
PC 2/9/11/1 SALA - Correspondence; Minutes of inaugral meeting of the
Natal Regional Association of the SALA, 25 March 1953.
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PC 2/2/8/1 Minutes, 1953 Conference
PC 2/9/26/1 Report of the First National Conference of the South African
Liberal Party, 1953
PC 2/2/411-2 Minutes, 1954 Congress
PC 2/2/4/1 Minutes, 1957 Congress
PC 2/2/5/1 Minutes, 1957 Congress
PC 2/2/5/1 National Organiser's Report, 1957
PC 2/2/4/1 Minutes, 1959 Congress
PC 2/2/5/2 Resolutions, 1959 Congress
PC 2/2/4/1 Minutes, 1960 Congress
PC 2/2/5/3 Resolutions, 1960 Congress
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PC 2/2/4/1 Minutes, 1961 Congress
PC 2/2/6/1 Resolutions, 1961 Congress
PC 2/2/6/2 General file (Minutes, Resolutions, correspondence, etc.): 1962
National Congress
PC 2/2/6/3 General file: 1963 National Congress
PC 2/2/6/4 General file: 1964 National Congress
















PC 2/2/7/1 National Chairman's Reports, 1959-1964.
PC 2/4/16/1-2 'Intimidation', memorandum (and material collected for it) by
the LP, 1962-1965.









PC 2/9/3/6 General File: Minutes, Resolutions, correspondence, etc.
1960
PC 2/9/25/3 Chairman's Report for 1960.
PC 2/9/1/2 H. Meidner (Natal Chairman) notes for Provincial Congress.
PC 2/9/3/7 General File: Minutes, Resolutions, correspondence, etc.
1961-1965
PC 2/9/3/8-12 General File: Minutes, Resolutions, correspondence, etc.
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Natal Provincial Committee and Executive Committee:
1953-1957
PC 2/9/10/2 Minutes.
PC 2/9/1 0/1 Minutes.






Branch Committees in the Natal Division:
1953-1957
PC 2/9/10/3 Natal Division Reports.
PC 2/9/23/1-2 Pietermaritzburg branch Committee, Minutes.
PC 2/9/22/1 Pietermaritzburg Regional Committee, Minutes.
PC 2/9/28/1 Natal Coastal Regional Committee, Minutes.
PC 2/9/17/1 Charlestown branch.
PC 2/9/26/1 Pietermaritzburg branch members 1956.
1958-1961
PC 2/9/28/1 Natal Coastal Regional Committee & AGM, Minutes, 1958.
PC 2/9/23/1 Pietermaritzburg branch Committee, Minutes, 1958-1959.
PC 2/9/23/2 Pietermaritzburg branch, AGM, Minutes, 1958-1960.
PC 2/9/23/3 Pietermaritzburg branch Committee, Minutes, 1961.
PC 2/9/23/3 & PC 2/9/23/5 Pietermaritzburg branch, AGM, Minutes, 1961.
1959-1968
PC 2/9/28/1 Natal Coastal Regional Committee, Minutes.
1962
PC 2/9/23/5 Pietermaritzburg branch, AGM, Minutes.
1965-1968
PC 2/9/23/3 Pietermaritzburg branch Committee, Minutes.
1966-1967
PC 2/9/23/4 Pietermaritzburg branch meetings, Minutes.
Natal Provincial Division:
1957
PC 2/9/13/3 Statement on Native Laws Amendment Bill by Congress Alliance
in Natal.
1962
PC 2/9/1/2 Notes on discussion of Sub-Committee on Regional Organisation in
Natal.
PC 2/9/1/3 Correspondence with National Organisers.
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95 APB 18: Catherine Brubeck (formerly Shallis) interviewed by Randolph
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95 APB 19: Jean Hill interviewed by Randolph Vigne, 15/2/1995.
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96 APB 4: Patrick McKenzie interviewed by Pat Merrett, 8/6/1996.
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i) Principles and Objects of the South Mrican Liberal Association, 1953. 1
South African Liberal Association
PRINCIPLES
ne Association subscribes to the fonowing fundamental tenets:
(i) The 'essential dignity of every human being irrespective of
race, colour or~ and the maintenance of his funda-
mental rights;
(ii) The right of every human being to develop to the fullest
extent· of which he is capable consistent with the rights
of others;
(ill) The maintenance of the rule of law;
(iv) That no person be debarred from participating in the
government and other democratic processes of the country
by reason only of race, colour or creed.
OBJECI'S
The Association's programme, based on the above fundamental
tenets, shall include, inter alia: - .
(i) Equal political rights based on a common franchise ron
for all civilised persons; •
(ii) Freedom of worship, expression, movement, assembly and
association;
(ill) The right to acquire and use skills and to seek employment
freely;
(iv) Access to an independent judiciary;
(v) The application equally to all sections of the population
of compulsory. state-sponsored education;
(vi) The right to own ~d occupy immovable property;
(vii) The right to organise trade unions and other economic
groups and associatioDS.
~e Association will employ only democratic and constitutional
means to achieve the foregoing objects, and will oppose all forms
of totalitarianism such as communism and fascism.
Note.-The CODstitution of the Association has a clause whereby
the Association can"~me a political party should it so desire.
by a two-thirds majority decision of its governing council. When
this is done, an the assets and the prograIDmc of the Association
will become those of the political party.
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Appendix One
ii) Principles and Objects of the Liberal Party adopted in May 1953.2
THE LIBERAL PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA
PRINCIPLES
The Party subscribes to the following fundamental tenets:
(i) The essential dignity of every human being irre~pective of
race, colour or creed, and the maintenance of his funda-
mental rights;
( ii) The right of every human being to develop to the fullest
extent of which he is capable consistent with the rights of
others;
( iii) The maintenance of the rule of law;
(jv) That no person be debarred from participating in the goverr
ment and other democratic processes of the country by reaso•.
only of race, colour or creed.
OBJECTS
The Party's programme, based on the above fundamental tenets,
shall include, inter alia :- .
(i) Equal politicalJights based on a common franchise roll for
all suitably qualified persons:
(ii) Freedom of worship, expression, movement,. assembly and
. ~ssoci~tion; ..
(iii) The right to acquire and use skills and to seek employment
freely;
(iv) Access to an independent judiciary ;
(V) The application equally to all sections of the population of
the principle of compulsory, state-sponsored education:
(vi) The right to own and qccupy immovable property;
( vii) The right to organize trade unions and other economic
groups and associations.
The Party will employ only democratic and cOllstitutio.§l mea~S
to achieve th-e foregoing ohj"ec·ts, and is opposed to all forms .
totalitarianism such as communism and fascism.
The addresses of the Party are:-
CAPE PROVINCE: Parliament Chambers, Parliament Street,
Cape Town (Box 3618).
".
NATAL: clo 10-11 Rand Provident Buildings, 240 Church
Street, Pietermaritzburg.
TRANSVAAL: 511, Auto-Mutual Buildings, 57, De Villiers
Street, Johannesburg (Box 6156).
Iaaued by R. F. Spence, 47, Parliament Street, Cape Town, and printed by
The Rustlea Prese (Pty.) Ltd., Court Road, Wynberg.
2
APC, PC 2/9/17/1, Natal Provincial Division, Correspondence, 1955-1959.
